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ABSTRACT 
 
In this thesis I consider the function of emotion in concept development as conceived 
by Lev Vygotsky.  I offer an argument for considering mental concepts as the 
material product of emotional activity and social relations mediated by speech.  I 
argue for a conception of mental development as arising at the interface of emotional 
activity considered as the neurophysiological activity of the body and speech shared 
in a dialogue.  I attempt to demonstrate how speech in a dialogue obtains the 
development of higher mental functions by simultaneously transforming primary or 
passive emotions into the secondary, social or active emotions that motivate the 
speech for the development of concepts.  To achieve an explanation of this process I 
consider Spinoza’s theory of emotion, conceived as consistent with Vygotsky’s 
interest in that theory in its methodological relation to the Spinozist theory of 
neuroscientist Antonio Damasio.  Following Vygotsky’s ‘testing’ of Spinoza’s theory 
against the Jamesian theory of emotion I ‘test’ Spinoza’s theory in the light of 
Damasio’s interpretation, for the purpose intended by Vygotsky.   
 
In the course of this ‘methodological test’ I reveal the extent to which Vygotsky and 
Damasio agree in their interpretations of Spinoza.  I show that the theory of 
Damasio, except in respect of Spinoza’s notion of active emotion, represents the 
theory of emotion to which Vygotsky would have appealed for his own ‘test’ of 
Spinoza’s theory of emotion as he explains in his monograph.  I show especially that 
Vygotsky is relevant to Damasio in just that part where Damasio’s theory does not 
meet Vygotsky’s objections to the James-Lange theory.  I explore the consequences 
for Damasio of his omissions from his theory of certain crucial parts of Spinoza’s own 
theory significant for Vygotsky and I show that following these omitted parts points to 
iii 
 
a theory of motivation which can only be completed by introducing Vygotsky’s theory 
of concept development.  From the shared Spinozist perspectives of Damasio and 
Vygotsky I develop an explanation of speech motivation.  In this, I explain the 
interaction between concept development and speech when the use of speech is 
motivated by emotional activity as a function of concept development.  I argue that 
the development of social relations and concepts of them can only be traced in 
speech motivated by secondary emotions.   
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For my students 
 
 
 
Theory Z 
1. For the transcenders, peak experiences become the 
most important things in their lives… 
2. They (the transcenders) speak easily, normally, 
naturally, the language of Being (B-language), the 
language…of the Spinozistic level. 
 
Abraham Maslow 
Farther Reaches of Human Nature 
1971 
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GLOSSARY 
 
D = Damasio;  S = Spinoza;  V = Vygotsky 
 
active emotion (S): 
that transition of the emotional experience of pleasure and desire (feeling) and the 
forms of its shared social experience in social relations. 
 
adequate idea (S): 
an idea the ‘intrinsic marks’ (its internal logic) of which makes it sufficient to explain 
its object.  The possible prototype for ‘scientific concept’. 
 
autobiographical self (D): 
conscious experience, including emotional experience created from interactions 
between the social environment including the use of language with the existing core 
self (up to the neocortex including the prefrontal cortex). 
 
common notions (S): 
higher order adequate ideas common to activities of modes of nature of the same 
kind.  The possible prototype for Vygotsky’s ‘word meaning’. 
 
core self (D): 
continuous background conscious emotional experience created from interactions 
between the environment and the existing protoself experience (from the brainstem 
up to the limbic system). 
xii 
 
 
dialogue: 
social relation in which the explanatory speech of the individual motivates the 
explanatory speech of the other by transforming emotional experience.   
 
emotional experience (“perezhivanie”) (V): 
successive experiences which become the means of development. 
 
everyday concept (V): 
phrase used for generalisations from experience referred to by a general or class 
term (same as spontaneous concept). 
 
explanatory concept: 
concept which explains the deductive relations between spontaneous concepts and 
their relation to the objects or data (same as scientific concept). 
 
inadequate idea (S): 
an idea of experience, but made ‘vague’ (S) by excitable passive emotions. 
 
passive emotion (S): 
That emotional experience of pleasure and pain and its more complex social forms, 
rewards and punishments, and praise and blame, when one individual interacts with 
another individual.  
xiii 
 
 
perfection (S): 
reality; the agreement of a developing idea with its object.  The possible prototype of 
Vygotsky’s ‘final’ form.  The prolepsis of a concept.   
 
protoself (D): 
the emotional experience or homeostasis of the body’s interaction with the external 
environment internally refracted through the most primitive parts of the CNS (up to 
the brain stem). 
 
scientific concept (V): 
a concept or theory obtained from the speech used to organise the systematic 
deductive relation between spontaneous concepts to explain objects and events.   
 
transition (S): 
the passage of emotional experience from less activity (passive) to greater activity 
(active) caused by forming adequate ideas.   
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
 
Introductory survey 
In this chapter I make a case for the centrality of Vygotsky’s plan to incorporate an 
explanation of emotional experience into his broader psychology.  I explain why 
Vygotsky’s methodological approach to psychology is particularly suited to an 
explanation and understanding of emotion and its function in his psycholinguistic 
theory of concept development.  I claim that Vygotsky’s understanding of psychology 
is a corrective to the results of quantitative measures in psychology.   
 
The field of enquiry of this research has very broad parameters.  These include its 
scope, relevance and application.  Research in the field of emotional and social 
development is considerable and takes a number of forms, mainly in the social 
sciences but also in biology and philosophy.  It is a principal concern of education.  
The mutually interactive relationship between emotional and social development and 
concept development and hence between the social, economic, political, ethical and 
psychological environment of the student and the student’s own emotional and social 
development makes the educational scope of this field of enquiry of both general and 
particular relevance.  Different forms of social scientific, biological and philosophical 
enquiry may emphasise the broad social dimensions of this relationship while others 
emphasise the personal and individual.  What is interesting is the intersection of 
these dimensions and in particular the interaction between them, that is, between the 
social and the individual.  The focus on this interaction has determined the form of 
this enquiry.  It determines the relevant psychology and methodology, and hence 
also the method of analysis and the form taken by the conclusions.  The researcher 
interested in these problems is not entirely free to design the research the way he 
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wants.  The purpose of the research sets limits to its design.  In this case I have 
followed the manner of enquiry of Lev Vygotsky in my primary source, his 
monograph on the Theory of Emotion (1933).   
 
Research into social development with its roots in quantitative method fields data 
which may allow the researcher to draw conclusions of a general kind and which 
may have general applications.  It is unlikely, however, that quantitative methods can 
give an exhaustive account of the phenomenon researched.  Such an account can 
only give an explanation in quantitative terms which have only general applications.  
That is to say, an explanation given which, because it is quantitative can only give 
evidence for what can be quantified, determines the overall form and result of the 
research.  For example, the researcher’s commitment concerning psychology may, if 
he is a behaviourist, limit his research to data from observed behaviour.  Although 
research can approach the phenomenon from several different angles and a general 
theory explaining the data can be created, an exhaustive account of the 
phenomenon cannot be obtained from quantitative data alone.  In the relations 
between the social environment and the individual what is salient is the interaction 
itself.  It is the qualitative changes which constitute the interaction which is the 
phenomenon that requires an explanation.  This phenomenon is the crucible in which 
the interaction between the social and the individual arises.  Vygotsky came to the 
view that this crucible was ‘emotional experience’.   
 
The phenomenon under investigation in this thesis is the interaction between 
emotion, concept development and the social environment and what form an 
explanation of the interaction of these would take.   
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In psychology, very broadly speaking, quantitative research depends upon a theory 
of mental phenomena which is either on the one hand phenomenological and 
introspective or on the other behavioural and observed.  Psychoanalysis can be 
regarded as phenomenological in that research depends upon the gathering of 
personal data describing or expressing a ‘subjective’, ‘inner’ or phenomenological 
mental state.  The strategy of behaviourism and physiological psychology on the 
other hand, in claiming to be ‘objective’ and ‘scientific’, depends on treating the 
‘mental’ as a black box and the gathering of data of observed behaviour so that it 
may be quantified.  Both of these approaches illustrate how quantitative approaches 
to understanding and explaining mental phenomena have the effect of determining 
how one is to understand mental phenomena themselves.  To avoid this problem 
Lev Vygotsky worked out a theory of psychological explanation which was neither 
‘introspective’, as in the case of psychoanalysis, nor methodologically reductive, as 
in the case of behaviourism and physiological psychology.  By demonstrating, for 
example, how social speech, the child’s imitating of adult speech, is ‘interiorized’, 
Vygotsky succeeded in demonstrating the social nature of mental phenomena and 
the social and cultural origins of mental phenomena.  Unlike physiologically or 
behaviourally oriented psychology, which treats ‘mind’ as equivalent with observable 
behaviour and has nothing to say about ‘concepts’, imagination, the range of 
emotional experience, or language or regards these as some kind of epiphenomena 
or supervenient phenomena, Vygotsky was able to do justice to the insights of 
phenomenology and psychoanalysis without reducing the psychological to the 
hidden domain of the subjective, the spiritual, the soul.  At the same time as doing 
justice to the ‘inner life’ of the individual he was able to demystify the psychological, 
to ‘explicate’ it, and to show it as natural phenomena accessible to scientific enquiry 
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with the rest of nature.  Hence it is to the psychology of Vygotsky one must turn if the 
relations between emotional experience and social development are to be 
understood.  Throughout the thesis I explain emotional experience in terms of 
Vygotsky’s psychology and to do this I refer principally to his unfinished monograph 
on this subject in Chapter 2. 
 
I have argued that the ‘data’ depend upon notions of science and scientific method.  
Necessarily, Vygotsky was innovative in scientific method in psychology exactly as 
he was innovative in explaining the psychological.  Hence in addition to turning to 
Vygotsky’s monograph on emotion for an understanding of the interaction I am 
interested in explaining I shall offer an explanation of his ‘unit of analysis’ beginning 
in Chapter 4.  I will develop both Vygotsky’s theory of emotion and his unit of 
analysis in this thesis.   
 
Vygotsky’s understanding of scientific method is saturated with observations 
concerning methodology.  His understanding of the psychological is of a piece with 
these observations.  For example, when Vygotsky writes about ‘tools’ or the ‘tool-
use’ of language he at once exhibits methodology in psychology as itself 
psychological.  Hence a good part of the substance of Vygotsky’s psychological 
writings is concerning methodology or the theory or philosophy of method.  
Vygotsky’s solution to the problems of psychoanalysis and phenomenology on the 
one hand and physiological psychology and behaviourism on the other, a bifurcation 
of psychological science he accounts for in terms of ‘descriptive’ versus ‘explanatory’ 
psychology, is found in his various methodological enquiries and also in his 
monograph on the emotions.  Vygotsky’s treatment of the study of emotion is 
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therefore at once methodological and psychological.  Surveying the development of 
psychology itself Vygotsky finds that explanatory psychology and descriptive 
psychology each falls on one side or the other of the philosophical problem of 
dualism.  In his search for a solution to this philosophical problem Vygotsky finds a 
solution to the problem of psychology in the philosophy of Spinoza.  Throughout his 
monograph on the emotions Vygotsky examines the rival ontological and 
epistemological claims of dualism and monism.  Monism, as argued by Spinoza, is 
ontologically consistent with any attempt to give a naturalistic explanation of 
psychological phenomena.  To put it another way psychological explanation 
presupposes monism.  Dualism in philosophy lies at the foundation of the problems 
of psychology both in its methodology and in its understanding of the mind, body, 
emotions, imagination, knowledge, belief and hence also, and central to the purpose 
of my thesis, learning, social interaction and an understanding of social, ethical, legal 
and political norms.  Spinoza did not hesitate to draw from philosophical monism the 
most radical conclusions and neither did Vygotsky.  Hence in Vygotsky’s writings on 
the emotions is found drawn together enquiries concerning methodological monism, 
a solution to the problems of psychology and a theory of emotion informed by the 
philosophy and psychology of Spinoza.  This apparently disparate material will 
furnish the unit of analysis in its completed form in Chapter 9.  In this sense the unit 
of analysis is itself a scientific concept, rich in potential interactions with other 
concepts as understood by Vygotsky.   
 
Because his monograph was unfinished Vygotsky was unable to offer his own 
conclusion to his enquiries.  In any case his enquiries discovered difficulties for 
which solutions could not be found in the contemporary psychology of the 1930s.  
Nonetheless various commentators have suggested the lines of enquiry Vygotsky 
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might have followed and I shall review these conclusions with the principal aim of 
constructing a version of his Spinozist theory of emotions to serve as the theoretical 
basis for a suggested unit of analysis in Chapter 9.  To achieve this I shall turn to a 
contemporary neuroscientist who shares Vygotsky’s interest in Spinoza.  I shall 
argue that a consideration of the theory of Antonio Damasio resolves the principal 
difficulties encountered by Vygotsky.  In making this argument I shall show the 
relevance of Vygotsky to contemporary neuroscience and also the limits of 
Vygotsky’s socio-cultural determinism.   
 
I will be unable to go so far as to employ Vygotsky’s psychology as a program of 
action.  Interpretations of his psychology as action theory are true to the unity of 
methodology and psychology, of ‘tool’ and ‘result’ he sought.  This is an exciting 
conception of scientific enquiry as praxis, as continuous resolution and explanation.  
My conception of Vygotsky’s psychology is limited by the necessity first, to furnish a 
unit of analysis consistent with his theory of emotion and second, to ‘test’ the 
coherence of that unit of analysis with the theory (Chapter 6) in a way consistent with 
Vygotsky’s thought that no more reliable ‘criticism of Spinoza than a testing of his 
ideas’ would yield (Vygotsky, 1999: 104-105).  Separating out the theory from the 
test of the theory has positivist undertones but I do not think this can or should be 
avoided and clarity is obtained by separating out, in some explicit form, the 
development of theory from its applications.  A theory, thus conceived, is a method 
of explanation, an explanation of some phenomenon, some datum of experience.  If 
the datum is explained by the theory, the theory is corroborated and the theory is 
better corroborated the more data it can explain.  In this case the method I employ in 
Chapter 6 follows Vygotsky’s own explorations of the relation of methodology to 
psychology.  The principal purpose of this study is to discover how the product 
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function of the unit of analysis makes explicit the interaction of emotion with concept, 
including social concept, development.  I shall have achieved my objective if I can 
exhibit and explain the relation of emotion to concepts and social concepts by this 
means.  I shall seek to explain and exhibit how emotions motivate the use of 
language in its social, shared use and how from this emotionally motivated sharing of 
language, social concepts develop.  In short I shall argue that emotion is a function 
in the development of concepts and that concepts, including social concepts, are 
emotionally motivated linguistic constructs.   
 
Because it does not engage with the qualitative, a quantitative, positivist psychology 
does not engage with the mental in any but its surface, concretised forms.  When the 
educational development of young people is measured in these forms, only an 
incomplete and partial understanding of their development is possible and when the 
measurement of mental and social development is obtained from the results of 
educational tests and examinations not only is the professional and adult 
understanding of young people incomplete but where the educational experience of 
young people is organised principally to meet the demands of quantitative measures 
so that a large part of the educational experience of the young person is served by 
meeting these demands, the mental, emotional and social development of young 
people is itself utterly impoverished by these very means.   
 
If I can demonstrate how social concepts can only be formed in social relations and 
in relations between the young person and others in schools of such a kind that 
fosters their development in the way explained, it will follow that obstacles to these 
relations will hinder the development of those concepts, and hence hinder mental 
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and emotional development.  Conversely I will attempt to explain how the function of 
emotion in social relations simultaneously fosters the development of concepts and 
why there can be no concept development without emotional development.   
 
Result 
I have marshalled my thoughts in order to persuade my reader that emotion is 
central to mental development, that it serves a function in the development of 
concepts that Vygotsky wanted to explain, and that quantitative psychological 
explanations cannot fully comprehend the part emotional experience has in mental 
functioning.   
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CHAPTER 2:  REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
Introductory survey 
The subject of this chapter is my principal primary source, Vygotsky’s unfinished 
manuscript or monograph, Theory of Emotion.  It was written between 1931 and 
1933 as Vygotsky turned to the consideration of emotion in mental functioning.  
Some of its ideas reappear in two of his shorter works in 1932 and 1934 but its 
theme reappears in the final chapter of his last masterpiece, Thought and Language 
(1934).  A small part of the monograph appeared for the first time in Voprosy filosofii 
in 1970, and in Soviet Studies in Philosophy in 1972 under the title “Spinoza’s 
Theory of the Emotions in Light of Contemporary Psychoneurology”, a sentence 
adapted from the text.  The monograph appeared complete in English, in 1999 as 
the main part of Volume 6, Scientific Legacy, Collected Works of L S Vygotsky.  The 
purpose of this chapter is to offer a review of this monograph and to offer an 
appraisal of its conclusions, principally to show how favourably Vygotsky regarded 
Spinoza’s philosophy but also to understand why the monograph appeared to be 
unfinished.   
 
In this chapter I begin research of the theoretical problem of the interaction of 
emotion with the development of social concepts through a review of the literature 
crucial to its understanding.  I shall do this with the expectation of articulating a 
theory of emotion and a unit of analysis which interacts with the development of 
social concepts in such a way that the development of social concepts is explained 
by the theory of emotion and the unit of analysis.  In Chapter 1 a case was made for 
seeking an understanding of emotion in the psychology of Vygotsky.  The principal 
reason argued was that the psychology of Vygotsky furnished a method of 
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explanation of mental phenomena which is the crucible, or as he would call it, the 
‘cell’ or ‘unit’ of the interaction.  However, Vygotsky’s monograph on his theory of 
emotion was unfinished at his death.   
 
I shall begin this review with reviews of the claim that Vygotsky’s monograph on the 
emotions is unfinished.  I shall isolate what is thought by various commentators to be 
the principal argument of that monograph.  This will be followed by a survey of what 
seems to me to be the principal component and subsidiary arguments of the 
monograph.  There are arguments concerning (1) a problem of psychology at the 
time Vygotsky was writing; (2) problems of methodology and (3) the problem of the 
James-Lange theory of emotion.  I shall outline the relevance of each argument to 
later parts of this thesis but I shall conclude this review with an initial description of 
the version of Vygotsky’s theory of emotion derived from his monograph and further 
informed by consideration of remarks made by Vygotsky elsewhere in his writings.   
 
Reviews of Vygotsky’s monograph:  it is said to be unfinished: 
Vygotsky’s monograph on the theory of the emotions has been reviewed by 
commentators seeking to establish the direction of his research and how this may 
have contributed to the further development of his psychology.  They agree that the 
monograph is unfinished but give different reasons.  Theory of Emotion (1933) was 
written a year before the publication of Thought and Language and although the 
latter work may have been compiled from sources pre-dating Theory of Emotion its 
conclusions give some indication of the direction of Vygotsky’s thought.  In the final 
chapter of Thought and Language Vygotsky reviews the reasons he “replaced 
analysis into elements by analysis into units” (Vygotsky, 1986: 211) and explains 
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how the unit captures the properties of thought under investigation.  Rather than 
associating words to meanings where meanings are treated as mental entities and 
driven beyond analysis, meanings, that is, concepts, are discovered in word use, in 
speech.  But it is only at the very end of that final chapter that Vygotsky comes to 
‘the last step in our analysis’ and there adds:  “Behind every thought there is an 
affective-volitional tendency, which holds the answer to the last ‘why’ in the analysis 
of thinking” (Vygotsky, 1986: 252).  In his introduction to the MIT edition of this work 
Alex Kozulin argues, therefore, that Vygotsky “was aware of the possible one-
sidedness of his research program, which was devoted almost exclusively to the 
development of intellectual functions” and that “it is not surprising, therefore, that one 
of the last works of Vygotsky, which remained unfinished, addressed the problem of 
emotions” (Vygotsky, 1986: xli).  Though “it remained in the form of an unfinished 
manuscript” (Yaroshevsky, 1989: 299), yet “He only made certain preparations for 
the future” (1989: 299).  Again, “this chapter was not completed by Vygotsky” 
(Robbins, 1999, p ix); “he had no time to deeply develop his ideas” (Rey, 2009, p 
66); “Vygotsky’s manuscript is incomplete” (Van Der Veer and Valsiner, 1991, p 
357). 
 
Why is it unfinished? 
It is possible that the manuscript was simply left incomplete “just as many other 
projects of Vygotsky” (Yaroshevsky, 1989: 299).  On the other hand “Vygotsky 
clearly believed that Spinoza did not have all of the answers to solving future 
psychological problems of emotions” (Robbins, 1999, p ix) and “he turned to the 
works of Spinoza only to find that the answers did not lie there” (Van der Veer and 
Valsiner, 1991: 359).  Both Yaroshevsky and Van der Veer and Valsiner claim that 
Spinoza’s psychology and philosophy lacks a developmental theory.  Van der Veer 
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and Valsiner maintain that Vygotsky appeals to the monistic unity of psychological 
phenomena found in Spinoza and that his naturalistic determinism offers a context in 
which the relations between lower and higher emotions can be resolved into one 
unified naturalistic account.  But, they insist, this unity permits no explanation in 
terms of development (Van der Veer and Valsiner, 1991: 359) and this concept is 
central to explanation in Vygotsky’s psychology.  Yaroshevsky goes further 
(Yaroshevsky, 1999: 265).  Throughout his writings Vygotsky has sought to give 
causal explanations which do not reduce to what Yaroshevsky calls 
‘mechanodeterminism’, the kind of determinism found in Descartes and in his 
treatment of the lower emotions.  This is enough to dismiss the relevance of 
Descartes in accounting for the higher emotions as I explain below (2.1).  At least in 
Darwin determinism has taken a new form, what Yaroshevsky calls ‘biodeterminism’.  
Biological determinism underpins a good part of psychology but precisely because of 
this, physiological psychology is unable to account for higher emotions either, even if 
the account given of the primitive or ‘lower’ emotions is complete.  What Spinoza 
furnishes Vygotsky is a monistic determinism in which a psychological account of the 
change from lower to higher emotions can be coherently explained and in a 
thoroughly naturalistic theory.  Despite this, Yaroshevsky contends, it is the 
“historical-cultural context of his activity” (Yaroshevsky, 1999: 265) and not his 
‘biological nature’ from which arises the emotions.  Hence Yaroshevsky argues 
Vygotsky’s psychology advances from ‘biodeterminism’ to ‘sociodeterminism’ and it 
is in the ‘process of social life’ that the emotions develop.  Hence while Vygotsky in 
his earlier research “concentrated on cognitive processes (perception, memory, 
speech) as parts of a whole, then at this point, the problem of feelings, experiences 
and affects moved to the centre of analysis” (Yaroshevsky 1999: 265).  But, 
according to Yaroshevsky, Vygotsky “never speaks of the limitations” of Spinoza, 
that Spinoza’s theory “was constructed on the basis of naturalism and not 
 13 
historicism”.  Hence, according to Yaroshevsky, Spinoza’s determinism lacks the 
socio-cultural moorings or the historical determinist context in which the concept of 
development makes psychological sense.  However, Yaroshevsky does not dismiss 
Vygotsky’s interest in Spinoza at this point:  “It may be that the concluding part of the 
work not only would have disclosed the greatness of Spinoza’s contribution but 
would have provided a critical analysis of his teaching” (Yaroshevsky 1999: 264).  
Kozulin also suggests that Vygotsky would have drawn “parallels between Spinoza’s 
synthetic approach and his own” (Kozulin, 1986: xlii).  Where Van der Veer and 
Valsiner survey Yaroshevsky’s three levels of determinism (Van der Veer and 
Valsiner, 1991: 358) they point out that failure in one level of explanation does not 
rule out explanation at another level, even if, as they maintain, Vygotsky’s socio-
cultural theory is not dissimilar to ‘modern social constructionist’ theories of emotion.   
 
In conclusion it would seem that while the monograph is indeed thought by expert 
opinion to be unfinished it is partly because it is thought Vygotsky would not have 
been able to reconcile Spinoza’s account of the emotions with his own socio-cultural 
theory of development.  On the other hand, whether Vygotsky would have achieved 
this is actually left an open question by Kozulin and Yaroshevsky.  In what follows I 
shall review Vygotsky’s monograph and pay special attention to this particular 
difficulty.  Understanding this difficulty is a preliminary to understanding the 
interaction between emotion and social development.   
 
The principal arguments of Theory of Emotion: 
According to Langford “The aim of the text as a whole is to criticise the James-Lange 
theory of emotions and put in its place Spinoza’s theory of emotion rightly 
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understood” (Langford, 2005: 105).  Although “Vygotsky’s lengthy manuscript had a 
complex structure”, Van der Veer and Valsiner (1991:350) agree that it begins with a 
discussion of the James-Lange theory of emotion, proceeds to a demonstration that 
the James-Lange theory is Cartesian and concludes with a demonstration of the 
advantages of Spinoza’s own theory.  I shall not depart from these considerations 
but I shall review the text principally attending to Vygotsky’s remarks concerning 
Spinoza as they have a bearing on (1) a problem of psychology that interested 
Vygotsky; (2) methodology and (3) the James-Lange theory.   
 
2.1   A problem of psychology 
Indicated above (p 13) Kozulin and Yaroshevsky independently suggested that the 
problem of psychology Vygotsky was approaching towards the end of Thought and 
Language and which he explores in the Theory of Emotion led him again to Spinoza.  
The problem centred on the “debate between ‘physiological (explanatory) 
psychology’ and ‘descriptive (understanding) psychology’ and the study of feelings.  
From this struggle, too, flows Vygotsky’s interest in Spinoza for he saw in Spinoza a 
thinker who anticipated the removal of this false antithesis” (Gal’perin, 1972: 364). 
 
The target of Vygotsky’s argument is the reasons given by contemporary 
psychologists, W Dilthey and H Munsterberg, for claiming that the differences 
between physiological psychology on the one hand and descriptive psychology on 
the other are irreconcilable.  A review of this particular problem as it is understood by 
Vygotsky will help to make clear the nature of the theoretical problem concerning 
emotion and its unit of analysis which I attend to later.   
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Put directly the difference between explanatory psychology and descriptive 
psychology lies in the difference between conceptions of the mental and the 
methods of accounting for it which have their roots in the theory of emotion of 
Descartes.  Vygotsky offers a thorough examination of Descartes’ theory in order to 
exhibit later the significance of Spinoza to his argument.  But it is not necessary to 
review the success of this argument.  It is sufficient to show that Descartes’ 
argument for the cogito, for introspection, led him to dualism, and that if a foundation 
for the natural sciences is to be laid, the relations between objects of experience 
must be explained in terms of concepts which cannot themselves be such objects.  
Hence the world divides into two domains, the physical and the mental.  For 
Descartes some emotions, the basic, sensual, lower, can be explained in natural 
scientific terms as arising from the actions of the body.  Higher emotions of love, 
devotion, imagination, must arise from the sublime contents of the mind, cannot be 
explained in sensory terms and hence must be fundamentally different from basic, 
primary emotions of fear, joy, and sadness.  With this argument Descartes 
bequeathed to science the philosophical entrenchment of dualism and this appears 
in the distinction as solid today as in Vygotsky’s day, between explanatory and 
descriptive psychology.   
 
By explanatory psychology is meant physiological psychology, naturalistic, causal 
psychology.  Modern variants would be cognitive science and behaviourism.  In this 
case the psychologist, if he is a behaviourist, treats mental phenomena as a variable 
intervening between independent and dependent variables.  If he is a behaviourist 
his data consists in observations of ‘bits’ of behaviour and the correlations between 
them.  This permits a causal explanation of the causes and effects of behaviour and 
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a theoretical explanation of behaviour in terms of ‘conditioned reflex’ and the effects 
of ‘intermittent conditioning’, ‘inhibition’, ‘extinction’ and so forth.  If he is a cognitive 
psychologist he straightforwardly collects data as reports of introspective states of 
consciousness.  The subject becomes a ‘simple observer’ of the ‘contents’ of his own 
thoughts.  From the collection of this data the ‘totality of the contents of 
consciousness’ can be used to explain behaviour in causal terms.  That is, more 
complex behaviour can be explained in terms of more basic reports or behaviour 
already explained.  Dilthey and Munsterberg claimed that physiological or 
explanatory psychology could not explain more complex reports except in terms of a 
reduction to more simple ones.  With respect to emotions they claimed that reports of 
higher emotions were either explained in terms of a reduction to basic emotions or 
were incapable of explanation in physiological terms.  Critics of explanatory 
psychology argued for the rival, descriptive, ‘understanding’, phenomenological, 
teleological psychology concerning itself with ‘intentional’ states, meaning and 
purpose.  They claimed explanatory psychology was either crudely reductionist or 
that it simply failed to explain mental experience.  Their claim was that mental 
experience could not be decomposed into verbal data and analysed.  Mental 
experience, especially emotional experience, they claimed, could not be reproduced 
voluntarily, hence introspective reports of mental states are completely unreliable as 
sources of scientific data.   
 
Descriptive psychology pursues an ‘investigation of spiritual activity as a completely 
autonomous part of reality, which lies outside nature’, and which calls for evidence of 
our powers of understanding.  Higher mental states and higher emotions especially 
can only be understood as intentional, ‘willed’ or purposive.  Particular mental states 
can only be understood as part of the inner life of the person having them.  They 
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form elements of a coherent mental life and the particular experiences of the life of 
that person.  It is possible to give an account of mental life only when one 
understands the intentions of the actor, that is those interests, objects and activities 
that engage the attention and life experience of the actor in a purposive way.  It is 
impossible to understand the actor’s experience of his mental life without 
understanding the meaning to him of these objects and activities.  And it is only in 
my understanding that the mental life of another is disclosed to me.  If I understand 
why the other person laughs it is because I understand too, in an instant, that the 
joke is funny.  If I have to have explained to me why the joke is funny then I did not 
understand it.  So too with love, the other understands that I love them.  If I tried to 
explain love in terms solely of my own physical sensations of pleasure or pain I 
would show that I did not understand love.  No satisfactory account can be given of 
these experiences by an explanation in terms solely of the physiology of the body or 
neurological activity of the brain.  To attempt to give such an explanation would show 
that I did not understand mental life and that I did not have a theory sufficient to 
comprehending any but sensual love, for example.  The most therefore that can be 
expected from psychology is a phenomenological description of inner mental states.   
 
Some investigators have interpreted Spinoza in just this way.  In his annotations of 
Spinoza’s correspondence A. Wolf thinks Spinoza’s account of his own method 
“suggests the phenomenological method of Husserl” (Wolf, 1966; 432) for in one of 
his letters for example, Spinoza says “method … consists, namely, only in the 
knowledge of the pure understanding” and that “to understand this, at least as far as 
the method requires, there is no need to know the nature of the mind through its first 
cause” (Letter XXXVII; Wolf, 1966; 228). 
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‘Idealistic interpreters’ can give a phenomenological interpretation of these kinds of 
words of Spinoza if first they reduce Spinozism to parallelism and then set aside 
Spinoza’s “analysis of bodily processes” (Vygotsky, 1999; 124).  In this case ‘bodily 
processes’ would simply run parallel to or duplicate mental processes.  In this case 
two Cartesian substances and the phenomenological, introspective reduction would 
therefore be sufficient to account for mental phenomena.  Unlike ‘idealistic 
interpreters’ Vygotsky understands very well that for Spinoza mental processes 
cannot be understood without relation to the body nor by anyone “unless previously 
he is sufficiently acquainted with the nature of our body” (Eth. II. 13, Sch.).  For 
Vygotsky the removal of a phenomenological interpretation of Spinoza removes also 
the claims of idealism and lays bare Spinoza’s ‘essentially materialistic’ ontology.   
 
Hence it would appear an unbridgeable gulf divides explanatory from descriptive 
psychology.  On the one hand explanatory psychology can give a causal explanation 
but cannot explain higher emotions without falling foul of reductionism and on the 
other hand descriptive psychology can account for higher emotions but cannot give a 
genuinely causal or scientific account of mental functions or those higher emotions.  
But, Vygotsky observes, though Munsterberg thinks psychology contains these lines 
of enquiry mixed in an arbitrary manner, and though explanatory and descriptive 
psychology must therefore have ‘something in common between them’, Munsterberg 
and contemporary psychology are completely unable to account for the relation 
between these lines of enquiry.  Meanwhile, Vygotsky also observes the dialectically 
antagonistic proponents of both descriptive and explanatory psychology each 
appeals to the psychology of Spinoza for their own purposes, whilst at the same time 
actually departing from his solution (Vygotsky, 1999: 222) and it is at this juncture he 
says “we must extract something significant to our purposes from the fact of 
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coincidence of two opposite teachings in one tendency toward Spinozist thought” 
(Vygotsky, 1999: 220).   
 
2.2 Problems of methodology 
Vygotsky says ‘tendency towards’ Spinozist thought because he argues that the 
division of psychology into its explanatory and descriptive schools has arisen 
precisely because each has departed from Spinozist thought, and in the direction of 
one or other side of the theory of emotions of Descartes. However while “Spinoza 
resists all of contemporary descriptive psychology as its irreconcilable opponent” and 
“it was specifically Spinoza who fought for a natural, deterministic, materialist, causal 
explanation of human passions”, nonetheless in accounting for the “higher in the 
emotional life of man”, “Spinoza’s teaching is actually on the side” of descriptive 
psychology (Vygotsky, 1999; 222).  The relation of explanatory to descriptive 
psychology was, it seems, something of a paradox.  On the one hand explanatory 
psychology gave a causal explanation of the lower emotions but was unable to give 
the same explanation for the occurrence of higher mental functions and the higher 
emotions, while on the other hand, descriptive, phenomenological psychology, able 
to give a description of higher mental functions and their higher emotions, was 
unable to account for them in causal terms, when for Vygotsky “true knowledge is 
possible only as causal knowledge” (Vygotsky, 1999; 181).  For Vygotsky then the 
problem is a methodological one, one of a deterministic, causal explanation of the 
higher emotions.  For Vygotsky, the solution is to be found in an interpretation of 
Spinoza which resolves these two sides of the paradox but “The problems of 
Spinoza await their solution, without which tomorrow’s day in our psychology is 
impossible” (Vygotsky, 1999; 222), and it was these problems that Vygotsky sought 
to solve. 
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Philosophically, the solutions to these problems are to be found in Spinoza’s monism 
for there, not only is found a unified naturalistic theory of the lower and higher 
emotions but also a theory of explanation which is causal.  The ‘problems of 
Spinoza’ are that he does not write as a scientific psychologist and this is principally 
owing to the metaphysical cast of his work.  But this problem and the more specific 
problems concerning the relation of causal explanation to phenomenological 
experience will find its solution in the “convergence of philosophy with psychology 
and a very deep transformation of the whole structure and content of contemporary 
philosophical and psychological investigation” (Vygotsky, 1999; 231).  Vygotsky 
insists that his investigation is part of this endeavour.  His interest in Spinoza is 
fundamental to an understanding of his whole project.  I have already argued that 
Vygotsky did not demarcate the boundary between methodology and psychology in 
any explicit way.  For him resolving the problems of methodology is of a piece with 
resolving the problems of psychology for, as Deleuze says of Spinoza’s method and 
which could equally be said of Vygotsky’s, “The aim is not to make something known 
to us, but to make us understand our power of knowing” (Deleuze, 1988; 83).  
Vygotsky’s ambition was to create a vast unified psychological science 
encompassing within one causal deterministic theory an explanation of mental 
phenomena inclusive of the whole range of its physiological and social conditions.  
“Consciousness must not be separated from its physical conditions; they comprise 
one natural whole that must be studied as such” (Vygotsky, 1999; 228).  Although 
Vygotsky does not anywhere explain the relation of language to emotion in his 
monograph, looking ahead to the relation of Theory of Emotion to Thought and 
Language, “Thought and speech turn out to be the key to the nature of 
consciousness” (Vygotsky, 1986; 256).  That is to say consciousness or mental life 
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cannot be explained as if it lay outside nature, as if it existed, as Spinoza says 
concerning the emotions in a line often quoted by Vygotsky, “as a kingdom within a 
kingdom” (Eth. III: Pref.).  Once causal explanation is understood in Spinoza, an 
‘adequate idea’ of the relation of the mind to the body follows (Eth. II: 13) and hence 
also “the knowledge of the union which the mind has with the whole of nature” (Corr. 
Und., II.13).  Vygotsky’s interpretation of Spinoza is intended to transform Spinoza’s 
philosophical solution of the problem of dualism into his own scientific solution to the 
problem of psychology concerning the emotions.  That is, where in Spinoza the 
understanding of the union of the mind and nature lies in his readers’ understanding 
of his theory of knowledge, in Vygotsky this is shown in the relation of thought to 
speech.  Vygotsky approaches this in demonstrating the social and hence material 
origins of mind.  When I explain this more fully below I shall explore the 
underdetermination of language as Vygotsky’s scientific rendering of Spinoza’s 
concept of ‘intuition’.  Hence the ‘possible one-sidedness of his research program’ 
referred to by Kozulin (Vygotsky, 1986; xli) already contains the ‘key’ to the solution 
of the problem in two significant respects.   
 
Firstly, Vygotsky already in his earlier work explains thought as an infolding or 
interiorisation of language and hence the main part of the solution is found in his ‘unit 
of analysis’.  Secondly, in his interest in the distinction between ‘meaning’ and 
‘sense’, towards the end of Thought and Language, Vygotsky remarks upon the 
transformation of meaning to ‘affective sense’ of words and sentences and the 
“affective-volitional tendency, which holds the last ‘why’ in the analysis of thinking” 
(Vygotsky, 1986; 245, 252).   
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Vygotsky does not think he will find in Spinoza a ‘ready theory meeting the needs of 
contemporary scientific knowledge’ but he does think “that in our hands there is no 
more reliable and powerful weapon for a criticism of Spinoza than a testing of his 
ideas in the light of contemporary scientific knowledge” (Vygotsky, 1999; 104-105).  
Hence, contrary to the conclusions of Van der Veer and Valsiner referred to above 
(page 11), Vygotsky did indeed expect to ‘find the answers’ to the problem of the 
psychology of the emotions in the philosophy of Spinoza.   
 
At this stage it is reasonable to argue that since Vygotsky did not think that the 
emotions could be explained by either of the schools of psychology dominant in his 
day, an account of the emotions consistent with his own theory of emotion will not be 
found in either or even ‘mixed’ in both of them.  It follows therefore that for this study 
neither a solely phenomenological nor a physiological psychological approach would 
be admissible.  However, since Vygotsky must have been interested in finding a 
solution to the problem of the psychology of the emotions as part of his own program 
in psychology, I might expect to find in either of these approaches an account or 
partial account of the emotions consistent with the body of Vygotsky’s psychology as 
a whole.   
 
The interest Vygotsky had in the psychology of the emotions was not for him an 
historical problem anymore than the interest of this problem is a problem of the 
history of psychology.  A Vygotskian account of the emotions therefore lands neither 
between the schools of explanatory and descriptive psychology of Vygotsky’s day 
nor between any recent developments in psychology as a ‘third way’.   
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Because for Vygotsky the solution to the problem of the psychology of the emotions 
lies in the dialectical relation between the two sides of the Cartesian divide as it 
unfolded in Vygotsky’s day, turning to Spinoza for a monistic resolution of this divide 
is not simply a matter of forcing them into a methodologically monistic mould but of 
locating the unit or cell in just that fertile system of philosophy in which the resolution 
can be found.  Locating this unit of analysis will not be found in quantitative methods.  
These entrench each perspective in lines of psychological enquiry, which, while each 
is undeniably creative and productive, nonetheless diverge in opposite directions.  
The cell, unit or crucible, calls for a qualitative method of enquiry.  By this means it 
may be possible to determine whether such a cell can be located, and in the effort to 
locate it, observe the qualitative changes that make it such a cell. 
 
These preliminary results of this section of this review suggests an approach that is 
constrained by Spinoza’s ontology, namely monism, interpreted by Vygotsky as a 
form of materialism, that will appeal neither to phenomenological introspection nor 
physiological psychology, that will be qualitative and not quantitative or reductionist.   
 
2.3   Problems of the James-Lange theory 
In the previous two sections I have argued that Vygotsky did not think that a 
satisfactory or complete theory of emotion could be obtained either from psychology 
oriented towards physiology (explanatory psychology) or towards phenomenology 
(descriptive psychology).  Each theory was incomplete in just that element contained 
in the other theory and so Vygotsky sought a theory of emotion which explained the 
whole range of mental phenomena in one comprehensive psychology.  But none of 
his analysis shows Vygotsky dismissing either type of psychology but on the contrary 
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Vygotsky makes an effort to find how they may be rendered coherent one with the 
other.  Since Vygotsky finds both trends in psychology make appeals to Spinoza he 
finds in Spinoza’s philosophy first, a psychology which is inclusive of the phenomena 
explained by both physiological and phenomenological psychologies separately, and 
secondly, offers the methodological solution to the dualism that divided the 
physiological from the phenomenological.  By separating the relevant parts of the 
monograph I think I have shown as clearly as possible that for Vygotsky, (1) the 
problem of psychology finds its terminus in Spinoza and (2) the problem of 
methodology also finds its solution in Spinoza.   
 
In addition to these two concurrent arguments, throughout the monograph Vygotsky 
also analysed the claims of physiological and phenomenological psychologies as 
they met the challenge of the famous theory of emotion advanced independently by 
William James and Carl Lange.  The James-Lange theory is prominent in his 
monograph because the “accepted view was to see in it a vital scientific realisation of 
Spinoza’s ideas” (Vygotsky, 1999; 120).  Because, as I have shown above, Vygotsky 
argued that Spinoza’s theory was ‘fruitful not only for the present but also for the 
future of our science’ one might expect Vygotsky’s analysis of the James-Lange 
theory to have been favourable.  But this is not the case.  Vygotsky sets about his 
analysis with the intention of refuting the James-Lange theory.  I shall show in this 
part at what points he does this and show how his counter-arguments may serve as 
elements of his own theory of emotion.   
 
Vygotsky gives an account of the James-Lange theory in neurological terms 
describing how ‘afferent impulses are directed to the cortex’, where ‘centrifugal’, that 
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is motor or efferent “excitations arise directed to the muscles and internal organs’.  
These bring on changes which afferent or receptor nerves ‘return again to the cortex 
and owing to this the object simply perceived is converted into an emotionally 
experienced object” (Vygotsky, 1999; 108).  Vygotsky notes that this account runs 
contrary to common sense opinion which holds that feelings and sensations follow 
the emotional experience.  In W James’s own well-known words, “My theory, on the 
contrary is that the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the existing fact, 
and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur is the emotion” (James, 
1952; 743).  Again, where Vygotsky concludes; “the aggregate of sensed 
associations and motor elements accounts for everything” (108), W James says, “no 
shade of emotion, however slight, should be without bodily reverberation …” (744).   
 
Vygotsky observes that many psychologists of his day, including Lange, and, to a 
lesser extent James, thought this theory of the emotions amounted to an empirical 
confirmation of the theory of emotions of Spinoza.  It is not difficult to see why.  
Without going into details at this stage, Spinoza says, “By affect I understand the 
affections of the body, by which the power of the body itself is increased, diminished, 
helped, or hindered, together with the ideas of these affections” (Eth. III. Def. 3).  
Having established that “The object of the idea constituting the human mind is a 
body …” (Eth. III Prop. 23) and where James says “I shall use the word object of 
emotion indifferently to mean one which is physically present or one which is merely 
thought of” (James, 1952; 738), Spinoza says, “The human mind is able to 
contemplate external things by which the human body was once affected as if they 
were present, although they are not present and do not exist” (Eth. II. Prop. 17. Cor).   
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Now, Vygotsky continues:  “If it is true that the teaching of Spinoza on the passions 
is inseparably connected to the names of James and Lange” and his investigations 
show this is not the case then “the part of Ethics that deals with passions may 
perhaps be only of historical interest for the psychology of our time…” (Vygotsky, 
1999; 120).  Vygotsky notes Lange’s claim:  “Spinoza comes closest” to his, Lange’s, 
own theory (Vygotsky, 1999; 71) and that James shows “historical blindness” when 
he claims there is no “kinship” between his theory and Spinoza’s (Vygotsky, 1999; 
74).  In what follows I shall briefly review how, despite investing considerable interest 
in Spinoza, Vygotsky arrives at the conclusion “with which we did not want to agree” 
(Vygotsky, 1999; 120).  In sum I shall review first, Vygotsky’s criticisms of the James-
Lange theory; second, his deployment of Cannon’s thalamic theory of emotion to 
refute the James-Lange theory and third, Vygotsky’s own dismissal of Cannon.  
None of this review is ‘only of historical interest’, as Vygotsky might say, because I 
shall argue later that Cannon’s own conclusions were challenged by developments 
that led to a Neo-Jamesian solution which, it is claimed, is consistent with the theory 
of emotion of Spinoza.  I shall argue that the Neo-Jamesian and Spinozist theory of 
emotions of Antonio Damasio meets Vygotsky’s objections to the original James-
Lange theory in a way which agrees with Vygotsky’s understanding of the relation of 
his own psychosocial theory with biology and the relation of these to Vygotsky’s 
methodology.   
 
2.3.1 Vygotsky’s objections to the James-Lange theory 
2.3.1.1  It is theoretical 
Vygotsky holds that the James-Lange theory was “based exclusively on speculative 
arguments and theoretical analysis” (Vygotsky 1999; 74) and that it “only inverts the 
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sequence of events in which emotions arise” (80).  Of course James was challenging 
folk psychology and this is expressed in his well-known formulation already cited 
above (page 26).  Moreover, James says himself, “It must be admitted that it is so far 
only a hypothesis, only possibly a true conception and that much is lacking in its 
definitive proof” (James, 1952; 744).  The problem as far as Vygotsky is concerned is 
not that the hypothesis stands in need of ‘proof’ but that the theory explains “the 
nature of emotions with such obvious simplicity, with such conviction, with such an 
abundance of factual evidence” that it has created “an illusion of truth and 
irrefutability” (Vygotsky, 1999; 74).  Vygotsky’s point is not that James’s hypothesis 
has escaped the test of fallibility, as against ‘proof’, as Karl Popper later would 
require of scientific theories, but that it is a theory not sufficiently coherent with 
Spinoza’s theory of emotion as even to begin to furnish empirical evidence for a 
more comprehensive socio-cultural psychology of the emotions.  For Vygotsky the 
explanatory power of the James-Lange theory rests on its ‘obvious simplicity’, and 
this, because it does not rise to the challenge of Spinoza and the power of his 
monistic theory to explain in causal terms emotional experience inclusive of social 
interaction.  In the next chapter I shall explain how the Neo-Jamesian development 
in psychology addresses Vygotsky’s objection.   
 
2.3.1.2  It is dualist 
Vygotsky’s methodology requires that for a theory of emotion to be adequate for his 
purposes it must be able to resolve the divide between descriptive and explanatory 
psychologies; that is, it must be able to offer one form of explanation for those 
emotions called ‘basic’, ‘lower’ or ‘primary’, such as pleasure, pain, joy and sorrow, 
as well as those emotions called ‘complex’, ‘higher’ or ‘secondary’ such as love, 
devotion, grief and wonder.  But when James makes his argument that emotions can 
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be resolved into ‘bodily feelings’, he continues, “if we fancy some strong emotion and 
then try to abstract from our consciousness of it all the feelings of its bodily 
symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind …… and that a cold and neutral state 
of intellectual perception is all that remains “(James, 1952; 745).  Referring to this 
passage of James’s, Vygotsky does not think that ‘intellectual perception’, in James, 
is capable of being interpreted or explained in the same way as primary emotions.  
He notes James is content to call these secondary emotions ‘judgements’ and he 
illustrates his criticism by arguing that ‘emotional manifestations’ always “imply the 
individual’s consciousness of the special meaning and sense that he contributes to 
the given impression” (Vygotsky, 1999; 226).  That is, where James says “we feel 
sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble” (James, 
1952; 743), Vygotsky would say that since we are not always frightened because we 
run and may tremble because we are cold or cry because we laugh, James must 
introduce a second order ‘judgement’ of the circumstances of the event in order to 
explain how felt sensations of the body become this or that emotion.  Vygotsky 
draws the conclusion that the James-Lange theory as a whole suffers the same 
defect of explanation as the Cartesian theory.  Hence it is a form of dualism.  The 
immediate theoretical solution to this problem is found in Spinoza’s monism, not 
merely for reasons of methodological coherence but because psychological 
phenomena are themselves coherent.  Furthermore, I shall argue below, Neo-
Jamesian theories incorporate developments in psychology consistent with the role 
James gives to ‘judgement’ but this will not be ‘judgement’ as conceived 
‘intellectually’, theoretical, ideal, abstract, but as emotionally motivated. 
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2.3.1.3  It is not materialistic 
In order for a theory of emotion to be coherent with Vygotsky’s socio-cultural theory it 
must not only be monistic but it must be materialistic, though non-reductively so.  A 
materialist theory is entailed methodologically if an explanation of the emotions is to 
be given in causal terms and this is as central to Vygotsky’s conception of science as 
it is to Spinoza’s theory of explanation, for where Vygotsky insists “true knowledge is 
possible only as causal knowledge” (Vygotsky, 1999; 181), Spinoza reasons “the 
order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things” 
because “the idea of anything caused depends upon a knowledge of the cause of 
which the thing caused is the effect” (Eth. II. 7 and Dem.).  Even though he writes 
“Under the cover of parallelism” (Vygotsky, 1999; 124) Spinoza is, according to 
Vygotsky, a materialist.  Whether Spinoza is or is not a materialist is an extremely 
difficult question to decide but for the purpose of understanding Vygotsky’s refutation 
of the James-Lange theory, it is not necessary to enter upon it.  A materialist 
interpretation of Spinoza is certainly possible.  Moreover it is possible to obtain a 
materialism which is non-reductive, that is one in which it is unnecessary, in giving a 
causal explanation of any natural, including social, phenomenon, to reduce it to inert 
‘matter’.  Turning to Spinoza, since “The first thing which forms the actual being of 
the human mind is nothing else than the idea of an individual thing actually existing” 
(Eth.II.11) and since “The human mind is adapted to the perception of many things, 
and its aptitude increases in proportion to the number of ways in which its body can 
be disposed” (Eth.II.14) it follows, “the more things the body has in common with 
other bodies, the more things will the mind be adapted to perceive” (Eth. II. 39. Cor.).  
Since “Our power of acting, therefore, in whatever way it may be conceived, can be 
determined, and consequently helped or restrained, by the power of another 
individual object possessing something  in common with us….” (Eth. IV. 29. Dem.) it 
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follows that “… it is a good which is common to all men and can be equally 
possessed by all men in so far as they are of the same nature” (Eth. IV. 36. Dem.).  
That is to say since I understand rationally what I have in common with others who 
can assist this understanding, my emotions motivate actively inasmuch as they are 
social.  In this way Spinoza explains social phenomena in the same naturalistic 
terms as biological phenomena and without the one ‘reducing to’ or ‘emerging from’ 
the other.  It is these ‘social’, ‘higher’ or ‘secondary’ emotions which Vygotsky seeks 
to explain in causal terms and furthermore in a socio-cultural theory the explanatory 
power of which is inclusive of ‘basic’, ‘lower’ or ‘primary’ emotions.  An effort could be 
conceived in which an attempt is made to give a causal explanation of primary 
emotions in terms solely of historical determinism.  This is why Yaroshevsky argued 
that Vygotsky’s psychology advances from ‘biodeterminism’ to ‘sociodeterminism’ 
(Yaroshevsky, 1999; 265) and that “This new determinist approach now has to be 
asserted in the theory of emotion and motivation” (Yaroshevsky, 1989; 312).  On the 
other hand Vygotsky argues the James-Lange theory “finds for itself…. A place in 
the spiritualistic psychology of pure spirit” (Vygotsky, 1999; 233) because the James-
Lange theory, “seeing their source in the activity of internal organs… tears emotions 
away from the general context of the mental development of man and places them in 
an isolated position” (156).  That is, in being unable to account for the secondary 
emotions in the same non-reductive materialist terms in which I have shown Spinoza 
gives his account above, the James-Lange theory fails to be consistently materialist.  
Hence Vygotsky does not seek a ‘socio-determinist’ explanation at variance with 
biological determinism as Yaroshevsky suggests, because, first, it would be 
inconsistent with Spinoza’s non-reductive materialism and second, Vygotsky insists 
“The historical development of human consciousness is connected primarily with the 
development of the cortex of the brain” (156).  Hence the solution to the problem of 
the theory of emotions must proceed “from below, without which materialist scientific 
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thought would not be able to move and develop” and “from above” in order to 
“overcome the methodological roots of the fallacies of the organic theory of 
emotions”, that is, the James-Lange theory (102). 
 
2.3.1.4  It is intentionalist 
If a causal and therefore a materialist account is to be given of mental phenomena 
then it will be impossible to explain mental phenomena in terms of intentions or ‘will’ 
since the appeal to mental phenomena as intentional, indeed, employing the concept 
of intentionality as the very criterion of ‘mind’, drives all mental phenomena beyond 
the reach of empirical explanation.  This is not to say that a psychological 
explanation of ‘intentionality’ cannot be given.  The thesis of intentionality holds that 
an account of consciousness or mind entails the notion that consciousness is 
purposive and has an object.  Being conscious ‘of’ some object or event is alleged to 
show that consciousness has ‘direction’ and, as it were, ‘goes over’ to the object 
upon which it has seized in order to give the mental act meaning.  For those arguing 
the thesis of intentionality and employing it in explaining mental phenomena, it is the 
meaning which constitutes the ‘mental’.  This would appear obvious in the case of W. 
James’s account of secondary emotions as ‘judgements’ for James has been unable 
to account for ‘judgement’ in the same causal terms consistent with his biological 
explanation of primary emotions.  Moreover, when an individual responds to some 
event or stimulus the “special meaning and sense that he contributes to the given 
external impression” is what determines for him whether the impression “is for him a 
subject of fear or anger” (Vygotsky, 1999; 228) for example, since there is nothing in 
the raw datum of the external impression which decides this judgement.  Hence 
despite all his efforts to give a causal explanation of the emotions, James cannot 
account for the way an individual discriminates between emotions without invoking 
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the thesis of intentionality.  Spinoza deals with ‘intentions’ or ‘free will’ as he calls it, 
in two ways.  Firstly, in asserting “In the mind there is no absolute or free will, but the 
mind is determined to this or that volition by a cause…” he claims that ‘faculties’ of 
“understanding, desiring, loving etc…. are nothing but metaphysical or universal 
entities” (Eth.II.48) or generalisations of our ordinary experience which we form when 
we use words as a sign for something.  Intention or ‘will’ is one of these ‘faculties’ 
falsely attributed to the mind by our use of language.  If we are not careful about our 
use of words, words become used as the signs of things signified as they are in the 
imagination, and the imagination is that activity of the mind which is not organised by 
‘common notions’ or ‘reason’ or ‘true ideas’, that is, by another use of language by 
which we form ‘true ideas’ or concepts.  It is this way of thinking and speaking which 
leads us to imagine that we freely ‘intend’ this or that mental activity.  Secondly, 
when Spinoza demonstrates that mental and physical events are the same (Eth. II. 
7), he does not claim there is any interaction between the mental and the physical 
such that the “mind can determine the body to motion” or vice versa (Eth.III.2).  On 
the contrary, “… if the object of the idea constituting the human mind be a body, 
nothing can happen in that body which is not perceived by the mind” (Eth.II.12), even 
if we are not conscious of it, “all this showing that the body itself can do many things 
from the laws of its own nature”… “so that it follows that when men say this or that 
action of the body springs from the mind which has command over the body, they do 
not know what they say…” (Eth.III.2.Sch). Departing, as radically for today as then, 
from accounts of thought and behaviour understood in mentalistic, ideal or even 
supernatural terms, Spinoza seeks to explain all human thought and behaviour 
entirely in terms of the interactions between the ‘internal’ biological and the ‘external’, 
social, environment of the body.  So when Vygotsky asks “Do we inevitably have to 
resort to rejecting the laws of nature, to introducing a theological and spiritualistic 
principle of absolute freewill not subject to natural necessity?” (Vygotsky, 1999; 173) 
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in order to account for intentionality, he finds a ready solution to this question in 
Spinoza.  Spinoza’s causal determinism rules out any notion of ‘freedom of the will’ 
or intentionality as it is understood in ordinary language and as it appears in W. 
James.  However, for Spinoza an account of free will or intention is achieved in the 
interdeducibility of ‘common notions’ or that coherent knowledge of nature obtained 
from the formation of ‘adequate ideas’.  Unlike ‘inadequate ideas’, which have only 
‘extrinsic marks’ or empirical indicators or references such as when words are used 
to refer, and which are therefore the work of the imagination and ordinary language, 
‘adequate ideas’ have ‘intrinsic marks’ and are so internally organised that they can 
‘concatenate’ or ‘connect’ with other ‘adequate ideas’ and form an interdeducible 
system of ideas which exactly is the knowledge of nature.  While inadequate ideas 
give rise to the idea of ‘mental phenomena’, including ‘intentions’, adequate ideas 
exactly are natural phenomena.  That is, an adequate idea agrees with its object 
(Eth.II.43) conceived under the ‘attribute of extension’.  Hence Vygotsky is right 
when he claims Spinoza writes ‘under the cover’ of parallelism, for the mind, for 
Spinoza, exactly is the body, conceived under the ‘attribute of thought’.  These ideas 
correspond to Vygotsky’s notion of ‘scientific concept’ for these also are concepts 
internally so rich that, in the ‘ascent from the abstract to the concrete’ they are the 
means of speaking about and explaining and hence thinking about and 
understanding, nature.  The means of forming these concepts is in word use such 
that as the concept is ‘interiorised’ an increased economy of speech is obtained 
exactly in proportion as the concept entails an understanding of nature.  Since these 
concepts are internally rich it is in speech that further interdeducibility of these 
concepts is made.  As we advance from using words or class terms to refer, as in 
‘spontaneous concepts’, to using words to explain, as in ‘scientific concepts’, we 
advance from talking about particulars to a scientific and comprehensive 
understanding of nature.  But this understanding of nature is not ‘theoretical’ as 
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understood in a positivist notion of science for that marks a return to the ‘mentalistic’ 
side of Cartesian dualism with which Vygotsky thought James struggled.  Spinoza 
accounts for such positivist knowledge, and its ‘images’, as arising from inductive 
generalisations from fragmentary, piecemeal interactions of the body with nature as 
a consequence of our limited knowledge of the body itself.  It is in knowing what 
happens to the body in its interactions with nature that an explanation of the 
emotions can be given and because James cannot give such an explanation, 
Vygotsky argues that James “covertly introduces intentions” (Vygotsky, 1999; 228) in 
order to explain secondary emotions.   
 
2.3.1.5  It is epiphenomenalist 
Vygotsky insists that whichever way one interprets the relation of consciousness of 
emotion, that is, feeling, to the body, in the James-Lange theory, this relation is 
epiphenomenal, that is, feeling is explained as a by-product of the emotions.  To put 
it another way, Vygotsky argues that the James-Lange theory, in claiming that 
peripheral changes in muscle and skin and in the internal organs, the viscera, 
relayed by afferent, receptor nerves to the central nervous system constitute the 
origin of the emotions, this process makes conscious awareness of these emotional 
states of the body, or feelings, as they arise in consciousness, epiphenomena.  Even 
if we interpret the James-Lange theory as an explanation of how bodily changes are 
to be interpreted in conscious experience, as in the case of James’s explanation of 
secondary emotions, as I have shown above, the theory still amounts to a form of 
epiphenomenalism.  If this were the case then it would be inconsistent with claims 
that the theory is materialistic, for to be materialistic the theory must be consistently 
so and hence be able to provide an explanation for primary as well as secondary 
emotions and other higher mental functions.  For Vygotsky a scientific theory must 
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be able to explain the entire range of psychological phenomena in one coherent 
causal system even if a distinction can be drawn between biodeterminism and 
sociodeterminism or those psychological phenomena which can be explained in 
biological terms and those psychological phenomena which can be explained in 
socio-cultural or historical terms.  Since for Vygotsky higher mental functions are 
explained socio-culturally, to attempt to explain secondary emotions otherwise 
means that the James-Lange explanation makes feeling epiphenomenal and 
inconsistent with his own psychological theory.  Moreover epiphenomenalism is 
entirely inconsistent with Spinoza’s own theory.  For when Spinoza says “The object 
of the idea constituting the human mind is the body” (Eth.II.13) he no more makes 
the mind the effect of the body than he does the body the effect of the mind.  This he 
again makes plain when he shows that “The body cannot determine the mind to 
think, nor can the mind determine the body to motion or rest, or to anything else if 
there be anything else” (Eth.III.2) by reminding his reader that the mind and the body 
have to be understood as modes each of the attributes of thought or extension, that 
is as modes of substance or nature, conceived either under the attribute of thought 
or under the attribute of extension.   
 
2.3.1.6  It makes emotions passive 
Finally, Vygotsky’s analysis of the James-Lange theory raises an objection that lies 
close to his own ambition for a theory of emotion.  It cannot explain motivation.  
Vygotsky sees in the James-Lange theory an account of emotions as an “essentially 
passive process”.  In accounting for feelings as awareness of emotional states 
brought on by the body’s response to changes in the environment, the James-Lange 
theory is unable to account for “striving, excitation to action, and impulse, which 
makes our emotions stronger and more influential motives of behaviour” (Vygotsky, 
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1999; 116).  It is possible, I suspect, to conceive of a Jamesian theory which 
interprets ‘striving, excitation to action’ as stronger visceral responses to stimuli and 
as causing stronger or more violent actions but the emotional state would still be ‘felt’ 
passively, not in the sense that what is felt is the effect and not the cause of the 
action, for this much Vygotsky would agree with James, but in the sense that what is 
‘felt’ would still not capture the emotion and hence the meaning of the action.  
Meaning is not given in emotion as understood by James.  Emotion, conceived as 
passive, is meaningless.  It is without any life or power.  It is merely the internal state 
of the body, merely its internal milieu, its homeostasis.  Even if Vygotsky conceded 
to James the ascription of internal differentiation of the visceral states to this or that 
emotion, which he does not, these would still be ‘felt’ states rather than ‘feeling’ 
experiences.  As a consequence, having rendered the emotions passive, James is 
not only unable to rescue his account of ‘intention’, but he is quite unable to explain 
motivation.   
 
The reason for the inadequacy of this aspect of the James-Lange theory lies in its 
inability to explain action except biologically.  Granted it does give Vygotsky a causal 
explanation of the emotions but only in a causal sequence in which action is merely 
descriptive of the sequence of events.  The most that can be said for this biological 
explanation is that it “anticipated the teaching on conditioned reflexes as the basis of 
behaviour” (Vygotsky, 1999; 230), but “His divergences with the theory of 
conditioned reflexes, not visible to casual observation” (Yaroshevsky, 1989; 113) led 
Vygotsky to interpose between the stimuli and response of classical conditioning the 
mediating role of word use and by this means, briefly put at this stage, introduces 
language and the socio-cultural into a theory of the emotions.  Vygotsky wants to 
argue that the ‘inner life’ of human action and interaction can only be understood in 
 37 
its relation to the social environment.  Emotional life therefore has to be understood 
in comprehensive terms that include its social determination and not only its 
biological determination.  When emotions are understood this way they become the 
substance of ‘motives of behaviour’, that is, of motivation and it is only when an 
explanation is given which reveals emotions as biological processes in social 
interaction that the substance of lived experience can be understood. 
 
2.3.2   Vygotsky’s use of Cannon’s theory of emotion 
Vygotsky’s references to the Cannon-Bard theory of emotion are motivated by his 
defence of non-reductive materialism inclusive of his socio-cultural psychology.  
Since he finds the James-Lange theory unable to account for secondary emotions, 
Vygotsky expects to find in the Cannon-Bard theory an explanation of the secondary 
emotions consistent with those objections.  Vygotsky is satisfied that from Spinoza’s 
monistic theory a methodology can be obtained in which a mental phenomenon can 
be given which is entirely consistent with the biological constitution of the body, that 
is, an explanation could be given of the interactions of the body with its natural as 
well as its social environments.  Nothing in Vygotsky’s remarks criticising the James-
Lange theory, as I have extracted them from his monograph, permits an account of 
emotions in a way coherent with his own socio-cultural theory.  In particular the 
biological processing of the interaction of the body with the environment as theorised 
by James is, according to Vygotsky, insufficient to account for secondary emotions.  
Even where James’s theory explains the activity of the central nervous system 
(CNS) in the secondary emotions, this is conceived solely in intellectual terms and 
not in their relation to biological processes.  When Vygotsky turns to the Cannon-
Bard theory there he finds an attempt to explain emotions which incorporates the 
activity of the CNS and in particular the processes of the neo-cortex as the medium 
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of the socio-cultural and as continuous with it in its phylogenesis.  So though 
Vygotsky’s socio-cultural theory has explanatory potential of its own, given 
Vygotsky’s methodological commitment to materialism one must grant that he 
expected his socio-cultural theory to be in agreement with the findings of neurology 
and his interest in a theory of emotion expresses his ambition to find such an 
agreement.  Vygotsky did not think he found this agreement in the James-Lange 
theory.  The significance of the Cannon-Bard theory of emotion to Vygotsky lies in 
the attention he gives Cannon’s neurological account.   
 
Unlike the James-Lange theory, which is largely theoretical, the Cannon-Bard theory 
was constructed from the results of empirical experimental tests of that theory.  
Vygotsky thus employs the Cannon-Bard theory as a counterpoint to the claims of 
James.  That is, the principal elements of James’s theory can be reformulated as 
empirically testable propositions concerning the causes of emotions and the feelings 
of them.  For Cannon it is not sufficient to explain emotion as feeling arising in 
consciousness or in conscious activity of the neocortex as a result of activity of 
viscera, muscle and skin relayed by afferent nerves to the CNS in response to some 
perceived event or stimulus.  The body does indeed undergo physiological changes 
as a consequence of sudden signals sent to the autonomic nervous system (ANS).  
The hair stands on end, the heart accelerates, the mouth becomes dry, pupils dilate, 
the body feels cold.  But for Cannon the centre of these activities is the thalamus.  
This small structure of the midbrain is not a centre of emotion as much as it is a relay 
or switching centre for activity in other parts of the brain and indirectly, the rest of the 
body.  Cannon’s point, acknowledged by Vygotsky, is that biological and neurological 
knowledge of this structure has consequences for a theory of emotion.   
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2.3.2.1  The relation of emotion to the brain 
Vygotsky’s objection to James’s theory in respect of the relation of emotions to the 
brain in a materialist theory is James’s claim that there are “no special cortical 
centres for emotion” (Vygotsky, 1999; 112 and 140).  James’s ‘perception of the 
existing fact’ created the conditions by which James explains the ‘intellectual 
emotions’ or ‘judgement’ but Vygotsky’s objection is James’s claim that the activity of 
the brain in its processing of emotions is generalised to all its parts.  James makes 
this case because he argues that specific emotions arise in the particular response 
to excitation from the periphery in the viscera, skin and muscle and that these, and 
not the brain, give sufficiently specific responses to explain emotions.  Contrary to 
this explanation Vygotsky appeals to Cannon’s counterargument that these 
peripheral responses reach the cortex and consciousness mediated by the thalamus 
and that it is the thalamus, with feed-back projections from the cortex, that 
discrimination between emotions arises.  Vygotsky, following Cannon, considered 
the thalamus the “co-ordinating centre of emotional reactions” and “processes arising 
in it are the sources of affective experience” (Vygotsky, 1999; 108) and hence “the 
problem of higher emotions …. Can find a satisfactory physiological explanation if it 
admits the thalamic hypothesis” (Vygotsky, 1999; 115).  The hypothesis explains 
emotions by introducing the function of the thalamus in the experience of emotion 
when perception is aroused or excited by some event or object in the immediate 
environment.  In normal conditions, when the stability and predictability of events in 
our environment is not a source of stimulation, excitation or arousal the activity of the 
thalamus is inhibited or dampened by the stability of our perceptions.  In this 
inhibited state the thalamus, which has numerous projections to other parts of the 
brain, does not precipitate any activity.  However, when stimuli are exciting or 
alarming the activity of the neocortex and consciousness of the stimuli mediated by 
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the neocortex cannot inhibit or dampen the responses of the thalamus to those same 
stimuli, and thus uninhibited it springs into action.  Through efferent signals from 
other centres of the brain, not fully understood in Cannon or Vygotsky’s day, 
especially the hypothalamus and the ANS, this activity of the thalamus raises blood 
pressure, sugar levels, increases respiration, dilates pupils and arteries and causes 
an inflow of blood from the periphery to protect the internal organs.  These 
physiological responses are the origins of the emotions, the physiological substrate 
of them, but not the emotions themselves.  These physiological responses are 
relayed back via afferent nerves through the thalamus to the sensory cortex and it is 
the combination of these efferent and afferent impulses which is the emotion and 
which is experienced as ‘feeling’ when conscious of it (Bear, Connors, Paradiso, 
2007; 565-7: and also Friedman, 2010; 385).  This explanation is at odds with 
James’s explanation and has the merit of giving a coherently materialistic account of 
the emotions.   
 
Cannon demonstrates the functional role of the thalamus in a number of experiments 
and Vygotsky refers to the results of the experiments of Sherrington and Cannon 
conducted on cats and dogs.  When the larger part of the brain of a cat is removed 
up to the thalamus so that there are no other cerebral controls on the thalamus, the 
behaviour of these ‘de-cerebrated’ cats becomes uninhibited when provoked or 
threatened by the presence of a dog.  This so-called ‘sham rage’ subsides when in 
later experiments the thalamus was completely cut away.  Alternatively, if the nerves 
projecting to the viscera were cut instead, the cat continues to react emotionally 
when provoked.  Hence it is projections from the thalamus, under the influence of the 
cortex, which send efferent signals towards the muscles and internal organs which 
afterwards excite afferent paths to the cortex.  To add to these illustrations Vygotsky 
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cites instances known to him of individuals who “experience normal emotions” but 
who suffer paralysis of the face, thus demonstrating again the incompleteness of 
explanations of the emotions in terms of the actions of muscle, that is, afferent 
signals from the periphery (Vygotsky, 1999; 86).  Again, he cites the example of 
another patient who, despite suffering all loss of sensation in her body, except for her 
face, as the result of a broken neck, nonetheless experienced “grief, joy, 
dissatisfaction and affection” (Vygotsky, 1999; 97).  The conclusion Vygotsky draws 
is that the peripheral organs, in one case the musculature of the face and in the 
other, the viscera, are not sufficient to account for emotions.  Vygotsky does not 
speculate concerning the relation between the nerve supply to facial muscles from 
the brain and emotion, advocated more recently.  The evidence Vygotsky seizes 
upon is that Cannon has shown that emotions arise centrally, not peripherally, are 
dependent upon the CNS, not the ANS, and that an adequate account of emotions 
cannot be given without understanding the functions of at least one brain centre.  
Hence “James’s thesis, which states that in the brain there are no special centres for 
emotion must be modified in the light of new data” (Vygotsky, 1999; 112).  For 
Vygotsky these findings mean “the cortex represents the mastery of the objective 
aspect of the person over the subjective emotions of the thalamus” (Langford, 2005; 
106).  Although Cannon, and hence Vygotsky, may be challenged in detail in the 
light of even more recent data, they share a coherent materialist theory of emotions 
which incorporates the activity of the CNS.  Although nothing in Vygotsky’s 
monograph prompts Langford to generalise any further the direction Vygotsky 
intends to take is clear enough.   
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2.3.2.2  Visceral discrimination of emotions 
Vygotsky next turns to Cannon’s evidence to show that different emotions such as 
fear or anger arise with the same visceral changes, the same increase in heart rate, 
sweating, pupil dilation, cold skin, all functions of the ANS and which occasion the 
so-called ‘fight or flight’ response.  Emotions arising from this response must be 
physiologically ‘indeterminate’ (Vygotsky, 1999; 78 and 83).  Moreover, Vygotsky 
approves of Cannon’s claim that ‘small sensitivity of internal organs’ of which we are 
not conscious anyway can’t help differentiate between any of the emotions; nor can 
they distinguish between emotional states of the body and other non-emotional 
states such as fear or chill.  All this is evidence for Vygotsky that the “specific quality 
of emotion is joined to simple sensation if thalamic processes are activated” 
(Vygotsky, 1999; 113, 82, 107)  and hence not only does the thalamus engage with 
the body in determining emotional responses but it engages with the neocortex in 
discriminating between the various feeling experiences of the emotions produced.  
This does not mean that the thalamus is the brain centre of emotion itself, as if one 
could speak this way.  Rather the feelings which arise in the neocortex unite with 
efferent impulses or signals ‘to’ and afferent signals or impulses ‘from’ the periphery 
mediated by the thalamus.   
 
2.3.2.3  Co-incidence of feeling and emotion 
Finally, Vygotsky also agrees with Cannon’s claim, since disputed, that not only do 
the viscera not respond differently in different emotional states but that because 
excitation following perception has to travel to the peripheral organs, the viscera, and 
then relay back to the brain, the path taken is fractionally slower than conscious 
perception or awareness.  That is, the emotion or body state, while processed by the 
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thalamus, falls below consciousness.  Hence if Cannon is right, his experiments 
would show that in the James-Lange theory, conscious perception of the stimulating 
event would arise before emotion gave rise to feeling and hence one could not be 
happy because one smiles, but one would, as usually imagined, smile because one 
was happy.  Strictly speaking, since Cannon places the thalamus at the junction of 
both pathways, one to the neocortex and the other to the periphery, the actions of 
the cortex and the periphery are virtually simultaneous.  Nonetheless Vygotsky took 
this result as evidence of a conclusive defect of the James-Lange theory.   
 
2.3.3   Dismissal of Cannon’s theory 
At the same time as raising these objections to the James-Lange theory from the 
perspective of the Cannon-Bard theory Vygotsky laces his monograph with 
objections to that same theory.  Vygotsky regards the empirical evidence obtained 
from animal experiments which induced or subdue emotion by removal of the cortex 
or the thalamus as being unable to supply any evidence for feeling.  The observer 
can only make very unreliable assumptions that the animal experiences the 
emotional changes as feelings.  Furthermore nothing can be said about the nature of 
these feelings.  In this Vygotsky agrees with Spinoza.  Hence empirical evidence 
obtained in this way cannot yield reliable evidence of ‘feeling’.   
 
Vygotsky draws the methodological conclusion that the psychologist can only “adopt 
the point of view of Descartes who considered animals as robots, as reflex 
machines” (Vygotsky, 1999; 89).  That is, the particular positivist methodology 
employed in these investigations inevitably lead to the dualist conclusions that are 
contrary to the methodological monism advanced by Vygotsky.  If the thalamus 
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projects to the cortex and causes ‘feelings’ these are still only primitive emotions 
unless one can demonstrate how these undergo the transformative effects of 
consciousness, that is of the socio-cultural context in which these feelings are to be 
understood.  Cannon’s theory does not attempt this explanation, hence like the 
James-Lange theory, the Cannon-Bard theory cannot explain secondary emotions 
either.   
 
Vygotsky considers further practical objections to the results of Cannon.  Cannon 
may have succeeded in showing that emotional expressions of rage can be induced 
in a cat after the removal of the sympathetic nervous system but this experimental 
result is limited to laboratory conditions.  The whole function of the emotion is the 
readiness of the whole body of the animal to respond to excitation from the 
environment.  If the animal is threatened, impulses, which may well signal from the 
thalamus to the cortex, also project to the SNS.  Here the efferent impulses cause 
pupil dilation, constriction of arteries, increased blood pressure, increased sugar, and 
all the changes to the body necessary for action.  Conceived this way the real 
consequences of the transections of the brain and nervous systems give no 
understanding of the emotions in the biological process and its ecology.  Emotions 
“preserved under laboratory conditions are, so to speak, impotent emotions, 
emotions devoid of their biological significance” (Vygotsky, 1999; 90).   
 
With methodological difficulties of this kind Vygotsky concedes that as between the 
James-Lange theory and the Cannon-Bard theory these are “alternatives in the 
sense that propose two mutually exclusive concrete solutions of the one and the 
same problem “and that “the new theory, like the old did not in the least approach the 
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solution to the main and basic problem – to constructing a psychology of human 
affect” (Vygotsky, 1999; 101).  Both of these theories try to explain emotion ‘from 
below’ and indeed that is all that can be achieved with animal subjects.  But given 
this methodology, even if human subjects were involved, it is difficult to imagine what 
other conclusions could be drawn.  The famous Singer-Schachter experiment has 
been regarded as inconclusive precisely because introspective reports from similar 
excitations induced in the SNS are unreliable.  Hence although Vygotsky regards the 
evidence of the Cannon-Bard theory as sufficient to refute the James-Lange theory 
on empirical grounds, not much more can be said for the Cannon-Bard theory itself.  
However, Vygotsky holds that the merit of the Cannon-Bard theory is that it makes 
an attempt to explain the role of the cortex or subcortical brain centres in the 
processing of the emotions, and at least theoretically, their causal relation to ‘feeling’ 
and hence the relation of feeling to the social conditions of their meaning.   
 
Result 
The complexity of the monograph is a consequence of Vygotsky’s simultaneous 
comparative analysis of biological, psychological and philosophical theories of 
emotion.  Vygotsky arrives at several results which convince him that contemporary 
physiological psychology, especially the promising James-Lange theory, cannot 
explain the relation of emotion to higher mental functions in a monistic psychological 
theory with the same coherence as Spinoza’s theory explains the same relations in a 
monistic philosophical theory.  Vygotsky’s disappointment with his critical 
conclusions nonetheless suggests a possible solution not available to him at the time 
he was writing.   
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CHAPTER 3:  THE POTENTIAL OF A NEO-JAMESIAN SOLUTION 
 
Introductory survey 
In Chapter 2 I reviewed the claims that Vygotsky was unable to complete his 
monograph on the theory of emotions.  From a reading of the monograph I isolated 
the particular objections Vygotsky had to the psychology of his day, especially to the 
Jamesian theory of emotion to which he had turned in the expectation that it might 
serve to transform Spinoza’s philosophical theory of emotion into a scientific theory 
consistent with his own socio-cultural psychology.  For reasons given by 
Yaroshevsky (Yaroshevsky, 1999: 264-265), namely how Vygotsky may have 
intended to complete his monograph, Vygotsky nowhere explains Spinoza’s theory 
of the emotions and he does not explain how the particular problems he encountered 
might be explained from the position argued by Spinoza.  Responding to 
Yaroshevsky’s suggestion I offered Spinoza’s explanations of some of these 
difficulties.  To continue with this line of argument, in this chapter I shall show that 
Vygotsky was closer to the solution than time gave him to find.  To do this I shall 
offer a synoptic account of Spinoza’s theory as I understand it showing its relevance 
to my broader argument.  I will explain why Spinoza’s is an ‘embodiment’ theory of 
emotion and in particular explain why and how Antonio Damasio connects his own 
Neo-Jamesian theory of the emotions to Spinoza’s theory.  I will argue that the Neo-
Jamesian theory is the scientific form of Spinoza’s theory to which Vygotsky would 
have turned to advance Spinoza’s own theory.  I shall do this by showing how 
Spinoza’s causal explanation of emotion reappears in a Neo-Jamesian explanation 
of, first, primary emotions and second, the work of imagination and memory.  I shall 
then show how Damasio’s Neo-Jamesian theory, consistent with Spinoza’s 
explanation, addresses Vygotsky’s objections to the Jamesian theory I had isolated 
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in Chapter 2.  I shall conclude with a brief preview of the research problem exploring 
why Damasio’s Neo-Jamesian theory, on the one hand is able to account for the 
biological genesis of the secondary emotions, but on the other hand is unable to 
account for the interaction between emotion and the development of social concepts 
and hence motivation, without turning to Vygotsky’s linguistic theory of concept 
development and Vygotsky’s own interest in Spinoza.   
 
3.1 Synopsis of Spinoza’s theory of emotion relevant to this part of the 
argument 
Understood very comprehensively Spinoza’s theory of emotion is an explanation of 
the interaction of the human body with its natural and social environment motivated 
by an epistemological theory of the relation of the mind to the body or concepts to 
the world, that is, the way concepts relate to their objects.  Spinoza does not 
conceive of emotions as transient or ephemeral epiphenomena of our sensory 
experience and knowledge of nature but on the contrary as absolutely integral with 
that knowledge and experience.  So he begins in the third part of the Ethics 
declaring, in a line often quoted by Vygotsky, that he does not regard human 
emotional experience as ‘a kingdom within a kingdom’ and separate from the 
kingdom of nature.  Our effort to understand the relation of the body to the rest of 
nature, and this cannot be achieved without our understanding the emotions 
(affects), is the same as to understand the relation of the mind to the body, since 
‘The first thing which forms the actual being of the human mind is nothing else than 
the idea of an individual thing actually existing’ (Eth. II. 11). But since the mind needs 
an object in order to have knowledge of itself and ‘The human mind does not know 
itself, nor does it know that the body exists, except through ideas of affections by 
which the body is affected’ (Eth. II. 19), it can only know the body in the interactions 
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of the body with another body or the rest of the natural and social environment. That 
is, as one body contacts another, the contact is reflected internally to both bodies 
and the reflection, or better still, refraction, since further action follows from this, is 
the mental and emotional activity of each body. Understanding this is a special 
instance of understanding how nature appears to us as divided into what Spinoza 
calls the ‘attribute of thought’, or nature conceived as a thinking thing, and the 
‘attribute of extension’, or nature conceived as extended in space and time, hence 
“The object of the idea constituting the human mind is a body, or a certain mode of 
extension actually existing, and nothing else” (Eth. II. 13). The significance of the 
concept of ‘attribute’ is not crucial here and I shall return to it in another section, but 
the relation of the mind to the body is understood, not by trying to understand the 
relation between the ‘attributes’ directly, though philosophical understanding of this 
can be won by struggling with Part I of the Ethics, but in knowledge of the interaction 
of the body with its natural and social environment. Once these interactions are 
understood then it follows that the actual relation between the ‘attributes’ is 
understood. It is only when we have a complete knowledge of the body in its 
interactions with the environment, that is, knowing how nature is refracted through 
the body and represented to us, that we can have a knowledge of nature undivided 
by any ‘attributes’. This is the aim of science or philosophy as Spinoza conceived it 
and its scope makes this part of his philosophy truly visionary. 
 
These interactions therefore cannot be understood solely in empirical terms as they 
would be understood from a positivist theoretical perspective.  Spinoza does not say 
there can be no such scientific knowledge.  He was, in fact, keenly interested in the 
positive science of his day, as his correspondence attests but he does propose, and 
this is the origin of the difficulty of accommodating Spinoza’s theory of emotion to 
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positive science, that empirical ideas or concepts, inasmuch as they are contingent, 
are incomplete, or to use his term ‘inadequate’.  Empirical knowledge is organised 
from contingent experience, including emotional experience, and accounts for what 
Spinoza calls ‘images’ or ‘inadequate ideas’, what I shall try to show Vygotsky calls 
‘spontaneous’ or ‘everyday’ concepts.  Images are formed inductively and our 
language of general class terms, in Spinoza, ‘signs’, captures these generalised 
images in speech.  Scientific knowledge formed inductively and by the effort to 
extend the use of class terms to economise in our ability to predict and understand 
events in the ‘common order of nature’, that is, nature understood empirically, is 
therefore not excluded by Spinoza from our efforts to understand natural 
phenomena.  But he does regard the ideas constituting this ‘first kind of knowledge’ 
as ‘inadequate’.  In this respect he is a fallibilist, not unlike Mill or Popper.   
 
To obtain ‘adequate’ ideas of nature, our contingent experience, including our 
emotional experience, has to be ordered, not by general class terms, for, as I have 
shown, these are themselves inadequate constructs upon contingent experiences or 
images of them further represented in speech as signs, but by a higher order 
concept or ‘adequate idea’, itself also knowledge of nature.  It is worth noting, in 
passing, that this relation between adequate and inadequate ideas anticipates the 
relation between Vygotsky’s ascending spontaneous concepts as they are organised 
by descending scientific concepts.  Like Vygotsky’s scientific concepts Spinoza’s 
‘adequate ideas’ represent knowledge of the most general or essential properties of 
nature shared ‘in the part and the whole’, that is, common to this or that object or 
body and the whole of nature.  Spinoza explains this in the famous ‘physical 
digression’ in Ethics I.13.  In the lemmata there he claims one of the most essential 
properties of nature, conceived under the attribute of extension, is its ‘motion-and-
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rest’, that is, the causal interactions between the various parts or ‘modes’ of nature of 
every size and description from atoms to human bodies and upward to social and 
political relations.  Under the attribute of thought these causal interactions reappear 
as what Spinoza calls ‘common notions’ or reason and our use of these common 
notions or reason amounts to giving a causal explanation, the standard of 
explanation shared by both Spinoza and Vygotsky, as I have shown above (2.3.1.3).  
Hence for Spinoza ‘reason’ has a natural origin under the attribute of extension and 
is an activity of nature conceived under the attribute of thought.  For Spinoza then all 
rational explanation is causal, whether in the physical, psychological or political 
sciences.  It is in thinking in terms of common notions that we can order our 
emotional experience and have knowledge of and understand nature in its different 
levels of causal interaction, what Spinoza calls ‘knowledge of the second kind’.  
Since our body is part of the ‘common order of nature’ we can acquire common 
notions and hence knowledge of nature only when we understand the relation of the 
mind to the body and while we do not understand this relation in our day-to-day 
experience we do not understand how the rest of nature is represented to us except 
through the narrow window of contingent sensory experience and our language for 
this experience.  It is in that relation, properly understood, that the mind exactly is the 
body, that is to say, when our concepts correspond to their objects.  These concepts 
are therefore not general class terms or Vygotsky’s spontaneous concepts but are 
like Vygotsky’s scientific concepts for in this case scientific concepts, like adequate 
ideas, both individually as systematically summarised by a word and in their inter-
deducibility or ‘concatenation’ as Spinoza says, ‘ascend to the concrete’, as Ilyenkov 
would say, just insofar as they explain physical, psychological and social 
phenomena, not in their general quantifiable features but in their natural qualities or 
essential properties.   
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For Spinoza a ‘body’ is only such because its parts move together in their 
interactions with nature.  It is its ‘motion and rest’ in its interactions with nature which 
constitute its coherence as a body and this is true wherever several bodies, or 
‘modes of nature’ as he calls them, also retain their ‘motion and rest’ together, so 
that social relationships of one kind or another are also modes of nature inasmuch 
as the ‘motion-and-rest’ of its parts retain their overall coherence.  The interactions 
between the various complex modes of nature including especially the interactions of 
individuals and their social and political interactions insofar as these individuals are 
also social, constitutes particularly the complexity of emotional experience and these 
experiences either subvert or advance our individual activity.   
 
Spinoza’s study of this particular problem constitutes his psychology of the emotions 
and it belongs embedded in the visionary program of philosophy or science as he 
conceived it.  The purpose of his psychology of the emotions can now be 
understood.  It has two interrelated aims; first, to give an explanation of how the 
interaction of the human body with nature causes emotional experience, and second, 
to explain how this experience, especially in its social genesis, variously subverts, 
hinders and demotivates, or advances, helps or motivates, our activity.   
 
3.2 The psychological context of Spinoza’s theory of emotion 
With this overview it is evident that Vygotsky found in Spinoza a theory consonant 
with his own.  In order to clarify this and indicate where Vygotsky stands in relation to 
other theories of the emotions and why Vygotsky is close to Neo-Jamesianism I shall 
demonstrate briefly Spinoza’s theory in relation to cognitivist, recent appraisal and 
Neo-Jamesian theories of emotion.   
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3.2.1 Spinoza’s theory is not consistent with cognitivist theories 
Cognitivist theories are intentionalist.  That is, they have, to use Helm’s phrase 
‘mind-to-world direction of fit’ (Helm, 2010: 307) and hence emotions are to be 
accounted for as themselves cognitive and mental phenomena in which emotions 
are conceived as rational judgements about events which stand in an external and 
objective relation to individual minds.  For example, in accounting for feeling happy a 
cognitivist would argue that someone, event or thing is such that I can give a reason 
why that individual or event is the object of my happiness.  This is not entirely to give 
a causal explanation since such an explanation would discount the significance the 
‘other’ has to ‘me’ prior to my ‘feeling’ experience and the significance of the other is 
embedded in a myriad of other unexplained experiences, thoughts, reasons and 
other emotions.  Hence a researcher who was a cognitivist would be interested in 
asking someone thinking about their feelings, questions like ‘Why do you think you 
feel this way?’ or ‘What do you think made you so happy?’ and the answers would 
constitute ‘reasons’.  So where William James says ‘I am frightened because I run’ 
the cognitivist argues ‘I run because I am frightened and I am frightened because I 
have reason to believe that that person is going to hurt me’.  Such an account is not 
ruled out by Spinoza, but for Spinoza, to be able to give a reason is the same as to 
have higher order or rational control of ones emotions.  But this is not to say, as 
cognitivists must argue, that rationality is divorced from the emotions.  Rather it is to 
say, as Vygotsky wants to show, that emotions are ordered by higher order concepts 
or as Spinoza calls them ‘common notions’ which have the same experiential origin 
as do emotions, namely, the body.  What distinguishes common notions from the 
contingent experiences of the body is not that they are not empirical, they are, but 
that these concepts arise from interaction with any part of nature whatsoever and 
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more especially from interaction with other human bodies, for these concepts, having 
in common knowledge shared by a part of nature, a human body, with the whole of 
nature (Eth.II.37), are therefore ideas under the attribute of thought of the most 
common properties of nature conceived under the attribute of extension, namely the 
motion-and-rest of its various parts together.  Hence these higher order concepts are 
the means by which the emotions and any contingent experience can be ordered 
into a scientific explanation of their occurrence.  Since cognitivists do not conceive of 
the relations of different concepts to themselves in this way (and if they did they 
would have adopted Spinoza’s theory of mind) they must retreat to intentionality in 
an account of mental phenomena, including the emotions.  Though Spinoza can give 
an explanation of intention, “there exists no absolute faculty of understanding, 
desiring, loving” (Eth.II.48, Note) or ‘will’, ‘intention’ or ‘intellect’.  These are what he 
calls ‘faculties’ or ‘affirmations’ by which any assertion is true.  They are ways I have 
of talking about my ideas but they add nothing to those ideas.  I cannot ‘will’ that a 
triangle has three sides any more than I can ‘will’ someone to love me if all the 
evidence is to the contrary.  Since for Spinoza to give an explanation for something 
is to give its causes, the more I understand the causes of something the more do I 
understand my part in its explanation.  A cognitivist interpretation could be given of 
William James’s theory for in this case the higher emotions or ‘judgements’ as 
James called them such as moral satisfaction, gratitude and pleasure solving a 
problem, cannot, appraisal theorists would need to argue, be explained as the ‘basic’ 
emotions can be explained, as consciousness of visceral changes aroused non-
consciously by perceptions of environmental cues.  Of this problem Vygotsky says 
“James had to admit that such calm emotions, passing with no bodily excitation, may 
be ascertained in man” (Vygotsky, 1999; 114).  It was this cognitivist component of 
James’s theory and its failure to account for the emotions in a monistic theory that 
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led Vygotsky to reject James’s theory.  Hence, neither Spinoza nor Vygotsky are 
cognitivists.   
 
3.2.2 Spinoza’s theory is not consistent with appraisal theories 
The broad spectrum of appraisal theories of emotion are more easily accommodated 
to Spinoza and Vygotsky than are cognitivist theories though there remains a 
cognitivist component in some of these theories.  Unlike James’s explanation for 
arousal of basic emotions, appraisal theorists, somewhat like cognitivists, put 
cognition or perception of an emotion at the commencement of an emotional phase 
as a ‘feeling’ but hold that perception and the bodily responses or emotions that 
follow may occur below the level of awareness, and remain non-conscious.  Hence, 
like James emotions are constituted by bodily changes as an appraisal response to 
some environmental cue or are the result of conscious appraisal of those emotions, 
the conscious appraisal constituting the feeling.  In this case an appraisal response 
can entail bodily changes or emotions of which I can have no conscious feeling.  
Appraisal theories would not regard these bodily responses as true emotions.  On 
the other hand conscious appraisal can decide the feeling of the emotion.  Hence in 
the same environment the appraisal response of two individuals could be quite 
different.  The same environment could arouse an appraisal response readiness to 
fight in one individual and readiness to run away in the other.  Consciousness of the 
threat would mean I became angry in one appraisal and intimidated in the other.  For 
Prinz (2012, 242-247) the principal weakness of appraisal theories lies in the 
restrictive use of ‘emotion words’.  If the sense of the word is different in the case of 
‘I love food’ and ‘I love you’ how can my speech or my thoughts about what I say 
inform or inspire my feelings.  This is not to say that the sense of a word cannot 
change with its place in an utterance or in the circumstances in which the utterance 
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is made but it is questionable whether the perlocutionary force of the speech act is 
sufficient to discriminate between emotions or to determine an emotion or emotional 
motivation.  Speech is itself motivated emotionally so what is needed is a theory of 
emotion sufficiently comprehensive to explain the relation between, on the one hand, 
bodily emotions and feelings, which the appraisal theory includes in a limited form, 
and on the other, a theory of concept development which engages speech directly 
with emotion.  For Spinoza words are mere ‘puffs of air’.  For words to obtain the role 
appraisal theories want them to obtain their use must themselves be emotionally 
motivated.   
 
For Spinoza all the activity of the body, what he calls ‘appetite’, carries on with 
emotional effect and can continue below the level of awareness.  When we are 
conscious of ‘appetite’ then, Spinoza adds, we ‘desire’ the object of our actions.  
Although ‘intention’ might be explained in this way Spinoza’s purpose is to argue that 
if we can give a causal explanation of our ‘appetites’ we are thereby conscious of 
them and the more of our activity we can explain in causal terms the more readily 
can we transform passive emotions into the active emotions which motivate further 
activity.  The means for this is our understanding of higher order concepts, what 
Spinoza calls ‘adequate’ ideas, ‘adequate’ because ideas are merely more or less 
‘adequate’ in our task of ordering our activities and obtaining autonomy in them.  The 
retreat to ‘intention’ makes this impossible.  Vygotsky’s insight is in transforming 
Spinoza’s ‘adequate ideas’ into a hierarchy of complexes, pseudoconcepts and 
concepts in which higher order concepts organises lower order concepts.  Where in 
Spinoza the further means of achieving this is in the common notions that are 
socially distributed, in Vygotsky this ordering of concepts is mediated by the progress 
made in internalising speech, and in particular, speech which mediates those social, 
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cultural, scientific, and historical developments which are the means of individual 
learning and hence development, further creativity and autonomy.  Vygotsky 
detected an empirical component of the solution to the problem addressed in his 
monograph on the theory of emotions in the Jamesian theory and the methodological 
implications of this in the theory of Spinoza.  Methodological monism requires that 
James’s empirical explanation of the basic or primary emotions be extended to 
include the higher or secondary emotions.  In Spinoza’s theory the relation of primary 
emotions to secondary emotions is mediated by the process of their 
conceptualisation and the discovery that this process obtains a transformation or 
metamorphosis of emotion into motivation and the motivation of thinking and speech.  
Hence, as against appraisal theory, Vygotsky asserts “Thought is not the superior 
authority in this process (of verbal thinking)… Behind every thought there is an 
affective-volitional tendency…  A true and full understanding of another’s thought is 
possible only when we understand its affective-volitional basis” (Vygotsky, 1986; 
252).  Hence appraisal theories would be regarded as deficient by both Spinoza and 
Vygotsky. 
 
Cognitivism assigns motivation to intentionality.  As a consequence cognitivism has 
no role in this for the body and the visceral and homeostatic changes that sweep 
through the body as emotional experience.  Though the appraisal theory does seem 
to take the body seriously, the relation of appraisal to emotion renders the emotions 
as passive much in the way as did James’s theory, as Vygotsky observed, and in 
this relation the potential for the emotions to transform thought, that is, to motivate 
thought, is as diminished in appraisal theories of emotion as it is in the cognitivist 
theory.  Hence neither Spinoza nor Vygotsky can be accommodated to either the 
cognitivist or appraisal theories of emotion.   
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3.2.3 Spinoza’s theory is consistent with Neo-Jamesianism 
The principal difficulty with cognitivist and appraisal theories is that these showed an 
essentially Cartesian, conception of the relation of thought to emotion.  For 
judgement to be made to assign emotion thought must be conceived as 
discontinuous or split away from emotion rather than as continuous with it ‘in’ the 
same body.  The principal result of this philosophical problem is that neither theory 
can give a coherent empirical psychological account of the role of emotions in 
motivation.  The cognitivists retreat to intentionality requires the effort of ‘will’ to do all 
the work while appraisal theorists render emotions as passive.  Significantly for both 
theories the body is marginalised and diminished.  The Neo-Jamesian theory 
represents an advance over cognitivist and appraisal theories in that taking the lead 
from the Jamesian theory Neo-Jamesians want to argue that appraisals, including 
James’s ‘judgements’, are themselves embodied.   
 
Where the Jamesian theory traces emotions as the perception of bodily changes 
triggered by autonomic nervous system responses to some environmental stimulus, 
the Neo-Jamesian theory of Antonio Damasio engages the neocortex in those 
physiological responses that demand our conscious attention.  So-called ‘quick-and-
dirty’ emotional responses brought on by the amygdala when a threshold in the 
action of the thalamus has been reached occur before and below the level of 
consciousness.  My conscious awareness of the circumstances of my emotional 
response may catch up with these autonomic actions and I may then consciously 
‘feel’ the emotion.  At that stage I may consciously appraise either the circumstances 
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of my feelings or the feelings themselves in the light of experience or speculation 
and this feedback may even change the emotion.   
 
Emotions are therefore embodied responses to conscious or non-conscious 
perceptions of some event in the environment.  When these embodied responses 
are non-conscious they are emotions and they can be called ‘feelings’ when we are 
conscious of them.  It follows that emotions are not thoughts as appraisal theorists 
want to argue but that feelings of emotions are thoughts and emotions are bodily 
changes that give rise to feelings.  For example if I am surprised by some event or 
stimulus my surprise will consist in bodily responses fed from the moment of 
perception through the thalamus, amygdala and other circuits of the central and 
peripheral nervous system to the viscera and muscles and back to the neocortex.  
The emotion of surprise can therefore arise spontaneously and before I become 
aware of it.  I do not need to be conscious of my surprise to be surprised.  The 
evidence of this is those occasions when someone watching our response to some 
event says something like ‘You should have seen your face!’  This remark may even 
trigger my embarrassment but here again my emotion of embarrassment is surely 
not a ‘thought’ as appraisal theorists insist.  I could avoid this objection by assigning 
‘surprise’ and ‘embarrassment’ to non-conscious appraisals of bodily responses 
which I experience as feelings.  This would allow me to say my surprise or 
embarrassment was a feeling rather than an emotion.  But if my emotion is decided 
by my appraisal this would mean my surprise or embarrassment could be 
transformed from a feeling to an emotion by it and this surely does no justice to the 
momentary experience of surprise or embarrassment, both of which are distinctive 
emotions wired to very particular interactions between the viscera and musculature 
on the one hand and complex details of the central and peripheral nervous system 
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on the other.  Like surprise and embarrassment, Vygotsky observes, like Darwin and 
much in the way Zajonc and Plutchik have recently, that ‘intellectual feelings, 
curiosity and interest’, “in and of themselves… possess an extraordinary 
imperceptible physical expression, confined for the most part to slight movements of 
the eyes and face” (Vygotsky, 1997; 109). 
 
This arrangement, if consistent, gives the Neo-Jamesian theory greater explanatory 
power of the data than the cognitivist or appraisal theories.  It enables an explanation 
of non-conscious appraisal as bodily changes or, which is the same thing, emotional 
responses to our environmental stimulus, and the conscious awareness of these 
appraisals consistent with the Jamesian theory.  Assigning conscious awareness of 
emotions to feeling enables an explanation of the modulation of feeling by conscious 
appraisals.  Moreover conscious appraisals can further stimulate those bodily 
changes which constitute emotion by a process of ‘feedback’.  Finally, the 
explanatory power of this theory is extended further when one considers that 
conscious appraisal can consist of remembered or imagined appraisals and that 
these past or speculative appraisals can further modulate feeling or the feedback of 
emotion.  It would not be sufficient to simply re-label the Jamesian theory’s 
‘judgement’ or ‘intellectual emotion’ as appraisals.  This would be dallying with the 
word ‘appraisal’.  But if it can be shown that thought is emotionally motivated and 
that the reach of emotion is as pervasive as experience shows it to be, as Spinoza 
repeatedly reminds his reader throughout the Ethics, then the Neo-Jamesian theory 
has confirmed and corroborated the ambitions of Spinoza and Vygotsky in 
reasserting the status of the human body as the proper focus and concern of 
psychological and educational enquiry and its social ramifications.  
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By asserting the status of the body against the claims of idealism and dualism 
Spinoza was able to assert, in the Ethics, the conditions of its proper functioning, and 
challenge, in the Theologico-Political Treatise and the Political Treatise, the claims of 
autocracy, authoritarianism and tradition, shored up by idealism and popular religion, 
as contrary to the democratic conditions of individual liberty and well-being.  
Vygotsky, like Marx, seems to have found in Spinoza a kindred spirit and in the 
Ethics the solution to the problem of the theory of emotions consistent with his own 
psychosocial theory, and a remedy, both personal and professional, against the 
increasingly burdensome obstacles mounted against his progress as the Soviet 
experiment turned inwards upon itself and toward authoritarianism.   
 
3.2.4 Spinoza’s theory is consistent with the Neo-Jamesianism of Antonio 
 Damasio 
Because Jamesian and Neo-Jamesian theories of the emotions have foregrounded 
emotion rather than cognitive mental states these theories have been regarded as 
empirical versions of the epistemology of David Hume.  Damasio’s Neo-Jamesian 
theory is not Humean but Spinozist so it is necessary to my argument to offer a 
defence of Damasio’s philosophical position.  Neu has argued that because Spinoza 
regards “emotions as essentially thoughts with feelings attached” he can “account for 
ranges of intellectuality among emotions and within particular emotions” (Neu, 1977, 
1-3).  In making his case for Spinoza as “the philosopher of psychoanalysis” Neu 
compares him with Hume, who “treats emotions as essentially feelings (‘affects’ or 
‘impressions’) with thoughts incidentally attached” and hence argues that the 
comparative weakness of Hume’s treatment is that, unlike Spinoza’s, it restricts 
discrimination between emotions.  This follows because the incidental attachment of 
thought to the emotion rather than the attachment of emotion to thought makes it 
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difficult for one to believe that there is a particular object or cause for any emotion 
one might feel.  On this account Neu regards Hume’s theory of emotion as 
anticipating the Jamesian theory of emotion and in this conclusion Neu shares 
Vygotsky’s objections to the same theory. 
 
On the other hand Helm (2010; 303-323) argues that the Humean theory, with its 
tendency to render motivation as little more than a basic impulse to move, is ‘implicit’ 
in the Neo-Jamesian theory advanced as a development of the Jamesian theory.  
Helm wants to argue that emotions motivate and that the Neo-Jamesian theory 
cannot explain this any better than the Jamesian theory.  For Helm “what is missing 
is that desires are for things that are worth pursuing” and that “for something to have 
import to you – for it to matter to you, for you to care about it – is for it to have a kind 
of worth” and that consequently emotions are “intentional feelings of import”.  Helm 
thus introduces ‘intentions’.  According to Neu “Spinoza holds a strong thesis of 
intentionality” and quotes Ethics, II, Axiom 3, where Spinoza proposes there are no 
modes of thought such as love or desire “unless in the same individual exists the 
idea of a thing loved, desired, etcetera”.  Setting aside for the present the question 
whether Spinoza does argue the intentionality thesis, if Neu is correct in holding that 
Spinoza’s theory is better able to explain motivation than Hume’s, or indeed 
James’s, and Helm is correct in regarding Neo-Jamesianism as lacking a theory of 
intentionality able to account for motivation, it would appear that Helm would want to 
make a case for Spinoza or for a Neo-Jamesian theory informed by Spinoza.  But 
since both Neu thinks the Jamesian theory and Helm thinks the Neo-Jamesian 
theory are each versions of Hume’s theory it would appear that the Neo-Jamesian 
theory is not a development of the Jamesian theory after all.  However, as evidence 
of a Neo-Jamesian, Helm cites Damasio and in particular the way Damasio 
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assimilates fear, anger, pleasure, drives and motivation itself to homeostasis.  It is 
the explanatory significance Damasio accords homeostasis with which Helm takes 
issue for the objects “worth pursuing” invite “responses that sometimes rationally 
demand intentional action” and for Helm intentionality simply cannot be explained in 
terms of the bio-regulatory function of homeostasis.  For Damasio, “This does not 
appear to be the case… single cells also appear to have intentions and aboutness” 
(Damasio 2010, 90-91).  Moreover since “Brentano actually saw the intentional 
attitude as the hallmark of mental phenomena” the results of biology offer “one more 
reason to deny the intuitive abyss between the mental and the physical worlds”.  So 
it is curious that Helm did not point out that it is not Hume that Damasio seeks to 
‘connect’ to the “advances on the science of emotion and feeling” and “to some of 
the corresponding neurobiology of today” but Spinoza, who Damasio calls “the 
protobiologist” (Damasio, 2003, 14).  Damasio’s Neo-Jamesianism is not Humean 
but Spinozist.  The advance from a Jamesian to a Neo-Jamesian theory consists in 
the absence of Spinoza in the former and his presence in the later theory and this 
advance seems to have been anticipated by Vygotsky in his monograph on the 
emotions as I have attempted to demonstrate (Chapter 2).  As I have just hinted and 
shall try to explain below in detail, it is not the philosophical thesis of ‘intentionality’ 
which determines consciousness, but biological function.  Damasio is surely right.  
For Spinoza motivations are what he calls ‘appetites’ and consciousness of these 
are our ‘desires’.  “Desires are for things that are worth pursuing”, says Helm and 
these things are the kinds of things we regard as worthwhile.  Those things are not 
simply the need for food and water.  Nor are they the performance of those actions 
that obtain reward, but higher order active emotions that arise in our social relations.  
It is in those relationships of responsibility, co-operation, friendship, tolerance and 
democracy where some psychologically meaningful account of ‘intention’ can be 
given.   
 63 
 
To look ahead a little, I shall attempt to demonstrate below that Antonio Damasio, 
referring to Spinoza, explains hierarchies of concepts as increasingly more complex 
and comprehensive neural patterns or “topographically organised representations” 
(Damasio, 1995, 101) of patterns of changes in body states or emotions.  Damasio’s 
explanation embodies emotion at every level of human activity, except in its 
intersection with speech, but looking ahead again I shall attempt to show that 
Vygotsky, himself referring to Spinoza, is pointing the way to a Spinozist, Neo-
Jamesian theory of motivation where the corresponding ordering or nesting of 
concepts is obtained during emotionally motivated dialogue.  I shall attempt to show 
that the interiorisation of speech, which occasions the development of higher order 
concepts, is simultaneously motivated by the transformation of passive into active 
emotional experience as explained by Spinoza.  I shall attempt to show that this 
transformative function of emotion was the component function Vygotsky sought for 
his unit of analysis described at the end of Thought and Language.   
 
Result 
It is claimed for Damasio that his theoretical perspective, explained by him in his 
professional and popular academic writing, is Neo-Jamesian and his biological and 
neuroscience theory of emotion, Spinozist.  After reading the relevant work it seems 
reasonable to conclude, despite omissions by Damasio from Spinoza’s arguments, 
that Damasio’s theory of emotion has the potential for resolving the objections 
Vygotsky raised against the Jamesian theory of emotion set out in Chapter 2.   
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CHAPTER 4:  RESEARCH PROBLEM AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
Introductory survey 
The subject of this chapter is the formalisation of the research problem as far as the 
nature of the subject permits.  The research problem centres around the potential of 
Damasio’s Neo-Jamesian theory and how this theory can serve in a response to 
Vygotsky’s objections to the earlier Jamesian theory.  This potential will be explored 
by means of strategic research questions.  The answers to these questions resolve 
the problem of the relevance of Damasio’s Neo-Jamesianism to Vygotsky and permit 
progress through the thesis in steps or stages and hence arrive at a potential version 
of the unit of analysis informed by the results of considerations of Vygotsky’s 
monograph.   
 
Having in the previous chapters surveyed Vygotsky’s unfinished monograph on the 
emotions, observations about that work and its contemporary significance by 
Vygotsky scholars, I will survey the problems raised and mark a path through those 
problems with four principal questions to be addressed in the chapters that follow.   
 
In this chapter I shall give a comprehensive overview of the principal problem and its 
sub-problems so that the sub-problems do not obscure my main thesis.  The thesis 
can be put simply if one regards Spinoza’s theory of emotion as the middle term in 
an argument with Vygotsky’s and Damasio’s interpretations of Spinoza as the major 
and minor terms.  Put another way I shall aim to show that the work of Damasio is 
relevant to Vygotsky in that Damasio explains the relation of biology to the emotions 
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in a way Vygotsky already suggests.  Equally, I shall show that Vygotsky is relevant 
to Damasio, and to neuroscience generally, in explaining the social significance of 
the emotions in speech and their part in the motivation of concept development.  
Both Damasio’s ‘base-up’ explanation and Vygotsky’s ‘top-down’ explanation are 
Spinozist. 
 
4.1 The principal problem 
The broadest construction of the problem has to explain how a Vygotskian theory of 
emotion could interact with or explain the development of social concepts.  Of these 
two components of the problem the first entails some sub problems.  The verdict of 
Vygotsky scholars, that his monograph on the emotions is unfinished, poses a 
general or principal problem.  Towards the end of Thought and Language, which he 
wrote at the same time as Theory of Emotion, Vygotsky raises the question how an 
‘affective-volitional’ function would complete his unit of analysis (Vygotsky, 1986, 
252-3) or his psychological ‘cell’, that is the minimum unit in which memory, 
intelligence, speech, imagination, reason and emotion function together as part of 
the seamlessness of our ‘inner’ and mental life.  Hence Vygotsky’s ideas about the 
‘affective-volitional’, or motivational, have a bearing on his linguistic theory of 
concept development, for if we wish to argue with Vygotsky that mental development 
is partly a functional effect of learning and that learning is not entirely contingent 
upon prior mental development, an explanation of the conditions in which learning 
does and does not motivate is crucial for an understanding of mental development.  
Learning, and hence the mental development of the child and the adolescent, and 
hence also the adult, depends upon particular motivational conditions.  Learning 
does not, of itself, and considered without relation to emotion, motivate.  The 
function, additional to Vygotsky’s ‘unit of analysis’ and crucial to the possibility of 
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learning and mental development, is emotion, indeed emotional health and well-
being.  The conditions for this at home or at school are therefore social.  The social 
conditions of a school can be demotivating and painful where the autonomy and self-
regard of the adolescent is made a struggle.  On the other hand informed and 
responsible organisation, sensitive to the emotional health and well-being of the 
adolescent, means the creation of particular conditions for learning and mental 
development that can be called ‘social’ in the full sense of the word.  What these 
conditions are is the most general sense of the problem and its principal significance. 
 
At this very general level, Yaroshevsky suggested (Yaroshevsky, 1999, pp 264-266) 
Vygotsky would have completed the monograph by showing that Spinoza’s monistic 
theory of mind is consistent with sociodeterminism and that the ‘higher’, ‘social’ or 
‘secondary’ emotions could be shown to be determined by cultural-historical 
phenomena.  Given the contents of the monograph it is more likely that Vygotsky 
would have attempted an interpretation of Spinoza’s theory of emotion that would 
permit “a testing of his (Spinoza’s) ideas in the light of contemporary scientific 
knowledge” (Vygotsky, 1999 p 105) which would have resolved his objections to the 
James-Lange or Jamesian theory of emotion, in particular its inability to explain the 
secondary emotions in a way methodologically consistent with its physiological 
explanation of the primary emotions.  Unlike Yaroshevsky, Vygotsky conceived of a 
monistic empirical psychology inclusive of biological, mental and social phenomena.  
While Yaroshevsky thought Vygotsky would explain the secondary emotions on the 
social ‘plane’ of development, Vygotsky wished to incorporate ‘contemporary 
scientific knowledge’ of biological phenomena into his account.   
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Recent developments in physiological psychology and in neuroscience have shown 
that higher, or ‘executive’ mental functions, including secondary emotions, can be 
given the same biological explanation as can elementary mental functions and 
primary emotions.  In particular, advances in these fields that appear to account for 
explanatory defects or deficiencies in the Jamesian theory, especially as revealed by 
the Cannon and Singer-Schachter theories, has led to neuroscience explanations 
that can also be termed Neo-Jamesian.  Of the various Neo-Jamesian or 
neuroscience explanations of higher mental functions and secondary emotions 
Cromby (Cromby, 2005, p 295-297) and Daniels (Daniels, 2001, 27 and 47) have 
remarked on the special relevance of the theories of Antonio Damasio to Vygotsky 
and why they “appear compatible” (Cromby, p 297).  I shall give an account of this 
relevance and go on to argue that Damasio’s declared Spinozist perspective has the 
potential for resolving Vygotsky’s objections to William James and provide for a 
Spinozist theory of emotion consistent with the empirical interpretation of Spinoza 
that Vygotsky planned in his monograph.  I shall therefore return to the objections 
Vygotsky raised against the Jamesian theory I isolated from Vygotsky’s monograph 
on the Theory of Emotion, and mindful that Damasio was not addressing these 
particular objections with Vygotsky in mind, show how these are met from my survey 
of Damasio’s Spinozistic theory of emotion and hence offer a methodological test of 
the sufficiency of Damasio’s theory of emotion for Vygotsky’s purpose, namely a 
theory of motivation.  This can be put in the form of a fundamental research question 
which must be answered before anything else can be attempted without speculation:  
Does Damasio’s interpretation of Spinoza’s theory of emotion and its development in 
a biological theory meet Vygotsky’s objections to the Jamesian theory of emotions?   
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Only after that preparatory analysis will I be able to address the principal problem.  
This can be put as a question as follows:  What is the relation of emotion to the 
development of social concepts?   
 
However, nested within this principal problem and the question it raises, with its 
possible answer, lies a further, deeper problem of the interpretation of Spinoza by 
Damasio. 
 
4.2 Problem of interpretation 
With reference to Damasio I shall show that in the interpretation of Spinoza’s theory 
of mind he omits elements important to Spinoza’s own arguments.  While Damasio’s 
interpretation of Spinoza may be sufficient for a solely biological theory of the 
emotions and his omissions not essential for our understanding of his vast work, if 
one seeks in Damasio a Neo-Jamesian or neuroscientific theory with sufficient 
explanatory power to accommodate biological and social phenomena in a non-
reductive synthesis as do Cromby and Daniels, these omissions create problems for 
the compatibility of Vygotsky and Damasio.  This is especially interesting if Vygotsky 
and Damasio share common philosophical ground in Spinoza as they have declared. 
 
A minor problem arises in Damasio’s account of the role of memory in emotion but a 
further and very significant problem arises where Damasio gives his account of what 
he calls ‘extended consciousness’.  I shall attempt to show that a possible solution to 
these problems is found by appealing to a more complete version of Spinoza’s 
theory of mind and one that is consistent with Vygotsky’s understanding of Spinoza 
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as revealed in Theory of Emotion as well as his linguistic theory of concept 
development.  I will then be able to show that the relation of Vygotsky to Damasio 
lies in a Vygotskian solution to the problem of ‘extended consciousness’, that is, that 
Vygotsky’s linguistic theory of concept development completes elements of 
Damasio’s biological theory that attempts to account for social concepts without a 
theory of language.  Hence the problem set out in this section could be represented 
in the question:  Why is Damasio’s interpretation incomplete and how does this lead 
to a problem concerning his notion of ‘extended consciousness’? 
 
To reach that stage I attempt a version of Vygotsky’s unit of analysis incorporating a 
Spinozist theory of emotion.  Methodologically this is a further sub-problem (4.3 
below) nested within the problem of this section (4.2), but psychologically it is of a 
piece with the problem of ‘extended consciousness’ and its possible solution in 
Vygotsky’s theory of concept development as I shall attempt to demonstrate. 
 
4.3 Problem of the unit of analysis 
Vygotsky has amply explained how concepts, and hence thinking with concepts, 
develop with the use of language.  But the use of language is also motivated by the 
development of the concept because development signals increased emotional 
activity.  This is the significance of the ‘affective-volitional’ function Vygotsky sought 
to incorporate into his unit of analysis.  His unit of analysis is at once a 
methodological tool of explanation and the simplest psychological or mental 
phenomenon, moment of experience or ‘qualia’. 
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If at one stage a word has been given ostensive or referential meaning but cannot be 
used in an explanation or a description in ordinary language, the development of the 
concept in the next stage expands the meaning, or concept, and hence the use of 
words.  Hence some words can be used in one ‘inductive’ process as class terms to 
generalise in referring to objects and events, while other words, and even the same 
words, can be used in another process to organise together general class terms in 
new perspectives capable of explaining the relations of those objects and events.  
The same words can serve as ‘tools’ in both processes of concept development.  
The use of language in an ‘inductive’ or generalising process augments the 
development of what Vygotsky calls ‘spontaneous’ or ‘everyday’ concepts, while the 
use of language in a ‘deductive’ or explanatory process augments the development 
of what he terms ‘scientific’ or ‘academic’ concepts.  In either case the main point 
here is that children and students at school or university do not form concepts in a 
vacuum, in the abstract, or as a consequence of some mechanical processes of 
teaching which are instructional, expository or didactic.  Teaching is not ‘telling’ or 
‘talking’.  Unless the relationship between teacher and student is motivated by 
dialogue it will be possible for children or students only to form what Vygotsky calls 
‘pseudoconcepts’ in this way and to use language to feign understanding, and there 
is no doubt that some students spend many hours fretting over how they may use 
language to convince others that all is well, when it is not. 
 
To reveal what is happening here it is necessary to explain the reciprocal relations of 
word use to concept development as well as motivation.  That is, to attempt to 
explain how word use, especially in a dialogue, is also motivated by concept 
development and conversely how concepts develop because their development is 
psychologically related to the motivation to speak.  The motivation to speak and to 
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use language for the development of understanding and powers of comprehension is 
given in the increased emotional activity or emotional well-being that accompanies 
the development of conceptual thinking.  For as the students’ own world view is 
expanded by the explanatory power of concepts and their internal systematic and 
external deductive interrelations, so the student increases in autonomy, mastery and 
maturity as an emotional state. Concepts are formed in word use in a dialogue which 
is not only rewarding at one stage but is, at a later stage, especially during 
adolescence, consolidating the emotional well-being of the student as an 
autonomous agent, not needful of or responsive to, rewards, punishment, praise or 
blame.  Speech is motivated by the emotional conditions of its use and its use is 
motivated when it serves further concept development and its accompanying 
emotional activity.  More than this, emotions, as Spinoza, Vygotsky and Damasio 
urge, are states of the body and both emotions and our consciousness of them, 
feelings, trace our mental processes.  Concepts develop and their development is 
embodied in emotional activity distributed through the body and the circuitry of the 
brain.  Hence an explanation of concept development and how the emotional 
conditions for it are mediated by the use of language shows the relation of 
Vygotsky’s completed unit of analysis to his linguistic theory of concept development.  
Moreover the unity of these two accounts resolves the problem of ‘extended 
consciousness’ by including in Damasio’s account a theory of language able to 
bridge the gulf between two individuals with ‘extended consciousness’ and hence 
bridge the gulf between biological and social functions of emotion, and again, the 
relation of Damasio’s biological theory of ‘embodied’ emotion to motivation in the 
social phenomenon of speech.  This problem can also be put in the form of a 
question.  How does Vygotsky’s unit of analysis, incorporating a Spinozistic theory of 
emotion explain speech motivation and resolve the problem of ‘extended 
consciousness'? 
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4.4 Relevance of the concept of ‘unit of analysis’ 
The research question put in section 4.3 above can be answered after establishing 
the relation of the proposed Neo-Jamesian solution (Chapter 3) to Vygotsky’s unit of 
analysis.  Vygotsky explores the concept of ‘unit of analysis’ in various parts of his 
work.  He gives the reasons for analysis that produces ‘units’ rather than ‘elements’ 
in both Problem of the Environment and Thought and Language, two of his last 
writings, but not anywhere in Theory of Emotion, work he had halted the previous 
year (1933).  It is possible that Vygotsky thought of the unit of analysis as 
contributing towards a resolution of the methodological problem raised by Theory of 
Emotion.  I shall attempt to show that the unit of analysis explored in Problem of the 
Environment, and usually captured in the phrase ‘emotional experience’, does 
establish the relevance of Neo-Jamesianism to the Vygotskian thesis.  In doing this I 
shall trace the different units Vygotsky discovered in his progress towards the 
concept of ‘emotional experience’.  Before I make that attempt I shall explore the 
origin and use of the concept of ‘unit of analysis’ and demonstrate as far as possible 
its place in my argument for the relevance of Neo-Jamesianism to the Vygotskian 
thesis.   
 
A reason offered for Vygotsky’s theory of the ‘unit of analysis’ is the quotation ‘from 
unpublished notebooks’ included by the editors of Mind in Society with the selections 
in that work.  According to Vygotsky “Marx analyses a single living cell of capitalist 
society…..and within this cell he discovers the structure of the entire system….” and 
he continues, “Anyone who could discover what a “psychological cell” is….would 
thereby find the key to psychology as a whole” (Vygotsky, 1978, p 8).  Hence, in the 
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words of Marx often quoted by Vygotsky, “…all science would be superfluous if the 
outward appearance and the essence of things directly coincided” (Marx, 1984, p 
817), and in Vygotsky’s own words, “If every object was phenotypically and 
genotypically equivalent….then everyday experience would fully suffice to replace 
scientific analysis” (Vygotsky, 1978, p 63).  The ‘cell’, therefore, is not directly 
‘observable’ phenomena and those who take the ‘outward appearance’ as evidence 
would be “…incapable of penetrating its phenomena, to recognise the inner essence 
and inner structure of this process behind its outer appearance” (Marx, 1984, p 168).  
The critical concept here is ‘essence’ and since, as Vygotsky says, “Units are 
products of analysis that correspond to specific aspects of the phenomena under 
investigation” (Vygotsky, 1986, p 211), ‘cells’ and ‘units’ are the ‘essence’ of 
phenomena determined by the investigation, whether psychological or economic, for 
example.  Vygotsky, it seems, is committed to a type of essentialism, the product of 
which is psychological.  Adopting the concept of ‘unit of analysis’ helps Vygotsky 
clarify, for reasons of methodology, the difference between the qualitative and the 
quantitative in research.   
 
Vygotsky explores this distinction by comparing ‘units’ with ‘elements of analysis’.  
Both units and elements are products of analysis so the question concerning what is 
meant by analysis is also partly explained in making the distinction.  Elements are 
discrete component parts of phenomena.  Whatever the phenomena, it is analysed 
in terms of its properties, parts or ‘accidents’.  Vygotsky illustrates this by explaining 
how a molecule of water can be analysed, or, to use his term ‘decomposed’, into its 
constituent atoms or parts.  Inasmuch as mental phenomena can be conceived as 
constituted by its parts in this way it would also be analysable in terms of elements 
and these would be said to include ‘memory’, ‘reason’, ‘imagination’, ‘intelligence’, 
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‘emotion’, and so forth; in other words, all the faculties dismissed by Spinoza.  
Evidence for the component parts or elements can each be quantified as data and 
depending on its theoretical pertinence corroborate or falsify the theory offered to 
explain the data.  Intelligence, for example, can be explained in terms of the data 
obtained from the application of the same I.Q. test to different sample populations or 
from the application of different tests corrected for cultural bias, to the same sample.  
In each case the data follows the administration of the I.Q. test, or the experiment, 
and are used as evidence for the theoretical explanation of the occurrence of ‘g’ 
intelligence in isolation from memory, emotion, motivation and imagination and other 
mental ‘faculties’.  Observing that data for ‘elements’ indicates the result of the 
application of the test, Vygotsky’s analysis into ‘units’ meant observing, not the 
results ‘following’ the test but the test in its process of administration, that is, 
following or observing the test as the subject solves the problems set.  Where 
analysis produces ‘elements’, the test is a ‘tool for result’ and where analysis 
produces ‘units’ (since ‘units are products of analysis’) the test is ‘tool-and-result’.  
The tool for result “methodology with which to tackle a world filled with problems is 
an instrumental one” (Holzman, 2009, p 10), one in which “psychology became 
about human beings in the ways that zoology is about animal life” and “thus 
dismissed that which is most fascinating and significant about being human – our 
subjectivity” (Holzman, 2009, p 12).  For Holzman “behaviour is the perfect unit of 
analysis for a culture dominated by alienation” (Holzman, 2009, p 14).  Following 
Vygotsky’s distinction what Holzman must mean here is ‘element of analysis’, since if 
behaviour is the unit, it would be the ‘product of analysis’ and, unless mental 
development is exactly equivalent to observable behaviour, this is methodologically 
impossible in psychology as understood by Vygotsky.  Hence Vygotsky’s ‘unit of 
analysis’ is consistent with essentialism and not instrumentalism in science.  It is 
consistent with the claim of Daniel Little that “Marx’s essentialism amounts to the 
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view that the aim of social science is to show how the observable characteristics of 
the system are shaped by its inner physiology.”  (Little, 1986, p 93).   
 
In his examination of ‘the scientific Marx’, Little argues that in seeking an explanation 
of the “inner physiology” Marx was “rejecting a very narrow empiricism” (Little, 1986, 
p 98) and “insisting on” a “theory of science” that would be “unwelcome to social 
scientists who imagine the role of their science to be systematic description of 
observable phenomena” (p 98).  In this Little argues that Marx’s reservations 
concerning “narrow inductivism” were ahead of his time.  Little argues that 
“Essentialism is highly consonant with the dominant contemporary view of modern 
science:  the conviction that scientific explanation requires more than simple 
enumeration of factual circumstances” (Little, 1986, p 99).  Illustrating this kind of 
argument Harré says that Mendel’s laws “were statistical and ‘external’ in character” 
and hence did not “satisfy the demand for explanation”.  This demand was met when 
the “system of genes and replicating molecular helices of atoms” was “finally 
uncovered”.  Again, “we know the Law of Mutual Gravitation” but “have very little 
idea as to the mechanism of gravitational attraction” (Harré, 1972, p 119).  One 
might say that if “elements of essentialism are fairly innocuous portions of a theory of 
science” (Little, 1986, p 99), then on the other hand, “In the absence of complete 
knowledge of a phenomenon, scientists will settle for the statistics of the conditions 
of its occurrence…” (Harré, 1972, p 118).   
 
Even if it is true that “Vygotsky never used any quantitative method of data analysis” 
(Toomela, 2014, p 108) his essentialism in psychology is methodological.  Vygotsky 
wants to avoid the “transpositions of the biogenetic principle, the experiment, the 
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mathematical method from the natural sciences” because their use “created the 
appearance of science in psychology” rather than help psychology develop in its own 
way.  After all, the quantitative data, and its results, that helped his collaborator 
Zhozephine Shif demonstrate empirically the difference between spontaneous and 
scientific concepts, is discussed at length in the first part of Chapter 6 of Thought 
and Language (Vygotsky, 1986, p 146-162).   
 
Turning to Spinoza the notion of essence becomes more clear.  He distinguishes 
between ‘vague experience’ or ‘perception’ which is contingent and chaotic and 
“Perception….wherein the essence of one thing is concluded from the essence of 
another but not adequately:  this happens when we infer a cause from some effect” 
(Corr. Und. Para. 19. III).  That is, we ‘infer’ by habit or association because having 
inadequate ideas we are unable to understand the union of the mind to the body and 
hence the relation of the mind to the modifications of the body as a consequence of 
our adaptations to nature (Eth. II. 25) and relations with others.  It is only when 
inadequate ideas no longer intrude upon our perceptions and are organised by 
adequate ideas (Eth. II. 41 and V. 26) that we can have knowledge of ourselves and 
hence psychology, and by the same method, the rest of nature, that is “wherein a 
thing is perceived through its essence alone or through a knowledge of its proximate 
cause” (Corr. Un. 19. IV), that is, a cause which is not ‘inferred’.  This ‘correction of 
the understanding’ is obtained because “Those things which are common to all, and 
which are equally in a part and in the whole, can only be conceived adequately” (Eth. 
II. 38).  Since “That which is common to all (Lemma 2) and that which is equally in a 
part and in the whole, does not constitute the essence of any particular thing” (Eth. II. 
37) is a ‘common notion’ (Eth. II. 40. Sch. 2) or ‘entity of reason’ shared by 
individuals who are said to be ‘rational’ because they ‘agree in nature’ (Eth. IV. 35), 
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essence ‘can only be conceived adequately’.  Hence, for Spinoza, the result of 
analysis of ‘that which is equally in a part and in the whole’, an essence, is also a 
‘common notion’.   
 
Given the essence, the unit, analysis is determined by its subject matter and that it 
must show that the nature of the whole is identical with its parts.  Next, “the direction 
we must move…relies on the analysis of the complex whole into its units” (Vygotsky, 
2004, p 41).  Our hypothesis or idea of the complex whole indicates how the analysis 
must proceed and this will be “through its essence alone or through its proximate 
cause” (Corr. Und. 92).  Spinoza illustrates this with the example of building a house.  
Suppose someone “Knows that the design of the author of that work is to build a 
house, he will call that house…perfect as soon as he sees it brought to the finish 
which its author determined to give it” (Eth. IV. Pref.).  But we do not have to ask for 
the origin of the concept of the house or “stand in need of another method to 
investigate the method of investigating” since, to take an example “to work iron a 
hammer is needed and in order to have a hammer it must be made…and in this 
manner any one might vainly endeavour to prove that men have no power of working 
iron” (Corr. Und. 30).  Again “At the end of every labour-process we get a result that 
already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its commencement” (Marx, 1977, 
p 173).  A result is obtained from unit analysis when the product and the process of 
its development are explained under analysis.  In Marx’s words the analysis “begins 
post festum with the results of the process of development ready to hand” (Marx, 
1977, p 80).  Returning to Spinoza’s ‘common notions’ or ‘entities of reason’, since 
these exist in complete or ‘perfect’ form and do not need to be created, their 
discovery is like the building of the house or the development of a concept.  The 
developed concept already exists at the beginning of the process of discovery and it 
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becomes clearer to the process of analysis the more analysis discovers the 
explanatory power of the concept or the potential of the concept to explain its own 
conditions, its necessity, as in the case of common notions.  This tendency of 
concept development Spinoza calls ‘perfection’ and is otherwise called ‘prolepsis’.  
Vygotsky calls it the ‘final form’.  Unlike element analysis there is nothing like an 
inductive process of generalisation in unit analysis, “For the understanding cannot 
descend from universal axioms to individual things since axioms are extended to 
infinity…” (Corr. Und. 93).  That is, generalisations do not tell us anything about 
particular things, and universal notions, unlike common notions, are transcendental 
terms, like ‘being’, ‘exists’, which tell us nothing at all.  As Marx continues, analysis 
“leads from abstract definitions by way of reasoning to the reproduction of the 
concrete situation in the concept” and hence “the method of advancing from the 
abstract to the concrete” is the method of abstraction or unit analysis and it is “simply 
the way in which thinking assimilates the concrete and reproduces it as a concrete 
mental category” (Marx, 1977, p 206-207).  Spinoza held that these were adequate 
ideas which explained the relations between other lower order adequate ideas, and 
even inadequate ideas and their occurrence, in a system of ideas under the ‘attribute 
of thought’, itself equivalent to the system of nature under the ‘attribute of extension’.  
Hence, when Vygotsky asks “What then is the unit that possesses the characteristics 
inherent to the integral phenomenon of verbal thinking and that cannot be further 
decomposed?” (Vygotsky, 2004, p 37), he is not “breaking it up into its component 
elements, thought and word, neither of which, taken separately, possess the 
properties of the whole” because “this method is not true analysis” (Vygotsky, 1986, 
p 211).  On the contrary, “In our view such a unit can be found in the inner aspect of 
the word, in its meaning” (Vygotsky, 2004, p 37).   
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This represented a decisive stage in the development of Vygotsky’s theory of 
method and its results in psychology.  However as he advanced in his analysis of the 
problem of mental development he came to view the unit he had discovered as 
needing further exploration.  In particular, he noticed that “By isolating thinking from 
affect at the outset, we effectively cut ourselves off from any potential for a causal 
explanation of thinking” (Vygotsky, 2004, p 41).  Although in 1931 he started an 
analysis which became the monograph on the Theory of Emotion, he “never 
advanced to the positive part of the treatise…and in 1933 the work on the book 
came to a halt” (Zavershneva, 2014, p 86).  In Problem of the Environment (1934) 
Vygotsky continued to address the problem with “emotional experience” as a new 
unit of analysis but according to Ekaterina Zavershneva “this line of theorising 
remained at the level of mere speculation” (Zavershneva, 2014, p 78) and since “it 
was the overemphasis on the intellect which prevented him from fulfilling the task” 
Vygotsky “spent the last two years of his life trying to overcome the intellectual bias” 
(Zavershneva, 2014, p 86).   
 
Having shown that Vygotsky’s psychology could be described, as I have argued 
Little describes Marxism, as essentialist, it does not follow that Vygotsky’s 
psychology is Marxist.  Mohamed Elhammoumi (Elhammoumi, 2002) and Danling Fu 
(Danling Fu, 1997) have each in their own way appealed to the same remarks of 
Vygotsky quoted by the editors of Mind in Society, referred to above, as evidence 
that Vygotsky’s psychology is Marxist and a variant of dialectical materialism and 
historical materialism.  Since it is part of my thesis that the psychology of Vygotsky is 
consistent with the results of Neo-Jamesianism I shall have to explain the 
consequences of misunderstanding Vygotsky’s concept of unit of analysis.  I have so 
far shown that the unit is the product of analysis and that the unit depends, therefore, 
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on what it is that is the object of analysis and whether this analysis is biological, 
psychological or sociological.  Apart from the superficial results of element analysis 
there is a problem of the proper object of unit analysis.  Just as Vygotsky has argued 
that element analysis is not suitable for the proper understanding of mental 
phenomena unless one is content with the superficial results of behaviourism, so in 
the same way Vygotsky has argued that Marx thought the analysis of the cell was 
the proper analysis of economic, social and cultural phenomena for the same 
reasons.  Elhammoumi misunderstands the difference between unit and element 
analysis and the different justifications offered for their relevance and use.   
 
Elhammoumi has argued at length that the “appropriate unit of analysis of human 
mental phenomena” is the “social relations of production” (Elhammoumi, 2002, p 89-
98) and deduces from this claim that Vygotsky’s psychology is Marxist and that 
“Vygotsky’s theory was an explicit attempt to develop a Marxist psychology” 
incorporating the “concrete application of dialectical materialism” (Elhammoumi, 
2002, p 92).  This is not to say dialectical materialism has no relevance for 
psychology but when Elhammoumi quotes Vygotsky’s remark, “The theory of the 
psychological materialism or dialectics of psychology is what I called general 
psychology” (Elhammoumi, 2002, p 90) he does this without reference to Vygotsky’s 
expanded remark that “the direct application of the theory of dialectical materialism 
to the problems of natural science and in particular to the group of biological 
sciences or psychology is impossible” (Vygotsky, 2004, p 330).  Moreover Kozulin, 
remarking on Vygotsky’s relation to Marxism, says “Vygotsky desperately sought…to 
make psychology scientific…without degenerating into ‘Marxist psychology’.”  
(Kozulin, 1986, p xxiii).  It is necessary to disentangle the unit of analysis from 
‘Marxist psychology’ because the unit of analysis was the means by which Vygotsky 
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eventually arrived at “perezhivanie” or emotional experience as his final unit of 
analysis.   
 
I shall argue that the concept of ‘emotional experience’ understood by this means is 
consistent with the results of the Neo-Jamesian solution to Vygotsky’s objections to 
Jamesianism.  That is, there is a coherence to Vygotsky’s arguments which ensures 
the coherence of the ‘product’ of the unit of analysis with responses to his 
observations concerning the Jamesian theory of emotion.  James appealed to 
Darwin for the authority of his psychology and hence was unable to explain what 
Vygotsky calls ‘higher mental functions’ in any but biological terms.  Vygotsky on the 
other hand, not satisfied with the Jamesian conclusion wants to explain higher 
mental functions as a consequence of the relations of biological with cultural 
phenomena, and the means of this explanation is the unit of analysis.  Elhammoumi 
has confused the product of unit analysis in psychology with the product of ‘the cell’ 
or unit analysis in economics, sociology or history.  Unit analysis applied to 
economic, sociological or historical phenomena will obtain a ‘product’ different from 
unit analysis in psychological phenomena because “units are products of analysis 
that correspond to specific aspects of the phenomena under investigation” 
(Vygotsky, 1986, p 211).  Since Vygotsky wants to be able to explain the relation 
between natural phenomena and cultural phenomena in a coherent, non-reductive, 
monistic and consistently naturalistic, causal explanation, it is necessary to avoid 
confusing unit products of different types of analysis.   
 
Since Vygotsky holds that mental phenomena are evidence of the processes of 
internalisation of social and cultural phenomena, and psychology includes the 
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scientific explanation of this process, the purpose of a functional explanation of 
emotion is to help explain how the mental processes of internalisation, or 
interiorisation, of the social, occurs.  That is to say, psychology as understood by 
Vygotsky, explains the mental dynamics of the interactions of biological with social 
phenomena.  If the product of the unit of analysis was itself social, cultural, historical 
or economic phenomena, as Elhammoumi has argued, the analysis would be unable 
to explain the relation, which is a psychological product, between biological and 
social phenomena.  If Vygotsky had conflated Marxism with psychology so as to 
create a Marxist psychology, or worse, to assimilate biology to Marxism, as 
illustrated by the Lysenko problem, he would have been unable to explain, in the unit 
of analysis, how the interactions of biological with social or cultural phenomena 
create mental phenomena.  So when Elhammoumi also conflates Vygotsky’s 
psychology with historical materialism he again confuses the relation between 
psychology and Marxism.  So where Marx says “It is men, real, living men, who do 
all this, who…fight battles.  It is not history which uses men as a means of achieving 
its own ends” (Marx, 1973, p 78), Elhammoumi claims “the forces of production bring 
human individuals into conflict with the relations of production” and consequently 
while “these conflicts are reflected in their thought processes” these “conflicts are the 
principle motive of history” (Elhammoumi, 2002, p 94).  The consequence of this is 
that having confused the relation between psychology and historical materialism, 
Elhammoumi is unable to share Vygotsky’s greater vision of the relation between the 
biological and the sociological.  It is possible that when Vygotsky acknowledges “the 
historical character of verbal thought” (Vygotsky, 1986, p 94), his unit of analysis, he 
means no more by ‘historical’ than ‘developmental’ or what Little argues Marx meant 
when he describes his historical hypothesis as the “guiding principle of my studies” 
(Marx, 1977, p 20), namely a kind of research program (Little, 1986, p 66).  But even 
if, writing of his unit of analysis Vygotsky says, “we must consider it subject to all the 
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premises of historical materialism” (Vygotsky, 1986, p 95) and one understands by 
the phrase ‘historical materialism’ Elhammoumi’s and Marx’s “locomotive of historical 
change” (Elhammoumi, 2002, p 94), and hence confuse historical materialism with 
psychology yet again, one removes altogether the relevance of biology in explaining 
the origins of motivation in mental phenomena.  Life is a biological phenomenon.  If 
social or historical phenomena were ‘alive’ in the sense in which life is biological, 
Vygotsky’s efforts to find in his unit of analysis the interactions and interrelations of 
the living with social and cultural phenomena, and hence the “affective-volitional 
tendency which holds the answer to the last ‘why’ in the analysis of thinking” 
(Vygotsky, 1986, p 252), would be impossible.  Vygotsky brilliantly incorporates 
social and cultural phenomena in his explanation of mental development without 
assimilating mental phenomena to the social and cultural.  Simultaneously he 
incorporates biological phenomena into the same explanation without reducing 
mental phenomena to the biological.   
 
4.5 Problem of social concept development 
Once a version of the unit of analysis is complete and an account can be given of 
Vygotsky’s ‘affective-volitional’ function with its relation to word use and concept 
development a further account can be offered for the development of social 
concepts. I expect to demonstrate that social concepts are ‘social’ precisely because 
their development is traced in the dialogue shared by speakers motivated to speak 
and develop their ‘inner’ lives.  The possibility of such a dialogue presupposes and 
rests upon the mutual creation and agreement of higher order social concepts such 
as ‘responsibility’ and ‘tolerance’ which must enter into the very action of teaching-
and-learning itself as conceived by Vygotsky.  This final problem was put as the 
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principal problem as follows:  What is the relation of emotion to the development of 
social concepts? 
 
Result 
The potential of a Neo-Jamesian solution raised research Question 1 (4.1).  The 
answer to this question is a necessary step towards demonstrating the relevance of 
Damasio’s Neo-Jamesianism to Vygotsky.  A consideration of omissions by Damasio 
from the argument for the theory of emotion of Spinoza raised Question 2 (4.2).  The 
special argument of Spinoza’s complete theory augments Vygotsky’s unit of analysis 
explained by the answer to Question 3 (4.3).  This is the last stage in the solution to 
the principal problem posed by Question 4 (4.1 and 4.5). 
 85 
CHAPTER 5:  THEORY OF EMOTION AND DAMSIO’S NEO-JAMESIAN SOLUTION 
 
Introductory survey 
Having established the potential for a solution and how progress towards this 
solution is marked by progress through the research questions, in this chapter I 
explore the theory of emotion of Antonio Damasio as he explains it in his 
professional and popular academic writing as a biologist and neuroscientist.  In 
Descartes’ Error (1995) and The Feeling of What Happens (2000) Damasio argues 
for a coherent non-reductive biological explanation of the emotions as part of the 
wider environmental and evolutionary processes of life regulation, including society.  
Because of Spinoza’s monism and proto-biological insights, Damasio argues, in 
Looking for Spinoza (2003), for the theoretical relevance of Spinoza’s theory of 
emotion and expands this thesis in Self Comes to Mind (2010).   
 
5.1. Spinoza’s anticipation of neuroscience 
In this section I seek only to confirm Vygotsky’s judgement of the significance of 
Spinoza’s philosophy for psychology and to indicate its contemporary context.  
 
5.1.1 Vygotsky 
For Spinoza, to have “knowledge of the union which the mind has with the whole of 
nature” (Spinoza, Corr. Und., 11.13), and hence to have knowledge of nature, it is 
necessary to understand the relation of the mind to the body.  Spinoza thought the 
understanding of this relation was an integral part of any effort to understand nature 
as a whole.  Nature is, as it were, refracted through the prism of the body, so that 
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empirical experience, conceived in Cartesian terms and unaided by knowledge of the 
body, will not yield knowledge of the whole of nature.  Until we have “understood the 
structure of the body so accurately as to be able to explain all its functions” (Eth. 
111. 2. Sch.) we shall not “understand the structure of the universe” (Eth. II. 30. 
Proof).  For Spinoza the study of the ‘structure of the body’ is continuous with other 
enquiries into nature, hence his monism.  For Spinoza there cannot be knowledge of 
nature, especially human nature, without understanding the relation of mind to body.  
But it is the idea of how empirical experience is mediated that is the central issue 
that Vygotsky shares with Spinoza, for he has seen in Spinoza the idea of a solution 
to the problem of motivation and in the functional relation of emotion to the 
development of concepts.  We must understand another’s thoughts, “but even that is 
not enough – we must also know its motivation” (Vygotsky, 1986, p 253).  In my 
review (Ch. 2) of Vygotsky’s monograph on that subject I explained what Vygotsky 
expected to find in Spinoza and that Vygotsky thought that there could be ‘no more 
reliable and powerful weapon’ than a testing of Spinoza’s theory of emotion in ‘the 
light of contemporary scientific knowledge’.  Hence Vygotsky counts as the first 
psychologist to argue Spinoza’s anticipation of contemporary neuroscience.   
 
5.1.2 Ravven 
Much more recently and concentrating on the social dimension central to Spinoza’s 
conclusions, Heidi Ravven has argued that Spinoza has effectively laid the 
foundations for a ‘natural history’ of ethics by explaining their biological origins.  
Significant also, Ravven remarks, is the understanding Spinoza shows in “how 
cultural components were integrated into and extend the biological” (Ravven, 2003, p 
71), and it is certain that Spinoza’s social theory, as it is found across his writings, 
shows the importance he attaches to the way language is used to assert authority 
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and particular types of social relation which are relations of power.   In greater detail 
Ravven considers how three “major discoveries” (Ravven, 2003, p 72) in modern 
neuroscience were anticipated by Spinoza.  That the ‘mind is embodied’ is an 
obvious appeal to Neo-Jamesianism; that reasoning operates ‘from bodily 
experience’ is harder to demonstrate.  But finally, that ‘thought is predominantly 
unconscious’ is referring to Spinoza’s demonstration that much behaviour of his 
“spiritual automaton” (Corr. Und. X. 85) is automatic and determined by “causes of 
which we are not conscious” (Eth. III. 2. Sch.).  Although Spinoza has been 
described as the ‘father of psychoanalysis’ (Neu, 1977) the idea of ‘subconscious’ as 
it appears in Freud is not apparent in Spinoza so the idea of ‘unconscious thought’ is 
to be explained more readily in terms familiar in biology and neuroscience than 
psychoanalysis.  In any case thought, feeling, value and imagination are examples of 
“twelve naturalistic claims of Spinoza for which there is now substantial evidence 
from the neurosciences or modern emotion theory”.  (Ravven, 2003, p 74). 
 
5.1.3 Harris, Sheth, Cohen 
Independently of Damasio but relevant to Damasio’s interpretation of Spinoza in 
detail, as I shall demonstrate below, Sam Harris, Sameer Sheth and Mark Cohen 
employed functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to detect a correlation 
between activity in different parts of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and different types of 
true, false or undecidable statements.  The authors discovered that when the 
subjects reading the statements had to decide whether they believed or disbelieved 
them their belief in true statements correlated with faster reaction times for activity in 
the PFC than their disbelief in false statements.  The authors argue that the data as 
a whole supports what they call ‘Spinoza’s Conjecture’, namely that it is easier to 
believe a statement as true than false or undecidable.  In other words, the subjects, 
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like most people, tend to accept statements at face value.  Spinoza draws a careful 
distinction between the representation of experience in language and the forming of 
‘adequate ideas’ or concepts.  Since truth is for Spinoza not a property of 
propositions but of the correspondence between an adequate idea and its object as 
part of the wider ‘union which the mind has with the whole of nature’ his 
philosophical approach to this problem makes him very guarded about what can be 
said.  The results of these experiments not only seem to corroborate in neuroscience 
elements of Spinoza’s theory of language and give a different insight into Spinoza 
than that of Damasio, but also, as I shall attempt to show, complement Damasio’s 
findings in a significant way.   
 
5.1.4 Damasio 
Damasio has become the principal protagonist for the relevance of Spinoza to 
contemporary neuroscience and a Neo-Jamesian theory of the emotions.  There are 
two reasons why Damasio has turned to Spinoza.  Firstly Spinoza’s philosophy is 
suggestive of a biological apparatus which incorporates the mental and emotional in 
their indissoluble unity.  Related to this, secondly, Spinoza’s philosophy is monistic 
and this appeals to Damasio’s doubts about the ability of Cartesian dualism to 
accommodate a biological theory of the mental and emotional.  The Cartesian 
philosophy assuredly divides the world into physical objects and the concepts for 
deliberating about those objects.  It follows of course that concepts of language, 
number, space and time are presupposed in empirical explanation and cannot 
themselves become the objects of empirical explanation.  This may yield a 
reassuring notion of science as “objective” but it renders the efforts of biologists to 
account for the biological roots of rationality and emotion problematic.  The clinical 
evidence that Damasio employs showing that lesions to parts of the brain impair 
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particular types of mental functioning motivates his search through Spinoza much in 
the way Vygotsky was motivated in his own psychological researches.  The 
criticisms levelled against Cartesian dualism by Vygotsky and Damasio have much 
in common and arrive at shared conclusions with respect to objections to the James-
Lange and the Cannon theories of emotion.   
 
5.2.1 Damasio is Neo-Jamesian 
Inasmuch as Spinoza anticipates the neuroscience of Damasio he anticipates Neo-
Jamesianism.  The labels ‘neuroscience’ and ‘Neo-Jamesian’ are largely co-
extensive though one might regard Neo-Jamesianism as a psychological research 
programme incorporating broader philosophical concerns of methodology and 
method, and the ethical and social considerations that follow from an interest in 
philosophy, such as Spinozism.  However, what Damasio and others suggest may 
help further to locate the convergence of Spinoza, neuroscience and Neo-
Jamesianism, but I will offer a broad account explaining why Damasio is Neo-
Jamesian.   
 
Damasio is Jamesian because he explains emotions from the body and feelings as 
consciousness of emotions, as did William James and the James-Lange theory but 
he is Neo-Jamesian because he explains how emotions are processed by the 
several different parts of the brain.  Moreover, Damasio explains how feeling 
depends upon this processing of emotion, how this processing can lead to feelings 
which feed back to the body and are ‘embodied’, and how feelings can be 
experienced without relation to the body, from memory, that is, entirely from brain 
function.  William James was unable to incorporate the role of the brain in any detail 
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because of the state of neurology at the beginning of the twentieth century so that he 
was led to account for ‘feeling’ as ‘judgement’ or ‘appraisal’.  But even by the 1930s 
when Vygotsky was writing, not much more than the brain-stem up to the thalamus 
was understood, let alone their role in the processing of emotion.  This explains why 
Vygotsky, in several parts of his monograph on the emotions, concentrated on the 
thalamus in attempting to explain the neurological elements of emotional and feeling 
experience.  In simply attempting this, Vygotsky was constructing the beginnings of 
Neo-Jamesianism.   
 
But this is not all that is meant by Neo-Jamesianism, at least in Damasio.  To attempt 
to explain emotions as sensations of the body, even if the brain is included in a 
Damasian ‘body loop’, gives only a partial understanding of their salience.  
Interaction with the physical environment will indeed cause sensations in the body 
which can include emotion but it is the interaction in the social environment which 
gives emotions and feelings the particular salience that matters.  Damasio explains 
the origins of consciousness as arising from problems of adaptation to changes in 
the environment that are problematic or involve risk and which cannot be negotiated 
by brain-stem responses, reflexes or even simple awareness even while these 
engage primary or primitive emotions of pleasure or pain.  A biological explanation 
will have to be relevant to the natural selection of groups or species and human 
social interaction is biological in this sense.  That is, adaptation to changes in the 
environment, while they are executed individually, is ‘social’ in Damasio’s sense, and 
hence social interaction is an essential element in adaptation to changes in the 
environment.  To what extent learned adaptations are heritable or established upon 
heritable adaptations raises questions about brain plasticity and continued human 
evolution in a larger perspective.  Damasio does not ignore this perspective but he 
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wants to concentrate on what these adaptations mean for this and that individual.  
The emotional lives of individuals matter to them.  One might say that emotional 
salience is what makes anything matter.  Both Damasio and Spinoza can take a 
wider view and they would like others to see how, taking a wider, informed view, it is 
possible to order one’s life in a way which has adaptive emotional salience.  The 
emotional life of individuals may be understood from a larger evolutionary 
perspective but Damasio is content with attempting to explain the origin and basis of 
what he calls ‘social emotion’ in the interaction of the body with the central nervous 
system, particularly the brain, and with other individuals and events, especially those 
events that occasion consciousness, such as problems, dangers and risks.  The 
consciousness that arises in this area is not different from interactions with physical 
dangers, and social interaction mediates the solutions to these problems, but 
because this consciousness means attention to social interaction itself, it is an 
‘extended consciousness’ and the feeling element of this consciousness, what 
makes the higher reaches of this consciousness, ‘conscience’ for Damasio, is 
‘marked’ by particular types of emotional experience which have set in motion 
particular brain circuits and parts of the brain.  These experiences and the feeling of 
them are also embodied.  Hence it is in explaining the relation of the brain to the 
body and the salience of social interactions and their embodiment by individuals that 
Damasio’s Neo-Jamesianism is understood. 
 
Finally, mindful that Damasio has not published any claim to share a Neo-Jamesian 
perspective it may help to see how this appellation is used in connection with his 
work.  “The mechanism I have outlined to enact emotion and produce a substrate for 
feelings are compatible with William James’s original formulation…” (Damasio, 1999: 
288) and hence “Damasio holds that the Jamesian portrayal of the temporal 
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sequence of events in emotion generation is largely correct” (Friedman, 2010, p  
383).  Because Damasio “adopts an explicitly Spinozist stance with regard to the 
relation of mind and body, individual and society” and is “the most social science 
friendly of the major neuroscientists” (Cromby, 2007, p 152) and “Recent advances 
in neuroscience (Damasio) and cognitive science open the way for rethinking 
mind/biology/social setting” (Daniels, 2001, p 47), “Damasio understands….through 
Spinoza’s philosophy” and “it is for this reason that Damasio’s model can be 
descried as Neo-Jamesian” (Wetherell, 2012, p 34-35).  Finally, ‘in the neo-Jamesian 
view of Damasio’ (Phaf and Rotteveel, 2012, p 47), the neo-Jamesian Damasio 
(Moores, 2010, p 11), and, ‘According to Damasio’s Neo-Jamesian theory’ (Helm, 
2010, p 305).   
 
5.2.2 Damasio is Spinozist 
The natural environment 
Damasio is Spinozist principally because he shares doubts that the effort to create a 
biological explanation of mind, and hence a biological basis for psychology, can be 
secured in the dualism or Cartesianism implicit in the positivist notion of scientific 
‘objectivity’ (Damasio, 1995, p 245-52).  In common sense and philosophy the 
Cartesian divide looks unbridgeable but Spinoza’s double-aspect theory of 
substance monism seems to attempt the impossible in deducing ‘thought’ and 
‘extension’ from one substance or nature as its ‘attributes’.  But ‘monism’ is entailed 
in ‘explanation’, for to give an explanation, according to Spinoza, is to show the 
relation of cause to effect and hence to explain the causal relations between parts of 
nature, conceived not as static but as dynamic and creative.  There can only be one 
creative nature or substance and not two, as Descartes and common sense assert.  
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For Spinoza the difference between ‘nature thinking’ and ‘nature extended’ in time 
and space is a consequence of the way our unaided experience appears to divide 
into objects and events and mental ‘representations’ of them.   
 
Insofar as we can give a causal explanation of the interactions between the parts of 
nature we can be said to understand nature.  The parts of nature we are able to 
understand in this way arise from the dynamic interactions of its parts and as these 
parts move against one another the interface between them is that enduring (in 
Spinoza, conatus) part of nature which is the physical and biological world (in 
Spinoza, natura naturata).  Individual things and their parts Spinoza calls ‘modes’.  
The physical and biological world is the passing phase of the motion-and-rest of 
nature Spinoza calls ‘the face of the whole universe’.  Individual things, like galaxies, 
planets, trees and human bodies are further temporary modes of nature and whose 
relative permanence depends on the organisation of their structure to endure against 
the greater powers of nature.  We know we are part of this (‘we feel and experience 
we are eternal’ (Eth. V. 23. Sch.)) because nature is reflected through the biological 
constitution of the body, as it emerges from and folds back into substance like waves 
on the ocean.   
 
We shall understand the causes of our divided way of perceiving things when we 
organise our contingent experience (‘knowledge of the first kind’) and its random 
effects on the emotional state of the body in accordance with explanation 
(‘knowledge of the second kind’).   
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To achieve this we have to know how the body works, insists Spinoza, but “no one 
has thus far determined what the body can do merely by the laws of nature” that is, 
to explain non-conscious acts such as the example he gives of sleepwalking or the 
‘sagacity’ of other animals (Eth. III. 2. Sch.).  In almost identical language to William 
James, Spinoza writes, “thus an infant believes that of its own free will it desires milk, 
an angry child believes that it freely desires vengeance, a timid child that it is free to 
run away” (Eth. III. 2).  In the ‘physical digression’ (Eth. III. 13) Spinoza describes the 
body as constituted by nested parts and variously ‘hard’, ‘soft’ and ‘liquid’, interacting 
with one another to create ‘traces’, ‘images’ and ‘dispositions’ (Eth. III. 18) of actions.  
This very general schema can be easily accommodated to biological knowledge of 
different types of body tissue such as bone, muscle, blood and lymph as well as 
internal organs and the parts of the nervous system, and Spinoza’s terminology is 
not dissimilar to Damasio’s, nor in sense.  Although it is thought Spinoza attended 
public lectures in anatomy at Leiden, he could not have had any detailed knowledge, 
especially of the brain.  Nonetheless “Spinoza may have intuited the general 
anatomical and functional arrangements that the body must assume for the mind to 
occur together with it, or more precisely, with and within it” (Damasio, 2003, p 210).  
This vision seems to have inspired Damasio’s passion for Spinoza and suggests why 
he sees in Spinoza so much potential for biology and neuroscience.   
 
The social environment 
This background provides Damasio with a monistic and materialist conception of 
mind and body and the reason for approaching biology as the source of an 
explanation for how the various biological processes occasion emotion and interact 
with the social environment to account for our deliberative actions.  Executive 
functions of the neocortex such as thinking can be conceived, not as ‘additional’ to 
 95 
our biology or even supervenient upon it but as processes of interaction with both the 
physical and social environments subsumed under one word, nature, and explained 
in causal terms.   
 
Interaction with the social environment is therefore, according to Spinoza and 
Damasio, a part of our interaction with the natural environment.  This is not to deny 
raw, immediate and spontaneous awareness of the physical environment 
experienced in pleasure, in sudden pain, in instant reactions to, say, a bird hitting the 
windscreen as we drive or when we run we find we can watch ourselves dodging 
obstacles without thinking about them.  In these instances our actions are outside 
our control and under the control of the thalamus and the amygdala.  But because 
the social environment is the domain of most of our conscious and non-conscious 
actions, our social interactions have a salience that our other interactions do not 
have.  Individuals largely occupy a social symbolic world through which our 
understanding of the natural environment is itself refracted.  So Damasio argues that 
Spinoza, “absent as a reference from the modern efforts to understand the biology of 
the mind” (Damasio, 2003, p 13), is a proper response to the Cartesian efforts in 
psychology and the social sciences that attempt to proceed with accounts of human 
flourishing without regard for the emotions.  An understanding of individuals, 
especially children and students, where thought is conceived as unmediated by 
emotion and knowledge as disembodied is an abstract conception of individuals as 
processors of data.  Hence Damasio’s plan “to connect this least known Spinoza to 
some of the corresponding neurobiology of today” (Damasio, 2003, p 14) has 
considerable educational significance. 
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Finally, if one can understand language as a medium for this conception of 
knowledge as ‘cerebral’ and disembodied, one will understand Spinoza’s strictures 
concerning language.  The significance of this becomes evident in considering the 
relation of Damasio to Vygotsky and the relevance of Vygotsky’s linguistic theory of 
concept development to Damasio’s concept of social emotion. 
 
5.3 Emotion and the social environment 
In this section I shall begin to draw together the shared relevance of ideas about 
emotion in Spinoza, Vygotsky and Damasio.  Each considers the individual in 
relation to the social environment and what the social environment comes to mean 
for the individual.  I introduce Vygotsky at this stage to throw light on the direction my 
argument is taking. 
 
5.3.1 Problem of the environment 
When Vygotsky writes about social interaction in his paper The Problem of the 
Environment published at the end of his life, in the same year as Thought and 
Language and Theory of Emotion, he wants to draw a clear line of demarcation 
between unaided development and development that is promoted by a particular 
kind of learning engagement with the social environment.  Vygotsky does not say 
that the natural and social environments are unrelated nor that a comprehensive 
account cannot explain natural and social phenomena in their unity.  He does remark 
on the basic conditions of development but his principal purpose is to point to a 
method of isolating how the development of mental functions depends upon learning.  
He calls this a unit of analysis.  It is a Vygotskian truism that learning does not follow 
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mental development, but on the contrary and contrary to widespread belief, that 
mental development follows learning.  It might be put very simply by saying teaching 
causes mental development in exactly the same way as Spinoza’s adequate ideas 
transform passive into active emotion.  Like Spinoza again, the conditions for mental 
development are social.  Mental development does not take place in the skull 
isolated from the environment.  Mental development is a social phenomenon 
promoted by a particular type of social relation, namely, learning, and this is unlike 
historical or biological development.  Because of his specialisms Vygotsky was 
aware that basic conditions effecting the “development of sensory and motor 
functions in children” (Vygotsky, 1994, p 347) have consequences for learning but 
Vygotsky took these to be reasons why it was necessary to find a unit of analysis of 
the conditions of learning.   
 
At any one time the child’s experience of the social environment is that it is for him a 
‘given’.  Of course, setting aside cultural and political change, the social environment 
has a particular stability even for adults.  But this is not the social environment 
experienced by a child.  The adult environment in all its detail will be present as a 
stable or abstract or ‘final form’ but this is experienced by children in stages of 
mental development from the early years mixed with play, toys and games.  This is 
clearer in Spinoza’s account of ‘perfection’.  Emotional experience undergoes what 
Spinoza calls ‘transitions’.  Transitions of emotion are ‘increases’ or ‘decreases’ in 
activity, conceived either mentally as ‘happiness’ or ‘sadness’ or as embodied as 
‘pleasure’ or ‘pain’.  It is the ‘increased’ activity which is pleasure.  Pleasure is a 
‘perfection’ Spinoza says, or an idea, or better still a word for an idea of a thing for 
which we aim (Eth. III. 11. Sch.).  In the same way the child’s mental development 
obtained by interaction with the social environment at home or at school will 
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determine how he experiences the current social environment.  That emotional 
experience is Spinoza’s ‘transition’ so as the child changes mentally and emotionally, 
the meaning of the environment, most significantly, the problems it poses for him, 
changes for him too.  Problems that he cannot solve and where he is abandoned to 
solve them alone will be a source of unhappiness for him but problems accompanied 
by help in their solution will foster mental development and emotional well-being and 
happiness.   
 
The issue is not that adults and teachers are vaguely helpful to the baby or child in a 
way that keeps the baby or child passively happy and bubbling with laughter but that 
a strategy of teaching is employed which, by engaging the current emotional 
experience of the child, causes him to notice his own mental advance and hence to 
be able to use language, firstly, as a tool to develop the concept, the ‘final form’ or 
‘perfection’ he has mastered in his interactions with another, also called the prolepsis 
of the concept, and secondly, as he internalises his speech, continues to elaborate 
the deductive properties the concept shares with other concepts he has already 
formed or is now preparing to form.  Spinoza calls these the ‘intrinsic marks’ of an 
idea and they concatenate (are interdeducible) with other adequate ideas.  The 
child’s emotional experience further changes in the process of this development.  
That is to say his emotional experience is the medium of his mental development 
and maturation.  Vygotsky writes:  “It ought to always be capable of finding the 
particular prism through which the influence of the environment on the child is 
refracted” (Vygotsky, 1994, p 341).  The ‘prism’ is the relation of emotion to mental 
functioning.  The child’s emotional experience does change as his relation with the 
social environment, the parents and teachers, cause it to change.  Indeed “an 
emotional experience is always related to something which is found outside the 
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person” (Vygotsky, 1994, p 342) that is, the problem and the ‘final form’ of its 
solution, or ‘perfection’ which the child is being offered to solve.  Hence in Problem of 
Environment Vygotsky is clarifying what would count as the learning conditions that 
would be the subject of his unit of analysis introduced at the end of Thought and 
Language.  There he says that it is “not sufficient” to understand the process of 
thought or concept development obtained in the medium of speech, “we must also 
know its motivation” (Vygotsky, 1986, p 253).  How exactly, developing emotional 
experience “is always related” to the acquisition of the ‘final form’ or prolepsis of the 
concept has been explained by Spinoza in theoretical form and it is in Damasio’s 
interpretation that it may be possible to harness Spinoza’s theory of the 
transformation of passive into active emotions to Vygotsky’s proposed unit of 
analysis, the ‘prism’, to show how in emotional change is to be found the motivation 
in the development of the concept.   
 
Since, in Theory of Emotion, Vygotsky works towards finding a solution in Spinoza, 
in the outlines of a theory which appears Neo-Jamesian, and anticipating Damasio’s 
Spinozistic neuroscience, an element of the unit of analysis can be found in the basic 
biology of Spinoza’s account of the primary emotions and their elaborations as they 
configure in the social environment, that is, in social relations.  But it will help if an 
account of Vygotsky’s concept of ‘emotional experience’ is explained as it would be 
understood first by Spinoza. 
 
5.3.2 Spinoza’s theory of primary emotions 
According to Spinoza all parts of nature are in a state of motion-and-rest, including 
the human body and its constituent parts.  The motion of parts is co-ordinated only in 
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their resistance (in Spinoza, ‘conatus’) to the greater power of nature and the actions 
of others to dissolve them.  Hence human beings resist the greater powers of nature 
(Eth. IV. 2) either individually or as members of a society.  But both the physical and 
the social environments are parts of nature in its monistic unity.  Interaction with the 
physical or biological environment causes impacts which reflect internally along the 
‘hard’, ‘soft’ or ‘liquid’ parts of the body as sensations (Eth. II. 17, Dem).  These can 
be called ‘ideas’, “For an idea is in itself nothing else than a certain sensation” (Corr. 
Und. 78) and ‘state of the body’ (Eth. III. Dem.).  To have a sensation, or an idea, is 
to have a mind (Eth. II. 11), though a rudimentary one, since “nothing can happen in 
that body which is not perceived by the mind” (Eth. II. 12), and the body, thus 
modified by its interaction (‘knowledge of the first kind’ (as above)), “is the object of 
the mind” (Eth. II. 13).  If we have regard for the human body as one organism, then 
if the interaction increases the activity of the mind and the body it is ‘pleasure’, and 
‘pain’ if it hinders it.  This broad distinction allows Spinoza to introduce details into 
social interaction later.  The activity of the body is its ‘appetite’ to persevere or strive 
(Eth. III. 6) and consciousness of this Spinoza calls ‘desire’.  Pleasure, pain and 
desire Spinoza calls primary or passive emotions (Eth. III. 11. Sch.).  Though he 
uses words usually translated as ‘happiness’ or ‘joy’ and ‘sadness’ or ‘sorrow’, for 
‘pleasure’ and ‘pain’ considered as mental activity, this permits him the theoretical 
means for explaining any passive emotion that he chooses.  The increase, 
‘pleasure’, or decrease, ‘pain’, in activity, Spinoza calls a ‘transition’ from a greater or 
lesser perfection (Eth. III. Aff. 2, 3).  By ‘perfection’ Spinoza understands that to 
which the transition is made, since “If a man were born with a perfection to which he 
passes, he would possess it without the emotion of joy”.  Hence we form ideas of 
those things for which we aim and call them perfect.  An emotion therefore is also an 
idea (Eth. IV. 14).  Usually we are unable to explain our emotions either to our self or 
anyone else and hence our emotions are as passive as our mind is inactive.  If we 
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can explain them causally then we have an ‘adequate’ idea of an emotion.  Since an 
emotion is itself an idea, having an idea of an idea constitutes reflective knowledge 
(‘knowledge of the second kind’ (above)) and this is the beginning of a 
transformation of passive emotion into active motivation, or Vygotsky’s “affective-
volitional tendency” (Vygotsky, 1986, p 252), as I shall try to show.   
 
If we passively endure emotions of sorrow, sadness or depression, and hence 
mental inactivity, it is because we do not know how to form adequate ideas and 
attempt to explain these emotions.  Spinoza therefore describes the theoretical 
apparatus of all possible passive emotions (Eth. III. 8 to 21), how we attempt to live 
socially motivated by them (Eth. III. 22 to 42) and what their social consequences 
are, that is, what kinds of social relations follow from passive emotions and our 
inadequate ideas of them (Eth. IV. 40 to 58).  So, for example we are passively 
motivated by rewards and punishment and hence praise and blame and the 
institutional structure of power relations which these include.  Hence, since the 
effects of rewards and punishments are passive emotions our ideas of them are 
inadequate ideas.  Social institutions, such as schools, may organise social conduct 
and achievement upon schedules of reward, punishment, praise and blame, but 
unless social institutions follow out Spinoza’s argument they will not know when 
systems of rewards and punishment become unhelpful and demotivating.  Even at 
the top of the school, those students who are struggling to gain ownership of a 
difficult idea need reassurance expressed in rewarding remarks such as “that’s 
nearly it…” or “yes, go on a bit…”  Of course once mastery over the concept is 
obtained the student will find words to show its interdeducibility with other concepts, 
perhaps unrelated to the study at hand, but significant for the student’s own personal 
autonomy.  At this stage of concept development the student will have enough 
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confidence to challenge any defects in understanding.  So Spinoza continues with an 
account of the difference between passive and active emotions and an explanation 
of how passive emotions are transformed into active emotions by enlisting adequate 
ideas (Eth. IV. 59, 61, 62 and V 5 to 13).  Since anything which “increases, 
diminishes, helps or hinders our body’s power of action the idea of that thing 
increases, diminishes, helps or hinders our mind’s power of thought” (Eth. III. 11), if 
we form social relations that constitute a mode (Eth. IV. 18. Sch.) where individuals 
are not divided “by emotions contrary to our nature” (Eth. V. 10) but “…live in 
conformity with the guidance of reason…” (Eth. IV. 35) then “the good which 
everyone who follows after virtue seeks for himself he will desire for other men…” 
(Eth. IV. 37) and this will amount to a psychological advance from extrinsic or reward 
motivation to intrinsic motivation and autonomy.  Spinoza details the psychological 
apparatus or structure for this advance as well as the method of its achievement and 
this serves as the common ground on which the theories of Vygotsky and Damasio 
meet.   
 
5.4 Damasio’s theory of emotion 
5.4.1 Damasio’s references to Spinoza 
In this section I shall give an account explaining how Damasio’s interpretation of 
Spinoza gives a theory of emotion which is Neo-Jamesian and sufficient for most of 
the purposes of Vygotsky.  Had a Neo-Jamesian theory been known to Vygotsky he 
likely would have integrated it into his planned theory of motivation, but the Jamesian 
theory Vygotsky explored, he dismissed for various reasons, including its 
intentionalism and epiphenomenalism.  My survey of Damasio’s theory of emotion is 
intended therefore to demonstrate that Damasio’s interpretation of Spinoza, 
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important to Damasio for his own project, will do some or even most of the work of 
Vygotsky’s plans for a Spinozistic theory of emotion.  Vygotsky’s Spinoza has to 
provide Vygotsky the theory of the ‘emotional experience’ as the ‘prism’ described in 
Problem of Environment and ‘affective-volitional tendency’ or ‘motivation’ described 
at the end of Thought and Language, and hence the function of these is the 
“interaction with the final form” (Vygotsky, 1994, p 349).  Damasio’s interpretation of 
Spinoza will give Vygotsky some, or most of what he wants, either because Damasio 
has found in his interpretation of Spinoza a result sufficient for his own purposes but 
which permit expanding or extending, or because omissions in Damasio’s 
interpretation of Spinoza invite observations and developments from the standpoint 
or perspective of Vygotsky.  In either case, extending Damasio’s interpretation or 
completing omissions in his interpretations, taken in the direction of Vygotsky, will 
provide Vygotsky his ‘prism’ or unit of analysis.   
 
I will begin, not with Spinoza and show how he anticipates the Neo-Jamesianism or 
neuroscience of Damasio, but with the ideas, theories or arguments Damasio has 
found in Spinoza useful to frame his own approach to neuroscience.  It is the biology 
of the emotions Damasio is concerned to explain and why Spinoza is useful to him.  
Damasio has already noticed Spinoza’s schema for biological explanation and the 
deficiencies in Spinoza’s own biological knowledge but “be that as it may, we can 
now fill in the brain details and venture to say for him what he obviously could not” 
(Damasio, 2003, p 213). 
 
Damasio refers to Eth. III. 6 to 8 to show that the Spinozan concept of ‘conatus’ or 
‘perseverance’ is the product of ‘dispositions of brain circuitry’ (Damasio, 2003, p 36) 
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and the environment.  Damasio makes one or two incidental references to Spinoza’s 
political writings.  He cites Ethics V 10, 32 and 36, where he connects the ends of 
Spinoza’s proposals (but not the means) with the most sublime emotion and the 
optimistic conclusion to the Ethics (Eth. V 42).  Apart from these incidental 
references Eth. III. 6 to 8 are fundamental to Damasio’s theory.  But the more 
elaborate conceptual structures that concern Damasio he finds in Eth. II. 13, 15, 19, 
22, 23 and 26 (Damasio, 2003, pp 210-214).  The Propositions omitted, especially 
24 and 25 and 27 to 29, are also part of Spinoza’s theory of emotion and hold the 
answer to the theory of emotion relevant to Vygotsky and to his ‘prism’ and unit of 
analysis.  I shall return to those Propositions after developing themes which become 
relevant to a problem of the interpretation of Spinoza.   
 
Damasio refers to a component element of Spinoza’s theory of mind to elaborate a 
biological theory of ‘self’ at Eth. II. 22.  In Eth. II. 21 and 22 Spinoza introduces the 
concept of an ‘idea of an idea’ as the formal relation that follows understanding the 
relation of the mind to the body.  In giving a brief account of the primary emotions in 
Spinoza I showed that an emotion is an idea and that Spinoza was able to say that 
‘joy’ or pleasure for example was an idea of the cheerfulness or stimulation which is 
the sensation of the whole body and mind, conceived as one entity, but understood 
only in respect to the mind.  Hence ‘joy’ or ‘pleasure’ is connected to the body in the 
same way as the mind is connected to the body.  Hence “the idea of the mind is 
united to the mind in the same way as the mind itself is united to the body” (Eth. II. 
21).  The “idea of the mind, that is to say, the idea of the idea” (Eth. II. 21. Sch.) is 
simply a formal way of putting this relation.  For Damasio “the notion of “idea of 
ideas” ....opens a way for creating an idea of self” (Damasio, 2003, p 215).  The first 
object constituting the mind is its body (Eth. II. 13) but the mind cannot know this.  
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That is the mind cannot have any knowledge either of itself (Eth. II. 23) or of anything 
else (Eth. II. 26), unless an event or ‘object’, experienced as a ‘sensation’, causes a 
change or ‘transition’ in the state of the body, that is, an emotional experience (Eth. 
II. 19).  The cause of the changing sensation is an event or ‘object’ or Damasio’s 
‘emotionally competent stimulus’.  This stimulus is not sufficient for knowledge 
according to Spinoza.  The mind, to know itself, must have an ‘idea’ of the changes 
or modifications to the body, and if it does, by the same ‘idea’ it simultaneously 
perceives other bodies or objects external to it.  This is an element of Spinoza’s 
monism, and Damasio’s adoption of it avoids any charge laid against Damasio’s 
theory as it develops, of epiphenomenalism.  Moreover, since, for Spinoza, and for 
Damasio (2003, p 210), ‘the human body is composed of a number of individuals of 
diverse nature, each of which is composite to a high degree’ (Eth. II. 13. Lemma 7. 
Post. 1), the sensation of the stimulus must be traceable through the ‘composite’ 
parts of the body and from the interaction of these parts together with their joint 
interaction with the stimulus or environment emerges what Damasio calls the 
‘protoself’, the non-conscious first layer of the ‘neural self’ (Damasio, 2000, p 153), 
the result of Damasio’s biological interpretation of Spinoza’s theory of mind.   
 
5.4.2 Origin of primary emotions 
Because the ‘protoself’ is so primitive it emerges from neural circuits which monitor 
or copy the resting state of the body (brain stem and somatosensory cortex), 
maintain homeostasis (hypothalamus) and respond to sensations caused externally 
or internally (insular).  Although Damasio says “I cannot guarantee that these 
structures operate as I describe” (Damasio, 1995, p 231), together these different 
parts create a ‘neural pattern’ or a body map.  Body maps can also be called 
‘images’ but they are a layer of neural activity distributed across different parts of the 
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brain, the pervasive sensation that results in the background to our feeling of 
continuity from moment to moment.  That continuity is not given in the things that 
occupy our thought.  Even if we sustain concentration and feel our ‘mental effort’, yet 
that effort is felt against a more primitive emotional background constituted by 
sensations.  These sensations are mediated by primitive structures of the brain and 
are simple enough to call ‘pleasure’ or ‘pain’.  The mediating structures determine 
the emotion, that is, the reactions of the body and the feeling we experience when 
these sensations contribute to core consciousness and extended consciousness.  
Pleasure, as Spinoza would explain it, is a motion of the body which becomes 
adaptive and is therefore repeated and pain is a motion which is not repeated.  The 
reasons why actions or motions are repeated is evolutionary and explained in terms 
of layers of biological adaptation including evolutionary differentiations in the brain 
which have survival value for the body.  In the case of pleasure an action is repeated 
because the electrochemical neurotransmitter dopamine, released from the ventral 
tegmental area and nucleus accumbens, increases activity in ‘earlier’ and ‘later’ parts 
of the brain, especially in the ‘later’ prefrontal cortex active in extended 
consciousness.  Dopamine reduces the sensations of pain and hence the activity of 
the amygdala when it is spurred into action by the thalamus or other parts of the 
nervous system.  Pain sensation begins when the active amygdala starts the relay of 
circuits which leads to the release of adrenalin and the emergency response which 
readies the body for urgent action and constitutes our sensations of stress or 
feelings of anger or fear.  Hence it is against this background that a further level of 
higher order brain circuitry gives rise to what Damasio calls ‘core self’.  This 
responds to the second order relation of brain circuits in interaction with the 
environment.  It is continuous from moment to moment and is how Damasio explains 
spontaneous moments of consciousness and particular emotional and feeling 
experiences.  That is, there is a succession of these ‘core’ experiences which 
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Damasio calls a nonverbal narrative (Damasio, 2000, p 169 and 184-188).  Unless 
we include memory of them, they pass outside our control.  This account would 
explain the emotional lives of animals, constantly trapped in the moment of the 
emotion, and passing from one to the next as a bundle of reflexes.   
 
As is the case of the protoself, where neural maps are distributed across brain 
circuits, so core consciousness is an even higher tiered neural map created from the 
protoself, and its particular neural map interacting with other higher-order cortical 
structures significant for adaptation in this more complex environment.  Where the 
protoself is simply responding as if stimuli were momentary, the core self, consisting 
of a succession of protoselves, must be able to form a basic spatio-temporal map of 
its environment.  Brought together the pleasant and painful experiences caused by 
events in the environment are mediated by the somatosensory cortex, reaction to 
changes in it in special senses, like touch, are mediated by the thalamus, and finally 
the cingulate cortex, which seems to respond to the other brain circuits, causes 
changes throughout the body through the rest of the nervous system.   
 
Though we are not conscious of the protoself yet we become conscious in the core 
self by virtue of the way it represents the environment.  So, where in Spinoza, 
cheerfulness, an ‘appetite’, is the continuous emotional experience or activity of the 
mind and the body in its indissoluble unity (Eth. III. 11) and ‘joy’ or ‘pleasure’ is this 
‘appetite’ conceived under the attribute of thought alone, the cause of my protoself 
cheerfulness or joy is, by Eth. III.12, the person I love.  My love is my core 
consciousness, my affirmation and existence.  The continuity of this emotional 
experience is, again, the nonverbal narrative, and it is important for Damasio’s 
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arrangements because it can be used to explain the ‘verbal narrative’ in a manner 
consistent with his observations concerning language.  Damasio wants to argue that 
consciousness must be explicable as nonverbal even if “the second order nonverbal 
narrative of consciousness can be converted into language” (Damasio, 2000, p 185).  
Hence the ‘verbal narrative’ must be a further feature of ‘extended consciousness’ 
and not core consciousness nor the autobiographical self which emerges from the 
relation of core consciousness to memory.  So the nonverbal narrative appears to be 
an unspoken level of consciousness or feeling lying behind or just below our 
attention and speech like the unspoken feeling experienced as we are moved along 
by the melodious phrases of a symphony. 
 
Higher order neural circuits co-ordinate these momentary and fleeting emotional 
experiences of the core self in a continuous ‘autobiographical self’ and its nonverbal 
narrative of feeling set against the autobiographical memory created by further 
neural circuits.  This combined system enables responses to the environment 
drawing on memory and imagination in ‘extended consciousness’.  Extended 
consciousness therefore places the experiences of core consciousness “in a broader 
canvas and over a longer period of time” (Damasio, 2000, p 196) further extended, 
Damasio inserts, by “that critical gift called language” (p 198).  It arises therefore 
from autobiographical memory of “many instances of a special class of objects” 
relating to those personal experiences which constitute the autobiographical self, in 
combination with action in the environment which stimulates memory.  None of my 
actions are intentional.  Action and adaptation triggers consciousness of any part of 
the autobiographical memory relevant to changes in the environment.  The 
memories of the autobiographical self are dispositions entrained across the nervous 
system depending on the nature of the experience giving rise to them and brought 
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together in an ‘image’, representation or ‘neural pattern’.  For example, my memory 
of a hammer consists of multiple dispositions in different sensory cortices depending 
on its weight, colour, how I moved my arm to lift it and what it felt like when I hit my 
finger.  I may not be conscious of some of my sensations of the object.  Damasio 
would say that my memory of the word ‘hammer’ is also a disposition and would be 
associated with the complex sensory experiences I have of the object in the higher 
order neural maps that co-ordinate these dispositions together in the total image or 
representation.  Hence every kind of experience I have becomes dispositional 
whether I am conscious of it or not.  If the experience encourages my 
consciousness, that combined experience becomes dispositional.  Neural structures 
engaged in memory involve most parts of the brain, especially the hippocampus, 
simply because the sensory origins of dispositions are co-ordinated in a myriad of 
ways.   
 
5.4.3 Origin of secondary or social emotions 
Dispositions to act in this or that way are the product of the interaction of the body 
with the environment and the brain with the body in what Damasio calls a ‘body 
loop’.  Because of the internally differentiated nature and structure of the brain, 
experience of the environment by the body, as it is mediated by the brain and its 
interdependent structures, undergoes change and this change is the change in 
electrochemical interaction of the different structures of the brain, called dispositions.  
This does not mean that the environment is something other than the complex 
representations of it through our complex biology.  To begin with the brain is able to 
represent the environment sufficient for our adaptations without consciousness as 
understood by Damasio, and most of the activity of the body from moment to 
moment falls below consciousness, even those complex learned actions that 
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become habituated as in playing a sport or driving a car.  Constant processing of the 
environmental stimuli can be ‘tuned down’ when the individual is occupied with 
complex interactions that engage parts of the brain in the neocortex not engaged in 
basic processing.  Because the brain cannot tell the difference between what it 
remembers and reality as experienced the memory encourages other parts of the 
brain to process sensory experience with the experience of the autobiographical self 
‘as if’ the body was still engaged in the entire neurophysiological process.  Thus in 
Spinoza “the mind is able to contemplate external things by which the human body 
was once affected as if they were present, although they are not present and do not 
exist” (Eth. II. 17. Cor.).  The experiences of the body as represented in dispositions 
can therefore engage with complex interactions with the environment called 
‘conscious’ that involves processing or mediation by parts of the neocortex ‘as if’ the 
‘body loop’ was active as normal.  The representation of the emotional state of the 
body in somatosensory cortices and other parts of the brain when I am engaged in a 
complex conscious interaction with the environment is mediated by the prefrontal 
cortex.  It would be reasonable to deduce that the phenomenon of consciousness is 
at least partly a function of the parts of the prefrontal cortex.  The point is that in 
considering interaction with the social environment, firstly, we are conscious as a 
consequence of the protoself and core self, and secondly, dispositions gathered 
together in representations, including the emotions dispositionally entrained in 
previous engagement with the social environment, ‘bias’ consciousness.  Moreover 
the ‘as if body loop’ postulated by Damasio means that emotions are felt more 
quickly than those feelings that follow from the usual processing of emotions 
described by William James.  So where, in a Jamesian account, feelings of anxiety 
would be traced from a sudden environmental stimulus to the thalamus, stimulated 
by the suddenness to trip the amygdala to start the process from the hypothalamus 
and pituitary, and their chemical signals to the adrenal glands and the resulting 
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muscle tension, pupil dilation, blood rushing from the periphery to protect the viscera 
and the whole experience of panic and readiness to ‘fight or flee’, the disposition, 
and remembered experience of it, engages the prefrontal cortex almost immediately.  
Hence Damasio regards secondary or social emotions as having a biological origin 
and their occurrence is not explained by the appeal to intentions.  (Damasio, 2010, 
pp  90-91).  For Damasio, social emotions are neither intentional nor are they social 
constructs.  This is not to say that cultural differences do not have any influence on 
their formation.  But given, as Damasio claims “you will find examples of social 
emotions in chimpanzees, baboons, and plain monkeys; in dolphins and lions…” 
(Damasio, 2003, p 46), from Damasio’s standpoint “It is highly probable that the 
availability of such social emotions has played a role in the development of complex 
cultural mechanisms of social regulation” and “One of the many reasons why some 
people become leaders and others followers, why some command respect and 
others cower, has little to do with knowledge or skills and a lot to do with how certain 
physical traits and the manner of a given individual promote certain emotional 
responses in others.” (Damasio, 2003, p 48).  Evidence for this, Damasio draws from 
Darwin’s study of emotion as these are displayed in facial expression and from those 
who follow Darwin such as Jaak Panksepp and Robert Plutchik.  This may amount to 
a question of demarcation between primary and secondary or social emotion since it 
would appear that by ‘social’ Damasio understands the situation or context of 
individuals in their separate acts and plans and not, as Spinoza understands it, as a 
mode of nature created by individuals who co-ordinate their actions together.  Hence 
Damasio conceives of social emotions as existing biologically prior to the functions 
they serve.   
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Since all of our experience in whatever form it becomes dispositional is mediated by 
the states of the body or emotions, emotions, especially as they are experienced as 
feeling in the ‘as if body loop’, that is, in the activity of the brain without regard for the 
body, ‘mark’ experiences.  They mark them differently accordingly as the experience 
is of a higher order according to the development of consciousness from the 
protoself, the core self and the autobiographical self.  The pervasive emotion of the 
protoself does not mark particular experience but he core self would respond to an 
electrical jolt to the body as reflected in the protoself.  Hence complex actions can 
also be marked and become dispositional.  When events in the social environment 
require us to follow one course of action or another the emotional experience 
relevant to the result of pursuing any action will ‘bias’ the course of action we ‘chose’.  
For Damasio “the purpose of reasoning is deciding and…the essence of deciding is 
selecting a response option…a nonverbal action, a word, a sentence” (Damasio, 
1995, p 165).  Although all of our actions are biased by our emotional experiences in 
one way or another it is in the matter of decisions, where choices are being made 
that the emotional bias becomes significant.  This is especially the case where there 
are risks and dangers or where a decision can lead to risk or danger.  Emotional 
experience contained in dispositions across different parts of the brain and its 
memory of them converges in the insular.  This part of the brain is stimulated when 
these problem situations arise, especially when experience from memory suggests 
the choices made would be maladaptive.  The activity of the insular is experienced 
as a feeling of anxiety.  But the part of the brain to which the insular projects, and 
where lower order emotional experience interacts with our sensory experience and 
factual knowledge is the prefrontal cortex, and it is here, Damasio has conclusively 
shown, that emotional experience interacts with decisions or the way we respond to 
problems in the environment, especially the social environment, where a decision 
must be made.  The social environment occasionally presents itself to us as a 
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situation to which we must adapt and the ‘decision’ how to adapt is biased by the 
nonverbal narrative of emotional experience.  Emotions do not decide for us 
(Damasio, 2000, p 42).  Hence in discussing the processes of ‘deciding’ Damasio 
draws a distinction between “’the high-reason’ view, which is none other than the 
common-sense view” in which “you perform a cost-benefit analysis” in accordance 
with a preconceived plan and his “somatic-marker hypothesis”, namely the emotional 
experience or feeling marking the possible choices relevant to the facts of the social 
situation and informed by the mediation of the insular and prefrontal cortex.  This 
may appear intentional but is the product of interactions of dispositions with the 
contingent events of the social environment.  Damasio offers proof of the role of the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) in this by explaining how damage to it 
compromises judgement in social situations (Damasio, 1996, p 1413).  He relates 
instances where, as a result of damage to the VMPFC caused by an accident or a 
tumour, the individual concerned, completely competent in all rational endeavours, 
discussion, performing logical tasks of IQ tests, would be unable to solve problems 
involving simple gambling risks, or maintain significant personal relations with 
members of their family and colleagues at work.  Without social emotion and its 
tendency to influence complex social decisions people’s lives simply fell apart.   
 
Result 
The result of this chapter has solved the problem set by research question 1 (page 
67) and confirmed that the Neo-Jamesian theory of Damasio has, except in one 
respect, the potential for resolving Vygotsky’s objections to Jamesianism.   
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 CHAPTER 6:  METHODOLOGICAL TEST OF VYGOTSKY’S OBJECTIONS  
 
Introductory survey 
In the previous sections I attempted to show that Damasio’s theory of emotion is 
consistent with Spinoza’s theory.  I followed up references to Spinoza adjunct to 
those references made by Damasio.  It would appear at this stage that Damasio’s 
argument, following from the propositions to which he refers represents Spinoza 
anticipating some of the results of Neo-Jamesianism or neuroscience in a way that 
would have appealed to Vygotsky.  In this chapter I follow Vygotsky’s method of 
analysis in Theory of Emotion and offer a version of his claim that “there is no more 
reliable and powerful weapon for the criticism of Spinoza than a testing of his ideas 
in the light of contemporary scientific knowledge” (Vygotsky, 1999, pp 104-105).  
This is achieved by substituting the Jamesian theory of his monograph with the 
contemporary Neo-Jamesian theory of Antonio Damasio and ‘testing’ each of 
Vygotsky’s objections, made from the standpoint of Spinoza (Ch. 2), in an effort to 
establish Damasio’s theory as the successor to James’s theory from the standpoint 
of Vygotsky.  The result of this Chapter will provide the answer to research Question 
1 (Ch. 4 (4.1)).   
 
The methodological test I have proposed (Chapter 4) simply tests Damasio’s Neo-
Jamesian theory against Vygotsky’s objections to the Jamesian theory Vygotsky 
explored in Theory of Emotion (Chapter 2), for the purposes of answering the 
research Question (4.1):  Does Damasio’s interpretation of Spinoza’s theory of 
emotion and its development in a biological theory meet Vygotsky’s objections to the 
Jamesian theory of emotions? 
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6.1 It is empirical (2.3.1.1: page 26) 
Damasio’s theory is empirical.  It is a biological interpretation and application of 
Spinoza’s ‘proto-biological’ theory of emotion.  Vygotsky conceived of Spinoza’s 
theory as the standard for a test of an adequate empirical theory of emotion.  
Vygotsky seems also to have expected that the results of such a test would be 
largely biological and probably neurological.  Despite the state of neurology in his 
own day Vygotsky shared an interest in the biology of the brain consistent with the 
findings of Damasio and Vygotsky shares the reasons Damasio has given for his 
own dismissal of Cannon’s theory of emotion (2.3.2: page 37).  Damasio has 
interpreted a complex theory of emotions as biological and derived an empirically 
testable theory from it.  In this Damasio has probably exceeded the ambitions of 
Vygotsky.  Hence although Damasio claims no more than to offer an hypothesis, 
since his hypothesis incorporates the ‘somatic marker hypothesis’ as an integral part 
of his biological theory of emotions and which is itself based in empirically 
corroborated evidence, Damasio’s Spinozistic ‘hypothesis’ is a scientific hypothesis 
and not in the least like William James’s speculative hypothesis.  Unlike James’s 
hypothesis, which Vygotsky regarded as too simple to test for, on the grounds that 
no evidence would ever refute it, Damasio’s theory, fully explained, is so information-
rich that it is a scientific conjecture open to the tests of falsification.   
 
6.2 It is monistic and not dualistic (2.3.1.2: page 27) 
Damasio’s theory is philosophically monistic in that it accounts for phenomena 
without appealing to extra-biological entities or constructs for its coherence and it is 
methodologically monistic in that the explanation Damasio offers for psychological 
and social phenomena are included within the single explanatory envelope of 
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biological monism.  Unlike the Jamesian theory to which Vygotsky objected on the 
grounds it was unable to account for differences among feelings without appealing to 
disembodied ‘judgement or appraisal for their differentiation, Damasio’s theory 
includes emotion and feeling, and hence consciousness, under a single explanation 
of ‘embodiment’.   
 
6.3 It is materialistic (2.3.1.3: page 29) 
For Spinoza, as for Vygotsky and Damasio, explanation is causal.  Causal 
explanation entails an ontological commitment to a conception of nature as a law 
governed and deterministic system.  Vygotsky’s complaint against James, that his 
theory of emotion was not materialist, was aimed at its inability to explain higher 
mental functions, including secondary emotions, called by James ‘judgements’, in 
terms of the same materialist ontology.  For a coherent theory which treats its 
phenomena as law governed the phenomena of secondary emotions must be 
ontologically of the same status as primary emotions and higher mental functions the 
same with lower mental functions.  Even if one’s ontology was a form of idealism, 
since idealism is not inconsistent with empiricism or, if Berkeley is right, is entailed 
by it, it is possible to give an empirical explanation of phenomena provided one’s 
ontological commitments are consistent.  Vygotsky’s complaint against James is that 
his explanation of secondary emotions as ‘judgement’ or appraisal is not an 
explanation giving evidence of natural phenomena governed or explained by the 
same laws of nature to which James appealed in giving his explanation of the 
biological origins of emotion and feeling.  With Damasio causal explanation is 
inclusive of higher mental functions and secondary emotions and hence is, from the 
standpoint of Vygotsky, non-reductively materialist. That is, the ontological status of 
physical, biological and social phenomena, though increasing in complexity is 
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identical.  Vygotsky also meant by materialism what was meant by the Soviet 
Spinoza academician Abram Deborin who ‘links Spinoza to the materialists of our 
time, that is, to the Marxists’ (Kline, 1952, p 92) and Yaroshevsky, as I have shown, 
expected Vygotsky to interpret Spinoza’s determinism as continuous with 
‘sociodeterminism’, that is, with historical materialism.  Though Vygotsky 
occasionally uses the phrase ‘dialectical psychology’ he related Marxism to general 
psychology rather than to his own specialism, so as Deborin fell out of favour, 
Vygotsky’s work came under debilitating scrutiny.  Spinoza’s concept of substance is 
a challenge to language which harbours a tendency to dualism but he guides his 
reader to a concept of nature which appears to be neither materialist nor idealist.  
Since however “the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and 
connection of things” (Eth. II. 7), Deborin and Vygotsky were able to interpret 
Spinoza’s theory of the attributes of substance as permitting a materialist explanation 
of mental phenomena and hence the non-reductive materialism consistent with 
Damasio’s biology of emotion.   
 
6.4 It is not intentionalist (2.3.1.4: page 31) 
Intentionality is a phenomenological concept which presupposes a non-scientific and 
Cartesian attempt to explain mental concepts such as ‘reason’, ‘intelligence’, ‘ethical’ 
and ‘judgement’.  These concepts are usually entailed in phenomenological attempts 
to explain consciousness or describe its composition or experience.  Intentional 
concepts express a mental ‘attitude’, orientation or sense of direction towards an 
object.  Its ‘effort’ is captured in the sense of the word ‘will’.  Spinoza explains 
intention, or, to use his term ‘will’ as what he calls a mental faculty, which, with 
‘reason’, ‘understanding’, ‘intelligence’ and ‘judgement’ is an idea that arises from a 
particular use of language and so, “In the same way it is proved, that there is in the 
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mind no absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, etc.” (Eth. II. 48. Sch.).  If 
ordinary language is used unaided by a proper distinction between types of concept 
then it will lead to generalisations and the creation of reified mental faculties which 
are used in explanation of mental phenomena in error.  Damasio avoids this 
Cartesian error by referring all these faculties, including knowledge itself to 
dispositions and the nonverbal narrative.  Jan Derry has explained what advantage 
for an understanding of Vygotsky there is in understanding Spinoza and hence his 
capacity to reconcile a notion of freedom with determinism.  “For Spinoza it is in self-
determination that human beings exhibit freedom” ( Derry, 2004, p 116) and this is 
possible for Spinoza, Derry explains, only inasmuch as individuals understand the 
causes of their own actions and this is possible when ideas or concepts are true.  A 
true idea is not a faculty but understanding when it is an increase in free activity.  “An 
appreciation of this lack of separation is necessary to grasp Vygotsky’s 
epistemology”, so Jan Derry denies the ‘simplistic idea that the possibility of free 
action depends upon sufficient knowledge’ (Derry, 2004, p 117).   
 
6.5 It is not epiphenomenalist (2.3.1.5: page 34) 
Epiphenomenalism avoids the error of Cartesian dualism in the sense that mental 
phenomena conceived as ‘effect’ share the same ontology as the ‘cause’ and the 
relation of cause to effect is included in a single explanatory theory.  Vygotsky 
thought James’s theory epiphenomenal because he explained feelings of the primary 
emotions as the product of the emotion or state of the body.  James’s conjecture that 
changes in facial expression might cause an emotion Vygotsky dismissed for the 
same reasons as Cannon.  Damasio also explains the processes that result in 
feeling as originating in emotion but unlike James has a neurological explanation of 
how feeling is reprocessed by the body and the brain.  Damasio explains secondary 
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and social emotions from the development of neural maps and dispositions 
coordinating various regions of the brain into the nonverbal narrative, including 
somatic markers.  These dispositions are ready to ‘bias’ a decision when 
circumstances in the social environment posed problems of adaptation expressed in 
customs, conventions, etiquette, suitability, morality and in a word ‘judgement’.  
Because the biasing effects the response to the problem or the ‘understanding’ of 
the problem in a way which was in previous similar encounters, adaptive, the 
response reinforces dispositional memory and more strongly biases decisions if a 
similar problem arises in the future.  These adaptations are learned developments of 
the protoself and core self by the autobiographical self.  These explanatory 
constructs Damasio uses to show that emotional experience is the product of 
homeostatic processes of increasing complexity.  The complexity increases because 
the evolutionary development of the brain means that it mediates the relation of 
homeostasis and the environment first through primitive and then through later, 
complex developments of the midbrain and neocortex.  The different layers of 
emotional experience are plainly not epiphenomenal.  Extended consciousness may 
appear to be epiphenomenal because it is the ‘last’ layer of consciousness to 
‘emerge’ but this reading of the words ‘extended’ and ‘emerge’ introduces a spatial 
metaphor.  In accounting for ‘extended consciousness’ Damasio is trying to explain 
how our sensory organs mediated by interaction of the body with the environment or 
behaviours with the social environment, ‘represent’ the natural and social 
environments so that we can adapt.  For Damasio adaptation in the social 
environment poses problems of a greater order of complexity than the natural 
environment, and this is the case because the social environment is the means of 
successful human adaptation of the species to changes in the natural environment 
that would otherwise select against it.  Hence no mental and emotional experience is 
epiphenomenal and the entire theory is biological.   
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6.6 It makes emotions passive (2.3.1.6: page 35) 
Vygotsky did not think the Jamesian theory could explain emotion adequately for his 
purpose.  It could not do this because it presented emotional experience as passive 
in its response to the environment and could not explain the discrimination between 
emotions.  Moreover, feeling, as epiphenomena of emotion in James’s theory, is 
itself passive effect.  Damasio, on the other hand, can explain an entire range of 
emotions as they are mobilized to mark responses to specific problems where a 
decision is prompted.  But this is still a conception of emotion as a passive stimulus 
to a solution.  The emotion obtains a function when it biases a decision concerning 
an event in the environment or ‘facts’ and ‘dispositional knowledge’ relevant to that 
environment.  Though the somatic marker prompts an action or a decision it is 
passive in its origins and in its power to ‘mark’ the significance of alternative 
consequences.  In this sense the function of the emotion is like a behavioural 
stimulus and is sufficient to explain the behaviour of an individual alone or 
responding to the problems posed in Damasio’s gaming experiment.  
 
In the case of individuals interacting, the relation between them on this account could 
be adaptive if one individual rewards the actions of the other.  Hence if a decision is 
to be made, the response of the other, if rewarding in some way, would cause the 
actor to repeat the action and experience the rewarded emotion so marked.  This 
requires an asymmetric social situation in which the actions of one individual can be 
called a ‘reward’ for the actions of the other.  Even if this relation of rewarder to 
rewarded were generalised to all social interaction in the sense that each rewards 
the other for actions that cause pleasure and avoid pain, the explanation of the 
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mutual interaction is a variety of behaviourism in which each individual is a stimulus 
to the other.  Hence social emotions as described by Damasio are passive.  
 
Damasio’s conception of the social environment is not one in which individuals can 
be motivated unless Damasio means by motivation a stimulus given by a stronger 
emotional bias to responses or ‘reward’.  Damasio introduces the word motivation 
conflated with the word drive in the expression ‘drives and motivations’ (Damasio, 
2010, pp 109-111; 2003, pp 34-37; 2000, p 77 and p 286) hence because “Drives 
and motivations are simpler constituents of emotion” (Damasio, 2010, p 111), 
Damasio is unable to conceive of social emotions or social environments as 
motivating.  Hence motivation, in any case ‘a constituent’ of emotion closely 
connected to drive, is also conceived by Damasio as passive and has none of the 
potential to develop a theory of motivation as explained by Spinoza and understood 
by Vygotsky.  When Vygotsky uses the word ‘motivation’ he uses it in its sense in 
ordinary language and does not argue that it is entirely explained in biology.  
Motivation does arise from the emotions but only in social interaction when emotion 
obtains its salience.  Hence “Theories, for instance, about the mechanisms 
underlying behaviour should not be mistaken for sufficient explanations of behaviour” 
(Peters, 1960, p 154). 
 
For Damasio emotions are significant in their influence on the rational process of 
making decisions.  But Damasio “did not suggest that emotions are a substitute for 
reason or that emotions decide for us” (Damasio, 2000, p 42).  On the contrary “the 
operation of logical reasoning is facilitated by the somatic marker” (Damasio, 1996, p 
1415).  The somatic marker may bias emotional experience during logical reasoning 
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and reasoning in speech but Damasio does not argue that either logical reasoning or 
reasoning in speech are themselves mediums of emotional experience or that the 
emotions may be mobilised in them.  Hence Damasio’s somatic markers function 
either before speech or independently of speech.  Moreover in a social situation 
where individuals were interacting with a patient of Damasio’s who suffered damage 
to the VMPFC sufficient to compromise the patient’s powers of judgement, the 
actions of others in the situation would introduce for the conduct of those who help 
the patient, concepts of ‘help’, ‘compassion’, ‘responsibility’, ‘consideration’ and 
‘tolerance’.  These are concepts of social interaction not ‘expressed’ from layers of 
dispositions represented to the autobiographical self and ‘emerging’ in feeling in 
‘extended consciousness’.  These   are concepts of social emotions captured in 
speech.  They motivate the dialogue between the patient and those caring for him 
and the actions they shape and plan.  Because Damasio’s account renders it 
impossible for language and emotion to mobilise one another in this way, he 
conceives of language as passive in relation to emotion. 
 
Without a theory of language Damasio is unable to account for social interaction and 
motivation and the relation they hold to the development of mental functioning.  I 
think I have shown that Damasio’s theory renders the emotions passive for the 
individual, for social interaction and for motivation and language.  Taking these 
points together it would seem that Damasio conceives of emotions as passive after 
all.  This result has not resolved Vygotsky’s objection to James’s theory on this one 
point.  It might be argued that this result is what must be expected from a biological 
theory.  But Damasio does not think his theory only biological but Spinozist.  Had he 
followed the argument of Spinoza to the Propositions he omitted from his enquiry 
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Damasio would have been led to a theory of active emotion and motivation.  I shall 
explore this step after the next section.  
 
Result 
The result of this chapter has demonstrated that Damasio’s theory is more than 
adequate for the purposes of ‘testing’ of Spinoza’s theory and of meeting Vygotsky’s 
objections to the Jamesian theory.  Research question 1 (Ch. 4 (4.1)) was:  Does 
Damasio’s interpretation of Spinoza’s theory of emotion and its development in a 
biological theory meet Vygotsky’s objections to the Jamesian theory of emotions?  
Except in respect of Damasio’s account of emotions as passive, Damasio’s theory 
resolves Vygotsky’s objections to the Jamesian theory and may be regarded as itself 
the ‘test’ of Spinoza’s ideas Vygotsky expected to attempt.  However, Damasio’s 
conclusions concerning passive emotion prevents the development or extrapolation 
from it of a theory of motivation or active emotion.  Part of the problem is the role 
Damasio seems to assign language.  In addition and closely connected to the 
problem of language, by passing over the distinctions Spinoza draws between types 
of idea or concept, Damasio is unable to follow Spinoza’s argument to active 
emotions.  Spinoza’s remarks concerning language are very guarded but they are of 
a piece with his theory of ideas and active emotion.  These two themes or problems 
concerning motivation and language can be followed in Spinoza but both of these 
problems converge in the direction of Vygotsky for an answer. 
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CHAPTER 7:  RESIDUAL PROBLEM IN DAMASIO’S THEORY 
 
Introductory survey 
The result of the methodological test showed that Damasio’s interpretation of 
Spinoza meets Vygotsky’s objections to the Jameson theory except in one matter, 
namely the matter of passive emotions.  This is not in the least a defect of Damasio’s 
theory.  Unless Damasio had intended to proceed to the Propositions interpolated 
between, or following from, the Propositions he followed from Spinoza, his results 
show that Spinoza is Damasio’s ‘protobiologist’ and that Damasio’s Neo-
Jamesianism or neuroscience is Spinozist exactly as far as Vygotsky would have 
expected, and no further.  Moreover the result of the review of Vygotsky’s Theory of 
Emotion produced a list of his objections to the Jamesian theory inasmuch as that 
theory did not serve his purposes in working out a theory of motivation at the end of 
Thought and Language consistent with his linguist theory of concept development 
explained in that work and the theory of motivation suggested in his paper, Problem 
of the Environment.  Hence the result of Damasio’s enquiry into Spinoza leaves off at 
exactly that point at which Vygotsky’s own enquiries into Spinoza are most 
significant.  That point is exactly the point at which Damasio’s theory of emotion 
intersects with Vygotsky’s theory of emotion.  To understand exactly this point of 
intersection it will be necessary to explore how far Damasio went in following 
Spinoza and the consequences both for his theory of emotion and its potential for a 
theory of motivation.  The result of this analysis will provide the answer to the 
research Question 2 (Ch. 4 (4.2)):  Why is Damasio’s interpretation incomplete and 
how does this lead to a problem concerning his notion of ‘extended consciousness’? 
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7.1 Damasio omits part of Spinoza’s theory 
Damasio’s theory of emotion is a theory of passive emotion because he follows the 
argument of Spinoza in Part II of the Ethics in those Propositions in which Spinoza 
sets out his theory of mind and emotion before he makes significant further 
theoretical deductions.  Spinoza begins with his idea of the relation of the mind to the 
body, which Damasio adopts.  At Eth. II. 13 Spinoza states almost by way of 
definition, that “the object of the idea constituting the human mind is a body”.  He is 
not putting the identity thesis that the mind ‘just is’ the body.  Nor is he saying that 
the mind just knows itself.  The interaction between physical objects is a mental 
event conceived under the attribute of thought.  A mind is an idea of the body in its 
interactions.  But because the body is itself constituted by parts and those parts by 
other parts (Eth. II. 13. Post), the mind is itself constituted by ideas of ideas (Eth. II. 
21 Sch.) and it is this ‘level’ of interaction in the body which Damasio calls the 
protoself.  But in the Scholium to Proposition 13 Spinoza says about this relation of 
mind to body, “But no one can understand it adequately or distinctly without knowing 
adequately beforehand the nature of our body”, and so introduces his idea of 
adequacy.  Hence the body and the emotional state of the body which are the 
subject of Damasio’s enquiries must be understood ‘adequately’, a point repeated in 
Proposition 24.  Damasio continues to Propositions 19, 22, 23 and 26 where Spinoza 
demonstrates how our mind only knows the body itself (Prop. 19) and the mind itself 
(Propositions 22, 23), through the ‘ideas of the affections of the body’.  Damasio 
follows these propositions in the development of his theory of the emotions.  The 
‘affections’, sometimes translated ‘modifications’, are the sensations or ideas caused 
by an interaction with an ‘external body’, Damasio’s ‘emotionally competent 
stimulus’.  This is plain enough in Proposition 26:  “The human mind perceives no 
external body as actually existing, unless through the ideas of the affections of its 
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body”.  Damasio’s interpretation thus follows Spinoza’s demonstration at a particular 
level of generality.  At Propositions 24, 25 and 27 to 29 Spinoza reintroduces the 
reference to ‘adequacy’ he made in Eth. II. Prop. 13. Sch. so where Proposition 23, 
followed by Damasio reads, “The mind does not know itself except insofar as it 
perceives the ideas of the affections of the body”, Propositions 24 and 25, omitted by 
Damasio, read “The human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge of the 
parts compositing the human body” (Prop. 24) and “The idea of each affection of the 
human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of an external body” (Prop. 
25).  Is it not that the mind cannot know itself except through the ideas of the body.  
It can only know itself if those ideas are ‘adequate’.  Further, at Proposition 27, “The 
idea of any affection of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of 
the human body itself”.  Propositions 28 and 29 urge the same caution and Spinoza 
adds, “I say expressly that the mind has no adequate knowledge of itself, nor of its 
body, nor of external bodies but only a confused knowledge, as often as it perceives 
things in the common order of nature…” (Eth. II. 29. Sch). Since Damasio omits 
these Propositions his interpretation of Spinoza can only go so far.  Damasio limits 
the relevance Spinoza has for him to a conception of emotion which is undeveloped 
or without the potential for development.  It follows from this that the emotions 
Damasio describes are not the energising feelings of our thoughts but their flow in 
the nonverbal narrative.  I should say such emotions are ‘passive’ and can only be 
‘energised’ by intense random activity which creates a further passive condition of 
excitement.  But, for Spinoza, our thoughts about this and that particular fact are 
brought together in the seamless flow of our consciousness, that is, in Spinoza, 
‘desire’, only if emotions are active.  There are no facts without feeling.  Since 
Damasio does not engage with Spinoza’s notion of ‘desire’ he cannot find the 
relation between our knowledge and feeling in consciousness, so his ‘extended 
consciousness’ is another field of passive responses.  So far I have simply shown 
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the difference between the sense of the Propositions Damasio has selected and 
those he has omitted.  The relations between these Propositions lead to a further 
‘level’ of Spinoza’s argument omitted by Damasio.   
 
7.2 Consequences of omission 
The introduction of the distinction Spinoza makes between ‘adequate’ and 
‘inadequate’ ideas does not undermine Damasio’s interpretation of Spinoza because 
he follows Spinoza in those Propositions where he does not draw this distinction.  He 
is simply unable to follow Spinoza in his elaboration of the difference between 
concepts (‘conceptions of the mind’ in Spinoza) and hence the difference between 
passive and active emotions, the active emotions being a proto-biological, or better 
still, a quasi-biological, account of motivation.  Following this distinction between 
ideas is significant for his argument but Spinoza elaborates upon this with a further 
distinction to be made between the concept of the ‘common order of nature’ and the 
concept of ‘common notions’ also expressed in the phrase ‘common properties of 
things’.  
 
In short, understanding things in the ‘common order of nature’ is to understand 
inadequately, that is, to understand objects and actions or events, contingently.  The 
knowledge formed from contingent events is empirical, what Spinoza calls the 
‘knowledge of the first kind’ and is not yet ‘scientific’.  This is the knowledge formed 
by Damasio’s ‘autobiographical self’ and evident in ‘extended consciousness’.   
Damasio’s individual can only form inadequate ideas.  Because Damasio has not 
included the distinction between these ideas he cannot construct the idea of an 
individual, like himself, who is motivated by adequate ideas.  His individual is 
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“determined to the contemplation of this or that externally” (Eth. II. 29. Sch.), by 
contingent events and hence the state of the body or the emotions follow the 
‘common order of nature’, or events as they happen and hence are simply passive 
responses to external stimuli.    For Damasio, as for Spinoza writing about the 
passive emotions, “Anything may be accidently the cause of joy, sorrow or desire” 
(Eth. III. 15).  We may be able to organise our lives responding to these emotions 
passively and Spinoza explores these social interactions which follow from such 
causes (Eth. III. 16 to 57).  So for example “We shall endeavour to do everything 
which we imagine men will look upon with joy and be averse to do anything to which 
we imagine men are averse” (Eth. III. 29), or “If we imagine that we are hated by 
another without having given him cause for it, we shall hate him in return” (Eth. III. 
40), and hence by the scholium of that Proposition, if we are the cause of another’s 
hatred “we shall then be affected with shame” or, worse, “He who imagines that what 
he hates is destroyed will rejoice” (Eth. III. 20)!  These are the possible social 
interactions of passive emotions and for Spinoza, explain most of social existence 
either because we do not have sufficient power to resist them or because we 
acquiesce in them, in our work, in our daily routines, in entertainment, and in our 
understanding of social and political affairs.  “Hence it follows that a man is 
necessarily always subject to a passion, and that he follows and obeys the common 
order of nature, accommodating himself to it as far as the nature of things requires” 
(Eth. IV. 4. Cor.).   
 
7.3 Spinoza’s psychological ‘method’ 
Active emotions are the experiences of our own activity as we engage with life, with 
the natural and social world.  These are not emotions of our passive, contingent 
interactions but the emotions of our actions.  For Spinoza, to be active is human 
 129 
nature, so that if our emotions are passive it is because the power of events and 
others has overwhelmed us.  I have established the difference between the 
Propositions Damasio selected and the Propositions he omitted and the distinction 
drawn between adequate and inadequate ideas in the Propositions he omitted and 
what the result was for a biological theory of emotion.  In this section I shall explain 
how the difference between adequate and inadequate ideas is deployed by Spinoza 
in his ‘method’ of transforming passive into active emotion or motivation.  I seek to 
show that Damasio’s theory amounts to a theory of passive emotion and cannot itself 
explain motivation.  I seek to show that a theory of motivation, while drawing on its 
biological explanation of the primary or passive emotions, can only be completed in a 
way that does justice to the concept of emotion or enables it. 
 
Inadequate ideas can only trace their interrelations externally so these ideas are 
related by association or similarity or ‘as they are in the imagination’ or memory.  By 
association “according to the way in which words, from some disposition of the body 
are joined in the memory in a vague way” (Corr. Und. Paras 88-89) words in ordinary 
language, as signs, ‘trace’ their objects (Wolf, 1966, p 140).  Spinoza distinguishes 
between universal terms and transcendental terms.  Universal terms like ‘dog’, 
‘horse’, ‘apple’ are words associated or traced mentally with the generalisation of our 
particular experiences.  So all class terms are generalisations from contingent 
experiences and are used to denote those particular things that fall under the class 
term.  Transcendental terms such as ‘thing’, ‘being’, ‘this’, are also linguistic signs 
but they denote nothing in particular.  
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So these words are really class terms of extreme generality, and it is in error that 
they are used in explanation or as if they could refer.  If they are used in speech 
unaided by adequate ideas they lead to reified belief in non-existent entities and a 
return to a Cartesian worldview.  Class terms are words used as signs to refer to our 
experience of things in the ‘common order of nature’ and hence this use of language 
can be called empirical.  The result is ‘knowledge of the first kind’.  Although a word 
may have a public meaning, this is a vague generalisation constituted by the use of 
language.  Apart from the ‘meaning’, a word also has ‘sense’ for this and that 
speaker depending on his use of the word in his experience.  Hence, to use 
Spinoza’s example, the word ‘horse’ has one sense for a farmer, associated in his 
experience with ‘fields’ and ‘ploughs’, and has another sense for a soldier, 
associated in his experience with ‘cavalry’ and ‘war’.  But contingent experience of 
things known externally constitutes inadequate ideas and consequently “the mind 
has no adequate knowledge of itself, nor of its body, nor of external things” (Eth. II. 
29. Sch.).  Hence ordinary language is part of our contingent experience and the 
meaning or sense word sounds obtain are part of our ordinary contingent experience 
where we associate the word with our particular use of it.  The ordinary use of 
language will not help us organise our experience except in passively generalising 
from passive experience itself.  From this it follows that “Anything may be 
accidentally the cause of joy, sorrow or desire” (Eth. III. 15) and, since we think by 
association when carried along by contingent experience, including the unpredictable 
phases of an emotional experience our actions will be determined by events and our 
passive interactions with other people because we “do some things and omit doing 
others solely because we wish to please them” (Eth. III. 29. Sch.).   
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Again, “If a person has done anything which he imagines will affect others with joy, 
he also will be affected with joy…” (Prop. 30), Spinoza traces out these passive 
emotions and the passive social interactions they describe, up to Part II, Proposition 
57.  Hence inadequate ideas of ourselves or others or nature in general will leave us 
enduring passive emotions and passively determined or controlled in a system of 
rewards and punishments and praise or blame.  What is described here are social 
interactions between atomised individuals in a context that may be called ‘social’.  
But these interactions are not social relationships.  The long range consequence of 
this for a biological theory of social interaction is conveyed in the theory of Damasio. 
 
As opposed to those things known externally, “By adequate idea, I understand an 
idea, which insofar as it is considered in itself, without reference to the object, has all 
the properties or internal signs of a true idea” (Eth. II. Def. 4). It follows from 
Spinoza’s remarks concerning language that he does not subscribe to a 
correspondence theory of truth.  So a statement is not true because it refers and it is 
not meaningful because it is true.  An idea is true because it ‘agrees’ with its object, 
which is to say no more than that a mode of nature conceived or understood under 
the attribute of thought is the same mode conceived under the attribute of extension.   
So if we have adequate ideas we know our own mind, the body and hence 
understand our emotions, and external things which are the causes of those 
emotions.  So the ‘internal signs’ of a true idea are its deductive connections or 
‘concatenations’ as he calls them, with other true ideas.  To put it another way a true 
idea is like a theory, the internal structure of which is interdeducible, and 
interdeducible with other theories.  A concept is not ‘a picture’, as Spinoza says.  It is 
constituted by ‘dispositions’ in the sense used by Spinoza and Damasio.  Hence 
ideas are actions and their causal concatenation is the flow of Damasio’s nonverbal 
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narrative.  Spinoza would like us to think that the Ethics is just such an idea and the 
Propositions, aided by our own adequate ideas, since adequate ideas are not 
conveyed in writing any more than speech, its ‘internal signs’.  If truth is the 
agreement of the idea and its ideatum, or our understanding the unity of mind and 
body, then “Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge which inadequate 
ideas….involve” (Eth. II. 35) and this is the result of our not being able to explain the 
causes of our ideas and hence emotions.  If anything “requires a cause to exist then 
it must be understood through its proximate cause” (Corr. Und. Para. 92) so if an 
“effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived by means of the cause”…”I call that an 
adequate idea” (Eth. III. Def. 1).   
 
Once we can explain our emotions by the ‘proximate causes’ of them then we can 
transform our passive emotions into active emotions.  This is Spinoza’s ‘method’ of 
motivation and I think this reappears in Vygotsky’s zone of proximal development.  
The process of ideas towards their ‘perfection’ is the prolepsis of the concept. 
 
7.4 Spinoza’s explanation of social emotions 
The transformation is obtained when we explain and hence organise our ideas of 
contingent experience, and therefore our passive emotions by means of ‘knowledge 
of the second kind’, or higher order ideas.  There is no emotion for which we cannot 
find the cause (Eth. IV. 59 and V. 4).  The means is not only empirical knowledge of 
the common order of nature but empirical experience of nature in those properties it 
shares in the whole of nature and its parts.  These properties are not the result of 
empirical generalisations from particular instances alone, as in inadequate ideas, or 
Vygotsky’s ‘spontaneous concepts’ but properties all of nature, including the human 
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body, already has.  The most basic is motion-and-rest.  Less basic but still in the 
whole and part are those social relations which do not hinder human activity but help 
it.  The only relations that increase activity are ones which increase the activity and 
hence autonomy and emotional wellbeing of the individuals in the social relationship.  
Individuals who pass passively from one emotion to the next with the passage of 
contingent events are unlikely to share common notions (Eth. IV. 32 and 34).  But 
since “An emotion which is a passion ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a 
clear and distinct idea of it” (Eth. V. 3) “through its proximate cause” (Corr. Und. 
Para. 92), if we seek to understand and hence explain both our own and the 
emotions of others, our effort to explain engages active emotions of cheerfulness, 
which we share with others of the same disposition (Eth. IV. 35), and therefore enlist 
the same common notions (Eth. II. 41).  It now follows that since cheerfulness is an 
increase in our mental activity (Eth. IV. 18), if anything or anyone helps increase our 
activity (Eth. III. 11), we will be able to explain, with those common notions or 
adequate ideas thus shared, our own emotions, and the emotions of anyone, in 
some system of psychological explanation, by their proximate cause (Eth. III. 59) and 
transform their passive emotions into active emotions (Eth. V. 3).  The most 
‘common notions’ shared in social interrelations or societies in which, by III. 11, each 
increases the power or, in Spinoza’s word for the same thing, ‘virtue’, of others, is 
“common to all, and all may equally enjoy it” (Eth. IV. 36).  Since understanding this 
is common to all reasonable people, they will desire this for others (Eth. IV. 37).  The 
teacher, for example, is autonomously motivated by the desire to increase the same 
self-determination or autonomy of his student and his teaching method will not, by III. 
11, ‘hinder’ the emotional activity of the student, but it will, because it is Spinoza’s 
method, so deploy the explanation of an adequate idea of say, the theory of 
evolution, that in its concatenation with other ideas of the students’, the engagement 
of the student so increases his mastery of the adequate idea, that his own desire or 
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increase in activity motivates his further social engagement and hence his 
understanding and transformation of his own inadequate ideas, by means of those 
and further adequate ideas.  Hence not only can we explain and understand our own 
emotions but we can explain and understand anything else when we are motivated 
by the same method.  Except for the function of emotion this is easily traced in 
Vygotsky’s account of the explanatory relation of scientific to spontaneous concepts 
in the zone of proximal development.  Continuing, very briefly, Spinoza develops the 
reasons for health in this context (Eth. IV. 38-39) and the role of the law for all, 
including those who have an inadequate idea of it (Eth. IV. 40).  There follows a 
further account of joy transformed into an active emotion by an adequate idea of it 
(Eth. IV. 41), why, given this, cheerfulness is always good (Eth. IV. 42), why hatred, 
since it ‘hinders’ social relations, ‘is never good’ (Eth. IV. 43) and an analysis of 
emotions deployed in social interaction but are not socially empowering, such as 
revenge, hope, fear, pity, humility and so on (Eth. IV. 44-58).  All of the active 
emotions, or motivations, are social relationships shaped or constituted by ‘common 
notions’ or ‘entities of reason’ (since ‘reason’ is a ‘faculty’) and none of them are 
entirely explained in biology.  The biological components explained by Damasio are 
the primary emotions explained by Spinoza.  These emotions enter into all passive 
social interaction preserving their biological function as explained by Damasio, but 
are transformed into active emotions or motivation only in social interrelations as 
explained by Spinoza.  Biological explanation of the primary emotions is sufficient for 
explaining social interaction conceived as passive, such as in a passive interaction 
where one person has the authority to ‘reward’ another.  But because active emotion 
is the effect of transformative social relations and not the cause, a biological account 
of motivation has to be assimilated to biological functions such as drives as 
expressed in Damasio’s phrase ‘drives and motivations’.  This is where Damasio 
departs from Spinoza.  Damasio argues that social emotions, inclusive of primary 
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emotions, can be explained biologically and he gives examples of the social 
emotions in the behaviour of other animals.  For Spinoza motivation is explained as 
the transformation of primary emotions when they are passive into active emotions 
through social interrelations.  Social emotions therefore are not explained biologically 
and exactly are those dynamic transformative social interrelations.  Spinoza can 
agree with Damasio inasmuch as they both explain primary emotions when they are 
passive.  But Spinoza would insist that Damasio’s account of social emotions 
renders them equally passive with his version of primary emotions, and moreover 
incapable of explaining motivation, that is, active emotion.  Damasio, in not being 
able to explain motivation, and its means in social relations, cannot explain social 
emotions.  Since he has not followed Spinoza’s arguments, Damasio can explain 
passive primary emotions only, and his account of the emotions, though it is 
Spinozist, is incomplete.  Spinoza is clear that we are unable to transform passive 
emotions into active emotions because language is misleading.  By association 
words ‘trace’ our inadequate ideas of our contingent experience, especially in 
empirical generalisations.  Though he explains the role of adequate ideas in their 
transformation of inadequate ideas in our giving a causal explanation of them, he is 
less explicit in explaining how language is mobilised in this transformation.  Indeed, 
for Savan, “So sharply does Spinoza separate words from adequate ideas that it is 
difficult to make out for language any useful philosophical function at all” (Savan, 
1979, p 63).  Looking ahead I think the function of speech in the relation of adequate 
ideas to inadequate ideas is explained by Vygotsky but I shall first survey Damasio’s 
ideas concerning language to show how they are compatible with Spinoza’s account 
of inadequate ideas and passive emotion.   
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Result 
Following my demonstration in Chapter 6 that Damasio’s theory explains emotions 
as passive, in this chapter I returned to a consideration of the omissions by Damasio 
(Ch. 5 (5.4.1)) of parts of Spinoza’s argument set out in the Ethics.  This is a residual 
problem for the relevance of Damasio’s solution to Vygotsky’s objections.  In giving 
an account of the significance of the distinction drawn by Spinoza between active 
and passive emotions, a distinction omitted from Damasio’s explanation of Spinoza’s 
theory of emotion, I have given the answer to research Question 2 (Ch. 4 (4.2) page 
69 and 124) and moreover indicated that an explanation of Spinoza’s theory which 
includes the distinction he makes and necessary for an understanding of Vygotsky’s 
project in Theory of Emotion, has the consequence of developing Damasio’s own 
theory.   
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CHAPTER 8:  THE FUNCTION OF LANGUAGE IN DAMASIO’S THEORY 
 
Introductory survey 
In this chapter I wish to show how far Damasio’s and Spinoza’s remarks about 
language are compatible.  I wish to show that just as Damasio’s theory is compatible 
with that part of Spinoza’s theory he has developed, so Damasio’s ideas about the 
role of language are compatible with Spinoza’s theory of language when he is 
explicit in what he writes.  Spinoza has a use for language as an explanatory tool 
which mobilises the passive emotions in the development of adequate ideas, but he 
is not explicit about this role for language and this function of language is also absent 
from Damasio’s account of language but for quite different reasons.  I shall argue 
that Vygotsky’s linguistic theory of concept development partly resolves the residual 
problem of Damasio’s theory explained in the previous chapter.  I say ‘partly’ 
because the complete resolution depends on incorporating the results of Vygotsky’s 
unit of analysis with his linguistic theory and demonstrating how this result further 
extends the Neo-Jamesian explanation.   
 
8.1 Damasio’s concept of language 
Damasio argues that my having a core self makes sense of my use of the word ‘I’.  
He argues that “the mind could not possibly translate it as I” (Damasio, 2000, p 186) 
unless there existed a core self to ‘translate’ by the word ‘I’.  Hence “language gives 
us names for things” (Damasio, 2000, p 108) and even if these ‘things’ are concepts, 
as most assuredly the core self is, ‘concepts precede words’ and ‘words and 
sentences translate concepts’ (Damasio, 2000, p 185), those ‘concepts that 
correspond to words’ (Damasio, 2010, p 70).  Damasio thus insists that 
consciousness and its concepts precede language.  This is why core consciousness 
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consists of a nonverbal narrative.  This does not mean that the written word or 
speech has no potential to form concepts.  Language is an ‘external memory system’ 
(Damasio, 2010, p 290) which I share in the semantic memory of my 
autobiographical self and extended consciousness, though here too Damasio will 
allow, based on observations of some of his patients, extended consciousness 
without language.  When I use language I use it to ‘bring those ideas to you’ that 
‘were formed as auditory, visual, somatosensory images’ (Damasio, 2010, p 70).  
Damasio describes ‘interacting sets of structures’ by means of which the ‘brain 
processes language’.  One structure consists of neural representations of 
“nonlanguage interactions between the body and its environment”, or concepts.  A 
second structure representing word sounds and syntactic rules “when stimulated 
from within the brain…assemble word forms and generate sentences to be spoken 
or written” and a third structure “can take a concept and stimulate the production of 
word forms, or it can receive words and cause the brain to evoke the corresponding 
concepts”.  Spinoza accounts for the same process of concatenation of ideas though 
he does think that the same words do have different ‘sense’ for different speakers.  
Nonetheless “from the thought of the word pomum a Roman immediately turned to 
the thought of the fruit” because “he often heard the word pomum when he saw the 
fruit” (Eth. II. 18. Sch.).  Contingent experience and the coupling of ideas to sounds 
of words constitutes empirical knowledge or what Spinoza calls ‘knowledge of the 
first kind’.  Spinoza regarded this kind of knowledge, unaided by common notions or 
adequate ideas, as significantly inadequate but Spinoza’s account of it is essentially 
the same as Damasio’s explanation of these associations.  Damasio is giving a 
biological account of language as far as language can be explained biologically but it 
is consistent enough with remarks of Spinoza.  Both Damasio and Spinoza give what 
appears to be an account of language as passive as the primary emotions described 
by Damasio.  An interesting result of a neuroscientific experiment appears to confirm 
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both Damasio and Spinoza in their accounts of this use of language.  The 
participants in the experiment were given groups of statements covering different 
topics, ethical, personal, geographical and so on.  In each group, statements were 
plainly ‘true’ or ‘false’ or ‘undecidable’.  The participants had to decide which of the 
statements in each group were ‘believable’, ‘unbelievable’ or ‘uncertain’.  The 
experiment employed fMRI to measure the rate of activity in the VMPFC, cingulate 
cortex and insula.  The results showed that participants were quicker to decide that 
true statements were ‘believable’ than they were to decide the ‘false’ statements 
‘unbelievable’.  In addition, and significant for Damasio’s theory of emotion, the 
VMPFC showed more activity when the participants decided the true statements 
‘believable’, and more activity in the cingulate cortex when they selected ‘uncertain’ 
for ‘undecidable’ statements.  Most interestingly the authors concluded that “Several 
psychological studies appear to support Spinoza’s conjecture that the mere 
comprehension of a statement entails the tacit acceptance of its being true…  Our 
behavioural data support this hypothesis….” (Harris, Sheth, Cohen, 2008, p 143).  
This confirms the connection Spinoza makes between the passive use of language 
and their function in the passive emotions.   
 
8.2 Explicit and implicit uses of language in Spinoza 
Savan was concerned that Spinoza’s remarks concerning language did not help his 
case, though Yovel, in one study and Parkinson disagreeing with Savan (in Grene) in 
another, have both argued that Spinoza was faced with the problem of attempting to 
explain ideas that at the time he was writing challenged orthodox opinion.  It is 
Yovel’s view that Spinoza uses contemporary scholastic vocabulary either to 
disguise his unorthodoxy or to subvert the accepted use of academic language in an 
effort to introduce radically new ideas (Yovel, 1989, p 128-151).  Whichever is the 
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case Spinoza is explicit in what he has to say about what he regarded as the defects 
of the ordinary use of language and understated about the role for language in his 
method.  Perhaps a distinction can be drawn here between an ‘explicit’ use of 
language and an ‘implicit’ use.  It might be argued that Spinoza has shown that a use 
of language that is ‘explicit’ leads to the kinds of empirical generalisations from 
contingent experience that he calls ‘knowledge of the first kind’ or ‘vague 
experience’.  This would seem to make a little clearer the relation of passive emotion 
to the neuroscience explanation Damasio gives of the relation between images 
mediated by the third structure which “can take a concept and stimulate the 
production of word forms” (above).  It might also be suggested that another use of 
language is ‘implicit’ in Spinoza’s method, that is, in the relation between adequate 
ideas, especially ‘common notions’ and inadequate ideas, when adequate ideas are 
the means for the transformation of the passive emotions into the active emotions.  
Spinoza tells us “It is the knowledge of the second and third kind, and not that of the 
first, which teaches us to distinguish the true from the false”, and in his proof, adds, 
“This proposition is self-evident” (Eth. II. 42)   Though the argument might appear 
circular the transformation obtained by explanation is the motivating function of 
active emotions.  Active emotions are obtained by the use of adequate ideas as tools 
and these ideas themselves become the means, since they are also active emotions, 
of further motivating the relations, the concatenation, between them.  Spinoza is not 
himself explicit in explaining the means by which adequate ideas or common notions 
function in this way.  I think this problem appealed more to Vygotsky than it does to 
Damasio because Damasio can only account for the theory of passive emotions he 
has followed in the argument found in his selected Propositions.  Despite Damasio 
having followed Spinoza so far Cromby in one paper and Brown and Stenner, in 
another, detect elements of Cartesianism in his neuroscience which make the 
accommodation of neuroscience to the social sciences problematic.  Cromby is 
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concerned that Damasio’s neuroscience, in ascribing ‘psychological predicates to the 
brain’, creates an ‘immanent, embodied self’ and ‘concretises’ it in a way that makes 
it less and not more accessible for the social sciences (Cromby, 2007, p 160).  
Damasio’s layers of proto, core and autobiographical self may appear to ‘concretise’ 
the idea of self in a way not found in Spinoza, at least not explicitly, but when 
Damasio writes about Spinoza he thinks of him as his proto-biologist and he follows 
Spinoza in those Propositions where he anticipates some of neuroscience.  Similarly, 
Brown and Stenner “applaud Damasio’s attempt to give the brain back its body, but 
he is not yet a Spinozist until he returns that body to the matrix that is its world” 
(Brown, 2009, p 132).  They arrive at this conclusion because they regard Damasio’s 
theory of emotion as deficient in its account of social emotions.  They notice that “the 
proposition from Spinoza that most appeals to Damasio” (Brown, 2009, p 132) is 
Proposition II. 19, which Damasio interprets as asserting “the human mind is the idea 
of the body” (Damasio, 2003, p 12) but Brown and Stenner think this reading has led 
Damasio to misrepresent the proper relation of the body to the world and add, “It is 
the body as affected through its encounters that is the source of mind and its 
knowledge and not the body as such” (Brown, 2009, p 132).  Brown and Stenner 
explore the ‘encounters’ in considerable detail in order to demonstrate the origins of 
social emotions in them.  To do this they introduce the role of common notions 
missing from Damasio’s account and demonstrate how “They emerge fortuitously 
during agreeable or euphoric encounters”.  This approach argues that it is from 
“encounters marked by euphoria the individual begins to develop the means to 
exercise adequate ideas” (Brown, 2009, p 123) and hence Brown and Stenner do 
not follow the consequences for them of Damasio’s explanation of primary emotions.  
On their account social emotions ‘emerge fortuitously’ from social encounters 
mediated by common notions, but by Proposition II. 19 “The human mind does not 
know the human body itself, nor does it know that the body exists, except through 
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ideas of affections by which the body is affected” and it is the ‘ideas of the affections’ 
which Damasio calls the ‘protoself’.  Damasio, as a biologist, explains the 
‘emergence’ of the consciousness attending the relation between more complex 
structures and relatively simpler structures and thereby traces the evolution of 
primary emotions.  For Spinoza social relations are mediated by common notions, 
the means, and end (tool-and-result) of the transformation of passive primary 
emotions into active emotions.  Although Damasio’s concept of primary emotion 
cannot do the work Spinoza wants it to do, Damasio is surely correct in explaining 
how the complexity of the body and most especially, the brain, mediates experience 
from the stimulus to conscious feeling.  He is correct too, if he, like Spinoza, follows 
out the consequences of monism.  Damasio is unable to bridge the gap between his 
incomplete version of the primary emotions and social emotions but there is no short 
cut to the social emotions.  Despite their account of the social emotions, Brown and 
Stenner have not themselves suggested the means of returning the “body to that 
matrix which is the world”. 
 
Damasio has been unable to account for the social emotions as understood by 
Spinoza as the deductive consequences of his primary emotions, completely 
understood.  For the same reasons Damasio has been unable to follow Spinoza to 
his complete theory of emotion and method with its potential for a theory of 
motivation.  Social relations, as explained by Spinoza, constitute the mind as a 
mode.  The development of social relations and the concept of them is impossible if 
primary emotions cannot be mobilised by a method of motivation.  Since Damasio’s 
interpretation has rendered the primary emotions passive and his explanation of the 
relation of words to concepts renders language equally passive his notion of 
extended consciousness is not compatible with Spinoza’s notion of ‘social’.  
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Damasio’s individuals are ‘atomised’ and seem to have no potential for social 
relationships.  If social emotions are active emotions conceived as the product of 
Spinoza’s method, on Damasio’s account it would be impossible to form social 
emotions as understood by Spinoza.  Moreover, if Spinoza’s remarks concerning 
language agree with Damasio’s similar remarks it would be impossible to use 
language thus passively conceived to mobilise the emotions.  Hence Damasio’s 
interpretation of Spinoza is incomplete and he has not the theoretical means to 
explain the social activity extended conscious includes.  Despite these problems it 
might be possible to find a solution in the relation of the nonverbal narrative to 
speech.   
 
8.3 Nonverbal narrative and speech 
The nonverbal narrative is the succession of emotional experiences in core 
consciousness as it represents the combined response to the protoself and 
interpretations of events in the environment.  Damasio insists that the narrative of 
core consciousness is not given in language.  Damasio’s role for language emerges 
with extended consciousness.  Damasio’s claim is against those who argue that 
human consciousness arises only in language.  Were this to be the case, he argues, 
he would be unable to make the claim for the role of the core self.  Nevertheless 
Damasio suggests that his “views could be questioned along the following lines.  
What if….the nonverbal narrative of knowing, occurs below the level of 
consciousness and only the verbal translation provides evidence that it exists at all” 
(Damasio, 2000, p 186).   
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This position is not inconsistent with the explanatory theory of concept development 
of Vygotsky.  For Vygotsky, as for Damasio, “Thought and speech have different 
genetic roots” and “develop along different lines” (Vygotsky, 1986, p 79).  Though the 
infant responds to word sounds in a pre-intellectual phase, probably not in a way 
dissimilar to Damasio’s associationist explanation of the relation of concept to word, 
“at about the age of two the curves of development of thought and speech, until then 
separate, meet and join to initiate a new form of behaviour” (Vygotsky, 1986, p 82).  
Vygotsky then traces the development of the intellectualisation of thought through 
social and egocentric speech, where the child learns from the responses of parents 
and others, the symbolic power of words, that is, the use of words as signs.  The 
sign is learnt and used in the same way as a gesture.  The sign or gesture of 
pointing was taught when the infant learnt that his effort to grasp with his hand 
something he wanted could be used as a sign or ‘tool’ with which to point, after his 
mother responded by giving to him what he grasped at.  In other words, his mother 
taught her baby how to make a sign.  Speech becomes a symbolic tool in just this 
way.  The internalisation of speech is obtained in the same way as the memory of 
the motor actions of grasping.  And just as the memory of the gesture incorporates 
the memory of the response of the mother so the internalisation of the word 
incorporates its potentials as a sign.  The internalisation of speech, especially 
noticeable with the internalisation of egocentric speech, as the use of language as a 
tool, into inner, soundless speech, may serve as the point at which Damasio’s verbal 
narrative becomes internalised as a nonverbal narrative.  This permits a distinction 
between nonverbal narrative that never originates in speech and a nonverbal 
narrative which originates in speech and is the product of the internalisation of 
‘egocentric speech’ as ‘inner speech’.   
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This nonverbal narrative appears to be ‘those aspects’ Damasio mentions which ‘are 
the first above the sea level of consciousness and precede the corresponding verbal 
translation’ (Damasio, 2000, p 187).  Hence it is conceivable that thought or core self 
consciousness, as already represented in the nonverbal narrative, becomes the 
medium for language.  This can happen in two ways.  The nonverbal narrative can 
be mobilised in a conception and use of language in which one speaker’s words are 
the stimulus for the other speaker’s words.  This would appear to be the situation for 
two individuals meeting and interacting in ‘extended consciousness’.  Alternatively 
the dialogue substituting for common notions is the means for adequate ideas, that is 
any theory which has explanatory power.  As the dialogue proceeds, adequate ideas 
understood by the speakers, and which explain the relations between their own 
inadequate and adequate ideas, simultaneously transforms the passive emotions of 
the nonverbal narrative into active emotions.  Since engaging in the dialogue is 
motivated by the effect of the assistance of the other, the motivation to speak is the 
transformation of the passive emotions into a social emotion in which they both 
share as a mode of nature.  For Spinoza the mode under the attribute of thought is a 
mind and the mind is the virtuous social relation between speakers whose speech 
augments the power of the other.  Speech is the means of mobilising the nonverbal 
narrative but the nonverbal narrative, if made ‘perfect’, through speech, would 
constitute the ‘nature’ or ‘essence’ of one mode.  The emotional development of 
each obtains their mutual social development.  The understanding of concepts of 
responsibility, authority, law for example, as understood by Spinoza, are developed 
simultaneously with any concept.  Social relations and concepts of them and not 
social interaction or relations of power are the conditions of learning.  This 
interpretation agrees with Damasio’s insistence on the independence from language 
of the nonverbal narrative and consciousness of it and begins to suggest where 
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Vygotsky’s linguistic theory of concept development and his plan for a theory of 
emotion intersects with Damasio’s theory of emotion.   
 
Result 
In this chapter I have argued that Damasio’s biological explanation of language 
shows agreement with what Spinoza says explicitly about language and that 
Damasio’s account of nonverbal narrative, and hence passive emotion, is equivalent 
to the results of the interiorisation of speech, or ‘inner speech’ as explained by 
Vygotsky.  This means this chapter has prepared the way for arguing that the 
transformation or conversion of passive emotion into active emotion or motivation is 
obtained during the process of the interiorisation of speech for the explanatory or 
‘scientific’ concept as this is explained by Vygotsky in his linguistic theory of concept 
development.   
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CHAPTER 9:  VYGOTSKIAN THEORY OF MOTIVATION 
 
 
Introductory survey 
An attempt has been made to demonstrate that the relation of Vygotsky’s 
psycholinguistic theory to Damasio’s neuroscience is mutually inclusive.  That is to 
say, I have attempted to demonstrate that while Vygotsky’s psycholinguistic theory of 
concept development is able to complement the neuroscience theory of emotion of 
Damasio, Damasio’s theory simultaneously explains the biological origins of emotion 
in an account sufficient to meet most of the objections Vygotsky raised against the 
Jamesian theory.  However, I have shown that in arguing that his biological theory of 
emotion is Spinozist, Damasio omits the distinction Spinoza draws between 
adequate and inadequate ideas and hence offers a theory of emotion equivalent to 
Spinoza’s theory of passive emotion only.  Vygotsky’s psycholinguistic theory, on the 
other hand, is able to explain the same relation to those passive emotions while 
advancing Damasio’s notion of concept.  It is now possible to explain how the 
transformative relation of Vygotsky’s scientific concepts to the biological origin of 
emotion, explored by Vygotsky in his unfinished theory and now fully explained by 
Damasio, would have followed Spinoza’s argument for the transformation of passive 
emotion into active emotion or motivation through the agency of adequate ideas.  But 
to further that argument I shall also explain the relation of Vygotsky’s unit of analysis 
which I explained in Chapter 4 (4.3-4.4) especially as it developed into the function of 
‘emotional experience’, to Damasio’s theory of emotion.   
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9.1 Phases of unit of analysis 
Vygotsky’s unit of analysis would capture or represent “those properties that belong 
to thinking as a whole” (Vygotsky, 1986, p 211) and “would equally well represent 
personality, motivation, volitional and emotional processes in their interrelation with 
the intellectual sphere” (Zavershneva, 2014, p 78) and hence demonstrate how 
“consciousness emerges as some form of interrelations of all psychological 
processes” (Zavershneva, 2014, p 77).  Vygotsky’s research and exploration of this 
unit in his various writings in the last two years of his life pass through stages of 
development and he retraces his thought in his last works so that what appears to be 
the full development of his unit of analysis in Thought and Language (1934) contains 
ideas which had already led him to earlier conceptions of the unit of analysis.  
Yaroshevsky has argued that Vygotsky’s psychological theory was intended to 
advance from biodeterminism to sociodeterminism and to offer a solution to the gulf 
between natural history and human history, and hence as Vygotsky was 
“contemplating the path he would have to take in his study of motivational 
(emotional-volitional) determinants of man behaviour” (Yaroshevsky, 1989, p 313), 
his conceptualisation of the unit of analysis underwent its own development.   
 
It might appear that Vygotsky’s developed thought concerning the unit of analysis is 
represented in Thought and Language (1934) by ‘meaning’ but his remarks 
concerning the ‘affective-volitional’ at the very end of that work are most fruitfully 
understood in the context of the earlier Problem of the Environment (1934) and 
Theory of Emotion (1933).  If one includes Emotions and their Development in 
Childhood (1932) where Vygotsky explores the difference between the function of 
emotion in young children and in apes, Vygotsky’s interests in emotion conform to 
the wider perspective argued for Vygotsky by Yaroshevsky.  Although I will treat 
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each of Vygotsky’s units as if they were separate conceptions yet these background 
considerations will help demonstrate the stage-growth development of the unit of 
analysis and how, taken together, the different conceptions of the unit show its 
explanatory power.   
 
It is usual to suppose that “Vygotsky postulated the meaning of the word as the 
primary unit of consciousness” (Yaroshevsky, 1989, p 297) and since “the unit of our 
analysis will thus contain in the most fundamental and elementary form the 
properties that belong to thinking as a whole” (Vygotsky, 1986, p 211), as I have 
explained above in Chapter 4 (4.3-4.5), “word meaning is an elementary ‘cell’ that 
cannot be further analysed and that represents the most elementary form of the unity 
between thought and word” (Vygotsky, 1986, p 212).  I shall explain how word 
meaning can be understood with other of Vygotsky’s conceptions of the unit of 
analysis below but Zavershneva has shown how Vygotsky appeared to move away 
from word meaning as his unit because he “failed to reveal all aspects of 
consciousness in word meaning” (Zavershneva, 2014, p 78) and after being 
“accused of intellectualism” (p 78), “Vygotsky spent the last two years of his life 
trying to overcome the intellectualistic bias of his theory…”(Zavershneva, 2014, p 
86).  Yaroshevsky himself relates “When he was completing his analysis of 
meanings (in Thought and Language, written in the same years when he worked on 
the treatise on emotions), he was already beginning to distinguish between the 
meaning and sense of the word” (Yaroshevsky, 1989, p 313).  This of course is the 
discussion in the last chapter of Thought and Language but Yaroshevsky has 
suggested that in trying to understand and explain the “motivational (emotional-
volitional) determinants of man’s behaviour, Vygotsky focussed more and more on 
the concept of sense” (p 313).  That is, the concept of sense represents a further, 
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transitional, unit of analysis, a unit in transition towards ‘emotional experience’.  If 
one thinks of the unit of analysis as evidence of Vygotsky’s methodology as itself 
undergoing a process of development we do not have to match the stages in the 
development of the unit of analysis with the order in which he appears to explore 
them in his writing.  From this perspective, Theory of Emotion was awaiting the 
results of Problem of the Environment.  It was in this work that Vygotsky considers 
emotional experience as a unit of analysis, but not as a new unit separate from 
meaning and sense, hence “The notion of perezhivanie encompasses all aspects 
reflected in the notion of sense” says Zavershneva (2014, p 91).  However, after 
having explained why drawing distinctions between ‘meaning’, ‘sense’ and 
‘emotional experience’ does not match the historical order of Vygotsky’s treatment of 
these units I would prefer to argue that the relations between these concepts of the 
unit of analysis are interdependent and possibly even inclusive and cumulative.   
 
9.2 Unit of analysis as meaning 
It is broadly accepted that by teasing apart the relation of thought to speech 
Vygotsky succeeded in demonstrating that there is an ape-like stage in the 
development of human consciousness which is prelinguistic.  By analysing the 
development of the relation of thought to speech Vygotsky was able to explain 
consciousness in terms of concepts or meaning, the alignment of thought with word 
sounds as tools to enable action.  One can observe his painstaking analysis of this 
as he traces the development of this alignment through the development of the 
complex to the pseudo concept and the concept.  When he arrives at the concept or 
word-meaning he has arrived at the product of analysis, the unit “capable of retaining 
and expressing the essence of that whole being analysed” (Vygotsky, 1986, p 211).  
The whole is human consciousness and in its part and whole it is understood in 
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terms of meaning.  Later Wittgenstein advanced the cause of ‘meaning’ as the 
principal preoccupation of philosophical analysis but Vygotsky sought to demonstrate 
‘meaning’ as integral to the nature of human consciousness itself.  In developing his 
theory of word-meaning and of the concept as the alignment of thought and speech 
in word-meaning, Vygotsky needed to trace the use of words in their generalising of 
experience, one of the principal consequences of word use.  In Chapter 6 of Thought 
and Language Vygotsky notices how concepts which generalise experience can 
themselves be generalised by a higher order concept.  Although he does not say so, 
this relation of lower order generalisations to a higher level general concept, not 
strictly as empirical generalisation, is the relation between inadequate ideas to 
adequate ideas exactly as explained by Spinoza.  Adequate ideas are the means of 
organising inadequate and of course, other adequate, ideas into a system of ideas of 
nature or science.  These higher order concepts are scientific concepts and “Thus 
the very notion of scientific concept implies a certain position in relation to other 
concepts, i.e. a place within a system of concepts” (Vygotsky, 1986, p 172).  The 
lower order concepts which generalise experience and the meaning of class terms 
which achieves this, Vygotsky variously calls ‘spontaneous’ or ‘everyday’ concepts 
and they can be thought of as being related one to the other ‘horizontally’.  The 
systematic relation of such spontaneous concepts by scientific concepts, on the 
other hand can be conceived as ‘vertical’.  The idea of the relation of scientific 
concepts to spontaneous concepts as vertical helps one grasp the deductive 
relations the scientific concept lends to spontaneous concepts.  Spontaneous 
concepts, being ‘horizontal’ generalisations, are the products of induction, repetition 
and habit and its language cannot be used to ‘explain’.  The language of 
spontaneous concepts can ‘capture’ empirical or concrete experience and perhaps 
distinguish between the physical force of these experiences in its pre-scientific 
conceptual meaning but it cannot ‘explain’ the relations between these parts of 
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experience.  The language of the scientific concept achieves this explanation 
because it is a use of language shared with another, the ‘more expert’ other, peer, 
parent or teacher, who has already, historically, understood the use of language 
which leads to the development of the concept or word meaning.  If one likes to think 
of consciousness as constituted by concepts, then these are meanings.  Meaning is 
obtained or developed in word-use and language is used as a tool for its own 
development but principally as a means for understanding our experience from 
simple sensory experiences or ‘qualia’, to the multitude and complex forms of 
culture, its language, architecture, painting, music, and the other complex artefacts 
of science, technology, agriculture, that is, nothing less than the cultural environment 
in which human existence is sustained.  Most important our engagement with this 
universe of meanings is social.  The shared use of language is the necessary 
condition for the meaning and hence conscious awareness of the natural and built 
environments and simultaneously the social environment.  The scope of Vygotsky’s 
explanation, the role in his explanation of scientific and spontaneous concepts, of 
language, culture, the ‘more expert other’ is vast.  But as Vygotsky came to 
distinguish between meaning and sense in Thought and Language he edged 
towards an explanation which included “the last step in our analysis of inner planes 
of verbal thought”.  It is thought, as Yaroshevsky and Zavershneva have 
independently suggested, that Vygotsky ‘advanced’ from ‘meaning’ to ‘sense’ as a 
new unit of analysis.  I wish to argue that there is a single coherence to Vygotsky’s 
psychology.  Where Spinoza explains the organising relation of adequate ideas to 
inadequate ideas, the adequate ideas are shared with other individuals as ‘common 
notions’, as I have explained above, and these substitute for the role of language in 
Vygotsky’s theory.  Nothing relevant to Vygotsky’s unit of analysis as meaning, such 
as the difference between scientific and spontaneous concepts is irrelevant to 
‘sense’ as the suggested new unit, but the ‘last step’ has to include an explanation 
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equivalent to Spinoza’s theory of motivation, which explains how ‘common notions’, 
and hence, I argue, language, can mobilise the emotions and effect their 
transformation from passive to active during speech for the development of the 
scientific or explanatory concept.   
 
9.3 Unit of analysis as sense 
Where “Previously, Vygotsky believed meaning to be the principal unit of the 
psychical, now a new unit came to the fore, namely sense” (Yaroshevsky, 1989, p 
315) and this is already evident in Vygotsky’s discussion of the difference between 
meaning and sense.  If one thinks of the meaning of phrases such as ‘French 
Revolution’ or ‘Principia Mathematica’ these meanings serve as references to 
historical or scientific features of culture but can serve no more to someone who has 
not also read widely about the events of the French Revolution or who knows 
something about Isaac Newton or about physics and has formed a scientific or 
explanatory concept of the French Revolution or Principia with its ‘internal’ 
systematic components.  The records which are the Principia might also be called 
‘public meaning’, that is, the public knowledge in Popper’s World Three.  They exist 
as parts of culture and civilisation whether or not anyone reads them or understands 
what is read.  It is like history, dead and lifeless.  It is not brought to life by copying or 
by rote learning or by memorising and repeating it.  There can be no mental 
development in learning to copy and repeat the dead and lifeless.  But as the 
language of spontaneous concepts of ‘stone’, ‘fall’, ‘heavy’, are used in the 
explanation of ‘gravity’, so the scientific concept, the concept used to explain these 
terms, is gradually developed in word use.  As the scientific concept of gravity is 
developed in speech, simultaneously the spontaneous concept of ‘stone’ for 
example, undergoes further elaboration until it too is understood as part of another 
 154 
explanatory science of geology.  Word use for the development of the concept of 
‘gravity’, like the meaning of spontaneous concepts, has itself to depend on the 
context and experience of the speakers using the relevant scientific language.  To 
take Spinoza’s example again the meaning of the word ‘horse’ has one sense for a 
farmer, who uses a horse to plough his fields and another sense for the soldier who 
rides his horse into battle (Eth. II. 18. Sch.).  Neither the farmer nor the soldier share 
the biologists scientific concept and ‘public meaning’ of the word ‘horse’.  Even the 
sense of the word ‘stone’ can be thought to change with the context and experience 
of different users of the word, but the word itself can be thought to have the meaning 
of a scientific concept or public meaning, so that “meaning remains stable throughout 
the changes of sense” (Vygotsky, 1986, p 245).  Sense is the interiorisation through 
inner speech of the public discourse of the scientific concept or its public meaning.  
During its interiorisation the explanatory power of the concept is found in its 
rearrangement of concepts deductively connected to it.  This rearrangement 
represents a modification, adjustment or reconfiguration of one’s conceptual scheme 
or frame of reference or world view with consequences for the whole ‘inner life’, 
mental life and nonverbal narrative.  But this also represents the ‘understanding’ of 
the public meaning.  Its assimilation has passed through ‘sense’ to ‘personal 
meaning’ and this personal or private meaning represents the development of the 
public meaning of the scientific concept for this or that individual.  It represents the 
individuation and personalisation of learning.  At this stage the concept of ‘gravity’ for 
example, has become a means of the perception of the physical world.  The concept 
or theory has ‘ascended to the concrete’.  It is not a theory detached from the data 
while explaining the data.  It is the development of a true concept, the understanding 
and explanation of which amount to the same thing, but while, as Yaroshevsky 
remarks, “sense denoted the individual’s emotional experience of the tense 
motivational attitude to the world” (Yaroshevsky, 1986, p 315), this is still only a 
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stage in the development of psychological explanation in the unit of analysis.  
Yaroshevsky is correct in making the connection from ‘sense’ to ‘emotional 
experience’ but to understand the difference between these stages or versions of the 
unit of analysis it is necessary to understand the function of emotional experience 
and hence to return to the Spinoza of Vygotsky’s Theory of Emotion.   
 
9.4 Unit of analysis:  emotional experience 
In suggesting “sense denoted the individual’s emotional experience” (Yaroshevsky, 
1986, p 315) Yaroshevsky perhaps did not want to distinguish sharply between 
‘sense’ and ‘emotional experience’ as separate units of analysis.  Although 
Zavershneva thinks of ‘emotional experience’ as a ‘new unit of investigation of 
consciousness’, this also marks for Vygotsky a “transition from sense to a special 
unit of analysis that he refers to as perezhivanie” (Zavershneva, 2014, p 90) rather 
than a boundary or demarcation between the product of the previous and the current 
unit of analysis.  Vygotsky explored ‘emotional experience’ in Problem of the 
Environment prior to completing Thought and Language so the emphasis he gives to 
word-meaning as his unit is qualified when he adds, “Thought is not begotten by 
thought:  it is engendered by motivation, i.e. by our desires and needs, our interests 
and emotions” (Vygotsky, 1986, p 252).  That is, “Vygotsky saw the word behind 
thought, and he saw the emotional and volitional tendencies behind verbal thinking 
as a whole” (Zinchenko, 2007, p 214).  Nonetheless “Vygotsky claimed that human 
emotions develop, but he did not explicitly state how this happens” (Magiolino, 2013, 
p 96).  The Neo-Jamesian and Spinozist part of a suggested statement of at least 
the development of human passive to active emotion has been attempted above 
(Chapters 5 to 7) but it is necessary to return to Problem of the Environment to 
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understand the relation of Vygotsky’s concept of ‘emotional experience’  to 
Damasio’s Neo-Jamesian and Spinozist theory of emotion.   
 
In Problem of the Environment Vygotsky found it helpful to consider the way events 
in the environment are experienced by the individual as subjective emotional 
experiences.  His approach to this problem is not unlike that of Spinoza.  Both 
consider the human body in its interactions with its environment, broadly conceived.  
These interactions modify the internal environment of the body and these internal 
changes determine the nature of future interactions. These internal changes are 
understood as emotions and all future interactions are therefore “refracted through 
the prism of the child’s emotional experience” (Vygotsky, 1994, p 340).  No number 
of children experience the same environment in the same way.  Hence the 
“environment is the source of development and not its setting” (Vygotsky, 1994, p 
349).  Vygotsky explains this in respect of the social environment with an example of 
three children of ages roughly three, seven and thirteen, whose mother suffers 
various psychological disorders as a consequence of her excessive drinking.  
Vygotsky relates how each child regards the same environment differently 
depending on each child’s previous experience.  Hence the youngest, unable to 
understand the reasons for the chaos of his environment, responds by developing 
neurotic symptoms, and of the eldest, since he has become responsible for the 
welfare of the other two, Vygotsky adds, his “course of normal development was 
severely disrupted” (Vygotsky, 1994, p 341).  Nevertheless, if this development is 
traced it is found, at different stages, always to lead in the direction of a more 
complete form so that the “result of the developmental process is already available in 
the environment from the beginning” (Vygotsky, 1994, p 348) and it is in the direction 
of this “ideal or final form” (p 349) that development is adjusted from its ‘primary 
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form’ or the initial stage of this process of development.  Again, the final form is the 
meaning of the cultural form, the particular creation or artefact from the multitude of 
forms of the arts, the built environment, science and industry.  The development and 
interiorisation of the final form, that is, the prolepsis of the concept, is the end of an 
educational process when the public meaning of an utterance, a written statement, a 
theory or explanation of a given artefact has passed through its accommodation to 
the background knowledge, presuppositions, or worldview and context of this or that 
individual, that is, its ‘sense’ and nonverbal narrative and finally ended with the 
personal and private meaning of the utterance, written work or theory of this or that 
object or artefact.  The educational process is the process of mental development 
and therefore nothing less than the process of socialisation and acculturation.  There 
is no mental development without this acculturation.  Acculturation is the absorption 
and inclusion of the individual ‘into’ the cultural forms of social life.  Some of these 
cultural forms and artefacts, such as toys, play and games for example are 
themselves, whether intended or not, historical cultural means for development, but 
their use can only be understood in this way from the standpoint of the parents or the 
teachers understanding of the complete form, the final form or public meaning of, in 
this case, play or games.  For the parent or teacher the significance of toys and 
games and of the use of computers and other gadgets is that their uses serve as 
markers, staging posts, ‘rites of passage’ and as preparation for more complex and 
demanding activities and encounters.  On the other hand for the very young child 
what is significant is the emotional experience of the toy, the play and the games, the 
increased voluntary activity, the endless talk with playmates, laughter and the final 
overall feeling of contentedness and happiness about the play or the game.  
Vygotsky has explained how emotional experience, at once the ‘prism’ through which 
the environment is understood, itself undergoes changes which begin in the 
environment.  These changes can be called ‘developmental’ if they mark stages 
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recognisably closer to the final forms as they are present in any culture.  The 
children of my illustration will become like the parent if the idea of mature parenthood 
is achieved through successive stages of enabling emotional experience.  Emotional 
experience must undergo change in the nature of development but it might also be 
suggested at this point that emotional experience be also ‘enabling’ and that it 
motivates development.  In Problem of the Environment Vygotsky explores the 
differences between the way children and adults use speech to generalise and how 
the inability of the child to understand generalisation in any but its most concrete 
form determines the long path of development, but he does not explain how the use 
of speech might be motivated through stages of emotional experience.   
 
In his earlier study of infancy Vygotsky remarks on the inability of the infant to 
distinguish between itself and its surroundings.  In describing this ‘infant 
consciousness’ as ‘passive’, Vygotsky continues, “If we understand that word in the 
meaning that Spinoza used in differentiating passive and active, passive or effective 
mental states, then we can with complete justification maintain that the initial 
consciousness of the infant still completely lacks active mental states, that is, mental 
states internally determined by the personality” (Vygotsky, 1998, p 233).  Vygotsky 
does not draw this distinction between passive and active states in Problem of the 
Environment and there he broadly considers emotional experience as if it were a 
passive state.  Nevertheless, if this earlier reference suggests how Vygotsky 
understands Spinoza it is reasonable to consider how maintaining the distinction 
between ‘active’ and ‘passive’ in ‘emotional experience’ as the unit of analysis might 
help elucidate the relation of speech to the nonverbal narrative as I have suggested 
in chapter 8.   
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9.5 ‘Perfection’ or ‘final form’ in Spinoza’s theory 
The concept of prolepsis I have addressed in Chapter 4 and above appears in the 
writing of Spinoza in connection with the activity of the human body and its mental 
activity.  In his simplest account Spinoza says “…we shall call it perfect as soon as 
we see the work has been brought to the end which the author had determined for 
it”.  Spinoza’s account is not unlike the notion of final form considered earlier and, 
when he refers to ‘transition’, it is not even lacking in a notion of development.  
Although Spinoza does not conceive of steps or stages in the development of a 
concept he thinks of mental activity in terms of greater or lesser ‘perfection’, so “The 
more perfection a thing possesses, the more it acts and the less it suffers; and 
conversely the more it acts, the more perfect it is” (Eth. V. 40).  Since, “By reality and 
perfection I understand the same thing” (Eth. II. Def 6) every mode or part of nature 
is as perfect as its activity, considered in itself and in its relation to the rest of nature.  
As far as concerns the mental activity of this or that person “…the mind can undergo 
considerable changes, and can pass now to a state of greater perfection, now to one 
of less perfection, and it is these passive transitions that explicate for us the 
emotions of pleasure and pain” (Eth. III. 11. Sch.).  These are the primary passive 
states Vygotsky ascribes to the infant referred to earlier.  There it was found, in the 
context of the distinction drawn by Spinoza between active and passive states, that 
“the initial consciousness of the infant still completely lacks active mental states” so 
that, “In this sense, we might say that the child passes in this period an animal-like 
stage of development that is marked by absence of consciousness of his own 
activity, his own personality” (Vygotsky, 1998, p 233).  My point here is that in 
addressing the question how the infant will traverse the cultural gulf between its 
initial passive consciousness and forming its own ‘personal’ consciousness and self-
consciousness, Vygotsky has turned to the part the environment, as the origin of the 
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final or complete form of the concept, plays when it is understood as capable of 
distinguishing between active and passive emotions as Spinoza conceives them.   
 
Most of Parts III and IV of the Ethics is devoted to a painstaking analysis of the 
layers of human life determined by social norms of simple interaction, like praise and 
blame, which are nothing more than derivations of reward and punishment, which 
are themselves analysable into forms of pleasure and pain.  Individuals thus 
rewarded and punished, praised and blamed “…are assailed by emotions that are 
passive and to that extent one and the same individual, too, is variable and 
inconstant” (Eth. IV. 33) and moreover “Insofar as individuals are assailed by 
emotions that are passive, they can be contrary to one another” (Eth. IV. 34).  Now 
“active states of the mind arise only from adequate ideas; its passive states depend 
solely on inadequate ideas” (Eth. III. 3).  If the argument of Spinoza is followed from 
Propositions that distinguish between adequate and inadequate ideas, omitted by 
Damasio, it will become clearer now the theory of active and passive emotion can be 
accommodated to the distinction drawn by Vygotsky between scientific and 
spontaneous concepts.  If an effort is made to understand the emotions by the same 
causal explanation nature as a whole is understood it is found that “the idea of any 
affection of the human body does not involve adequate knowledge of the human 
body” (Eth. II. 27), its parts (Eth. II. 24), any objects external to the body (Eth. II. 25) 
or the mind (Eth. II. 29).  When we move our body and engage in some activity, if 
that activity causes pleasure, “the mind, as far as it can, endeavours to think of those 
things that increase or assist the body’s power of activity” (Eth. III. 12) because 
“When the mind regards its own self and its power of activity, it feels pleasure, and 
the more so the more distinctly it imagines itself and its power of activity” (Eth. III. 
53).  As we have noticed above, from Eth. III. 3, “the essence of the mind is 
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constituted by adequate and inadequate ideas” (Eth. III. 9. Proof) of the activity of the 
body experienced as emotions, so taken together, the activity and the idea of it is 
appetite,  and feeling, or to use Spinoza’s word for feeling, ‘desire’, is therefore 
“appetite accompanied by the consciousness thereof” (Eth. III. 9. Sch.).  Because the 
mind feels pleasure, or ‘cheerfulness’ (Eth. III. 11. Sch.) when it regards its own 
activity, it will begin to notice that “Besides the pleasure and desire that are passive 
emotions, there are other emotions of pleasure and desire that are related to us 
insofar as we are active” (Eth. III. 58) and these are always emotions of pleasure or 
cheerfulness “So no emotions of pain can be related to the mind insofar as it is 
active” (Eth. III. 59. Proof).  This proposition marks a dividing line between Spinoza’s 
account of an utilitarian ethics which is fostered by rewards and punishments and 
disengages the mental life of the individual who is rewarded or punished and an 
account of ethical relations between mentally active individuals.  Once one is able to 
make the distinction between active and passive emotions it becomes evident that 
mental activity and active emotion, or to use the psychologically equivalent term 
motivation, are indissoluble aspects of the same psychological phenomenon or 
Vygotskian unit of psychological phenomena.   
 
Since “active states of the mind arise only from adequate ideas…” (Eth. III. 3) and 
the mind “endeavours to think of those things that increase or assist the body’s 
power of activity” (Eth. III. 12), then, granted Propositions 58 and 59 of Ethics III, 
quoted above, it follows that “A passive emotion ceases to be a passive emotion as 
soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it” (Eth. V. 3), that is form an adequate 
idea of it.  There are many kinds of adequate idea but it will be helpful to distinguish 
again between what Spinoza calls ‘universal notions’ on the one hand, and ‘common 
notions’ on the other.  Universal notions are inductive generalisations from empirical, 
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contingent, sensory experience and can be connoted by class terms.  These 
adequate ideas may be thought to include general theories but Spinoza, in the Ethics 
and in his correspondence, argued the insufficiency of induction as a source of any 
but the lowest, but not the only, ‘knowledge of the second kind’.  Empirical ideas are 
themselves in need of deductive organisation or a system of ideas of a logically 
higher order, and since “Whatever ideas follow in the mind from ideas that are 
adequate in it are also adequate” (Eth. II. 40) this deductive organisation is obtained 
though those adequate ideas Spinoza calls ‘common notions’.  Because, as I have 
shown above, Spinoza explains mental phenomena without appealing to the notion 
of ‘mental faculties’, common notions are, under the attribute of thought, ‘our 
reasoning processes’, and ‘motion-and-rest’ under the attribute of extension.  
Common notions, being our ‘reasoning processes’, are common to all individuals 
who are not divided by differences of passive emotion but “Insofar as individuals live 
under the guidance of reason, to that extent only do they always necessarily agree in 
nature” (Eth. IV. 35) and since “Insofar as a thing is in agreement with our nature, to 
that extent it is necessarily good” (Eth. IV. 31), it follows that “The highest good of 
those who pursue virtue is common to all, and all can equally enjoy it” (Eth. IV. 36).  
Hence it is in communication or sharing through the ‘common notions’ that active 
emotions ‘arise’ from adequate ideas as per Eth. III. 3 and Eth. V. 40:  “In proportion 
as each thing possesses more of perfection, so it is more active, and less 
passive…”, but equally it is in the social environment of active emotion, the social 
relation of motivation achieved through common notions, which enables adequate 
ideas.  Hence:  “…and vice versa, in proportion as it is more active, so far is it more 
perfect” (Eth. V. 40).  Earlier, in Chapter 8 (8.2) I argued for an interpretation of 
Spinoza’s ‘common notions’ as a particular use of language implicit in Spinoza’s 
theory.  If one understands ‘common notions’ in this sense, that is, as a language, 
then the role of language for Vygotsky, in the explanation of the relation of scientific 
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to spontaneous concepts, is not unlike the role of common notions in the explanation 
and understanding of the relation of adequate to inadequate ideas.  If this isomorphy 
is permitted, the purpose the difference between adequate and inadequate ideas has 
in making the distinction between active and passive emotions, and hence the 
function of active emotions in the ‘transitions’ to the ‘perfection’ of adequate ideas, 
suggests the role the distinction drawn by Vygotsky in his writing about infancy, and 
referring to Spinoza, between active and passive emotions, may have in 
understanding ‘emotional experience’ as his unit of analysis.  I suggest the 
distinction Vygotsky makes between scientific and spontaneous concepts can be 
understood in relation to emotional experience in the same way the distinction 
Spinoza makes between adequate and inadequate ideas is understood in relation to 
active and passive emotion.  
 
9.6 The relation of Spinoza’s theory to the problem 
In Problem of the Environment Vygotsky explains the relation of the process of 
prolepsis to development or changes in emotional experience and he summarises 
his argument that the social “environment’s role is the development of higher, 
specifically human characteristics and forms of activity is as a source of 
development” (Vygotsky, 1994, p 351).  But Vygotsky does not harness Spinoza’s 
distinction between active and passive emotional experience to speech.  Following 
the direction of Vygotsky’s thought it might be possible to argue that the distinction 
between active and passive emotion can be incorporated into emotional experience 
as the unit of analysis or perhaps as a final phase in the development of this 
concept.  I have argued in Chapter 8 (8.3) that the interiorisation of speech through 
‘inner speech’ can be traced in Damasio’s concept of nonverbal narrative and thus 
argued the relevance of Damasio’s Neo-Jamesian and neuroscience theory of 
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emotion to Vygotsky’s psycholinguistic theory of concept development.  However an 
account of the act of speech is not sufficient to explain the process of interiorisation 
of speech or the role of the nonverbal narrative in that process.  The explanation has 
to include the function of emotion in that process hence I argued in Chapter 7 (7.3) 
that the omissions by Damasio of parts of Spinoza’s argument could be resolved by 
introducing the significance to Spinoza’s argument of the difference between active 
and passive emotions.  In those arguments I attempted to demonstrate the 
coherence of Vygotsky’s Spinozist theory of emotion with Damasio’s Spinozism by 
arguing from Damasio’s Neo-Jamesian neuroscience solutions to Vygotsky’s 
objections to the Jamesian theory of emotion to a theory of emotion consistent with 
Vygotsky’s psycholinguistic theory of concept development.  I suggested that 
Spinoza’s completed theory of ideas, notably the difference between adequate and 
inadequate ideas, could be re-introduced as the preliminary to explaining the 
relevance of Vygotsky’s distinction between scientific and spontaneous concepts.  I 
argued that further to demonstrating Damasio’s own biological notion of concept as 
equivalent to Vygotsky’s notion of spontaneous concept, it would be possible to 
demonstrate Damasio’s theory of mind as more completely Spinozist if the distinction 
between adequate and inadequate ideas was introduced in the Vygotskian form as 
the distinction between scientific and spontaneous concepts.  Conversely, had 
Damasio included Spinoza’s distinction between adequate and inadequate ideas in a 
complete account of Spinoza’s theory of mind, he would have had to make way for 
the Spinozist distinction between active and passive emotions.  This he could not do 
if he conceives emotions biologically, and as the result of passive interactions.  From 
Spinoza’s perspective, Damasio in treating emotions as passive response to stimuli, 
correctly explains those social interactions created in a culture of praise and blame, 
with their origins in rewards and punishments, and hence as nothing more than 
complex forms of the pleasure and pain which mobilises the simplest organisms.  
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Human emotional life thus conceived and rewards and punishments and their 
administration, in schools, for example, depends on a behaviourist conception of 
emotional experience as that which constitutes the responses to rewards and 
punishments.  Had Damasio included those Propositions of Spinoza that he omitted 
he would have incorporated the philosophical and conceptual apparatus for 
explaining the difference between non-human animal behaviour and its ‘social’ 
interactions and human social relationships and why these are creative.  That is, 
Damasio would have established the difference between, on the one hand, animal 
behaviour and human ‘social’ interaction understood in terms of pleasure and pain, 
reward and punishment and praise and blame and hence an utilitarian ethic of 
behaviour and a conception of motivation he assimilated to animal ‘drives’, and on 
the other hand distinctly social relationships understood as mutually motivated by the 
transformative active emotional engagement with knowledge, culture and ‘life’.  
Further, it follows from this, had Damasio included Spinoza’s theory of emotion 
complete, he would not have made claims for biology that are possible only when 
understood from the philosophical perspective, first, of Spinoza, but finally, from the 
scientific perspective of Vygotsky.  In this section I have attempted to demonstrate 
how Spinoza’s distinction between active and passive emotion represents a solution 
to the problem of understanding ‘emotional experience’ as a unit of analysis.  I have 
suggested that Vygotsky was aware of this possible solution and that his objection to 
the Jamesian theory that it rendered emotions passive (Chapter 2 (2.3.1.6)) and 
which problem reappears as only one component of Damasio’s Neo-Jamesian and 
neuroscience advance from the Jamesian theory, is resolved, first, by including 
Spinoza’s distinction between adequate and inadequate ideas and therefore the 
relevance to that distinction of the difference between active and passive emotions, 
and second, by indicating the consequences for educational psychology of 
understanding Damasio’s biological and neuroscience theory extended from the 
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perspective of Vygotsky’s psycholinguistic theory of concept development.  It is 
possible to return to Vygotsky’s theory and demonstrate its relation to emotional 
experience.   
 
9.7 Passively motivated speech 
If an explanation is offered of concept development without regard to the function of 
emotion in the process of the development of a concept the explanation must at least 
account for dialogue.  That is to say an explanation cannot be given if one were to 
argue that concept development can proceed in the mental life of this or that 
individual alone and taken in isolation.  An explanation of speech in concept 
development can be made which follows word use for some object or event from its 
meaning, its interiorisation through inner speech and egocentric speech, to its sense 
for the speaker and its appropriation.  The speaker’s use of language would be taken 
as evidence that the concept has reached its final or complete form.  But this 
explanation does not demonstrate how any mental activity occurs or is sustained.  
The explanation might include an idea of motivation which lies externally to the 
speaker, so-called ‘extrinsic motivation’.  In this case concept development might be 
explained as following the rewards given the speaker for his use of language and the 
punishment given for its ‘incorrect’ use.  The student would be understood as 
‘negotiating’ the ‘correct’ use of language by tacking from side to side in his speech.  
Although the student has developed what Vygotsky calls a pseudoconcept for the 
teacher uninterested in such explanation the student has responded to the 
motivation from the teacher and can use language ‘correctly’.  However, because the 
use of rewards and punishments cannot be based on an understanding of the 
relation of emotion to the use of speech for the development of the concept, the 
teacher who rewards may also punish not understanding how pain hinders mental 
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activity.  In addition, the application of rewards and punishments to obtain the 
‘correct’ speech behaviour is premised upon the assumption that emotions are 
simply those processes for which the response to the application of rewards and 
punishments is evidence.  In other words the evidence the teacher has for what he 
understands as mental development or the development of the concept is 
constituted by the emotional responses to rewards and punishments for the ‘correct’ 
or ‘incorrect’ use of speech.  Students can ‘rote’ learn in this way and learn to say the 
‘right’ thing to win the approval of the teacher, but extrinsic motivation does not begin 
to help explain what word use might mean to the student.  Moreover the spoken 
transaction between the student and teacher cannot be called explanatory nor a 
dialogue.  A further explanation might be offered which incorporates the 
development of the concept through its meaning and sense as suggested earlier, 
enlisting the teacher who formerly understood the mental development of the student 
solely in terms of the administration of rewards and punishments.  In this case an 
explanation of concept development can advance from the meaning to the sense of 
particular word use where ‘sense’ is understood as the process of the interiorisation 
or internalisation of word use through egocentric and inner speech and even as its 
incorporation into the nonverbal narrative, as explained by Damasio.  If the ‘meaning’ 
of an utterance or statement is the public or formal use of language to connote or 
denote, ‘sense’ is the meaning of the utterance or statement for the individual and 
with regard to his particular circumstances or context as well as background 
knowledge and assumptions and his own emotional life.  The notion of ‘sense’ has 
wide explanatory power.  It can be used to explain inner speech as a stage in 
concept development and the evidence for this in the incomplete use of language or 
the use of speech to indicate the partial development of ‘meaning’ and hence the 
pseudoconcept.  Conversation is made from ‘sense’ even as a truncated form of 
‘meaning’ and having a ‘sense’ of some event or fact may be regarded as sufficient 
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for normal day to day purposes.  In all cases this explanation has incorporated 
Vygotsky’s concern with ‘sense’ as fulfilling the role or function he also sought in 
‘emotional experience’ as the unit of analysis.  I indicated that this was also the view 
of Yaroshevsky.  But although this account of concept development includes the 
explanatory role of ‘sense’ conceived as equivalent to ‘emotional experience’ it is still 
only an incomplete account because it understands emotions as passive in their 
relation to the use of speech in concept development.  
 
9.8 Emotion function in concept development 
The development of the scientific concept requires explanation.  Monologic 
statements and reading can augment the development of the concept during or after 
the beginning of a dialogue but as Vygotsky’s evidence for the zone of proximal 
development conclusively indicates, the scientific concept cannot develop 
independently of dialogue.  But even if the role of dialogue is included with what has 
been introduced as the ‘meaning’ and ‘sense’ of word use and ‘sense’ as understood 
as undertaking the role of ‘emotional experience’, the explanation of concept and 
mental development is still incomplete.  If one understands ‘sense’ and ‘emotional 
experience’ as passive emotion then the explanation of concept development is 
incomplete.  Passive emotion effectively means that a dialogue has been understood 
in terms of interaction and ‘turn taking’ where the speech of one or other speaker 
extrinsically motivates speech.  I have argued that this cannot begin to help explain 
concept development.  Moreover explanation in terms of passive emotion conceives 
of social transactions as interactions and not as ‘social’ in the human and cultural 
sense of the word.  When the relationship between two individuals is social and not 
merely an interaction, speech shared in a dialogue obtains the development of the 
scientific concept by a causal transition or transformation of passive to active 
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emotion or motivation.  The dialogue obtains this transformation because it enlists 
active emotion in a social relation.  This relation is social because biologically 
passive emotion has been transformed into active emotion or the motive to speak 
through dialogue.  Active emotion or motivation is therefore a phenomenon of 
dialogue only when dialogue is the means of concept development, or more 
particularly, the development of scientific or explanatory concepts.  So far I have 
argued that word use, considered alone, does not account for concept development, 
that ‘sense’, even if understood as ‘emotional experience’ and as the unit of analysis 
Vygotsky researched in his last writings, does not account for concept development 
if it is conceived as passive emotion and that dialogue does not complete the 
explanation if it is conceived as turn taking or as extrinsically motivated.  I have 
attempted to explain how dialogue for the development of the scientific concept is 
shared and is social only when the speakers are motivated to speak during the 
explanation of the concept and again only when, in the course of the development of 
the scientific concept, passive emotion is transformed into active emotion or 
motivation or more correctly, the motive to speak.  This motive to speak may be 
called speech motivation.  There is no speech motivation outside a dialogue, hence 
no properly called ‘interactions’ of the classroom can be the means of mental 
development.  Mental development or the development of the scientific or 
explanatory concept follows the use of speech in a dialogue and this dialogue is 
social only because it represents the external factor which caused the transformation 
of passive to active emotion.  This process might be understood as the socialisation 
of emotion.  A closer look at the process of the transition of passive to active emotion 
may make the explanation conclusive.  Vygotsky has explained the relation between 
scientific concepts and spontaneous concepts as complimentary, as reciprocal in 
their development, mutual and as inclusive.  The scientific or explanatory concept 
cannot develop without the enlistment of spontaneous concepts.  Spontaneous 
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concepts, exactly like inadequate ideas as explained by Spinoza, are obtained from 
the process of generalisation.  In generalisation different sensory experiences are 
brought together or classified by some inexact or exact criterion.  Vygotsky 
demonstrated a similar process in the development of the complex from ‘heaps’ to 
‘chains’.  When any number of different, particular sensory experiences, are 
classified by the use of a word, the word has augmented the development of the 
spontaneous concept.  For example, the word ‘red’ might be used on the occasion 
this or that colour is observed, or the word ‘cat’ might be used to refer to this or that 
animal.  These references may not always be successful and might include a small 
dog, but the ‘sense’ of the word ‘cat’ may be sufficient for most purposes though the 
development of a scientific or explanatory concept may encourage a return to the 
use of the word ‘cat’ in order to establish its use in the development of the scientific 
concept of ‘cat’.  The word ‘stone’ as referring to one of a multitude of stones is a 
generalisation and the process of generalisation is the spontaneous concept.  If by 
way of illustration we suppose the teacher is explaining the concept of gravity to a 
student for the first time, it can be assumed that the public meaning of the phrase 
‘theory of gravity’ has no personal meaning for the student but has only the meaning 
of a badge, a title, an indication of what it represents and betokens.  In beginning an 
explanation of the concept the teacher must enter into a dialogue with the student.  I 
have already established the significance of the social relationship of the dialogue, 
so though the fact of dialogue is an essential component of everything that follows, 
for the purposes relevant to explaining the development of the scientific concept, the 
central concern here is emotion function and its relation to the process of concept 
development.  The teacher may pick up and drop a stone and refer to the stone in 
beginning to give an explanation of the scientific concept of the theory of gravity.  
The student may do the same or they may discuss, even in a casual manner, 
dropping or throwing stones and what follows when stones are dropped or thrown.  
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The conversation may advance to a consideration of different types of stone and the 
sensory experience of handling, dropping and throwing stones.  As this conversation 
advances, the spontaneous concept, represented by the use of the word ‘stone’, can 
be enlisted in the explanation of the concept of gravity.  Hence the spontaneous 
concept or generalisation of experience represented by the use of the word ‘stone’ 
includes its sensory attachment to reality, those sensory perceptions which both fall 
below and occasionally rise above the level of consciousness.  But the spontaneous 
concept has innumerable associations for teacher and student, some, as suggested 
are immediate and sensory, others are related to the acts and occasions of throwing 
stones, pitching stones across a river, walking on a stony path or beach, or to names 
like Rolling Stones or Stone Roses and their music.  The public meaning or personal 
sense of the word ‘stone’ is not given in the word but in experience and this is the 
experience, including background mood or temperament of passive emotion.  This 
generalisation of experience represented by the use of the word ‘stone’ is 
incorporated through the dialogue shared by teacher and student explaining the 
trajectory of falling and thrown stones.  As the spontaneous concept is harnessed 
through the dialogue to the development of the scientific concept of gravity and the 
use of speech for an explanation of the scientific concept itself harnesses references 
to ‘stones’, the passive sensory and hence passive emotional significance of the 
spontaneous concept is mobilised in the development of the scientific concept.  The 
passive emotion of the spontaneous concept, its ‘sense’, its mobilisation in the 
nonverbal narrative, is transformed into active emotion during the course of the 
development of the scientific concept.    It is transformed into active emotion and 
becomes motivational because the dialogue, necessary for the explanation and 
hence development of the scientific concept, transfers the passive emotion of the 
spontaneous concept into the explanation of the scientific concept as the speech for 
the spontaneous concept becomes the speech for the scientific concept in the 
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dialogue.  Since this transition is not solely an increase in the activity of the passive 
emotion or an increase in excitement, but a transformation of the passive emotion 
and the transformation arises externally to the passive emotion of the spontaneous 
concept, the emotion becomes an active emotion just as it becomes a social emotion 
and the origin of a social relation.  Where dialogue is not used to explain and hence 
develop, there is only ‘social’ interaction.  There is no mental, emotional or social 
development in ‘social’ interaction.  Biological interactions between animals who 
have no speech for explanatory dialogue can not serve to explain human mental, 
emotional and social development.  Because the development of the scientific 
concept entails dialogue this process of the transformation of passive to active 
emotion, the process of the socialisation of emotion, is impossible without the 
dialogue for explanation.  Hence it is to the development, not of the spontaneous 
concept but of the scientific concept, that the cause of the transformation of passive 
emotion into active emotion and its social function is traced.  As the speech for the 
explanation of the scientific concept is interiorised through egocentric and inner 
speech and is melded into the nonverbal narrative, the transformation of passive 
emotion into active and social emotion is equivalent to developmental changes in 
‘emotional experience’ as understood and explored by Vygotsky in Problem of the 
Environment.  The explanation for the transformation of passive to active emotion 
suggested here represents an explanation of the internal dynamics of ‘emotional 
experience’.   
 
The function of speech is not solely in the development of the scientific concept and 
the function of emotion is not solely in the simultaneous motivation of that 
development.  The internalisation of speech for the development of the scientific 
concept into the nonverbal narrative represents its embodiment, but not only its 
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embodiment into the previous emotional and homeostatic state of the body, its 
viscera and nervous system, but also the internalisation and embodiment of the 
excitement of the dialogue itself and its degree of vitality and animation.  These too 
are internalised into ‘emotional experience’.   
 
Because the transformation of passive emotion to active emotion occurs across the 
physical space that separates individuals, that physical space is the non-social 
space for the interactions of biological organisms and not the cultural context of 
social relationships.  Only where speech is used in a dialogue for the explanation of 
a scientific concept, and where speech is thereby the cause of the transformation of 
passive to active emotion can learning, as Vygotsky insists, be the cause and not the 
consequence of development.  Moreover when learning is the cause of mental 
development it is simultaneously the cause of emotional development and the origin 
of social relations.  That is to say, the inverse, reciprocal relation of scientific to 
spontaneous concepts and their development through speech, is exactly 
simultaneous with the transformation of passive to active emotion and hence the 
creation of social emotions and the substitution of biological interactions by human 
social relations.  Although ‘mental’, ‘emotional’ and ‘social’ developments can be 
separated out under analysis and regarded as different ‘forms’ or ‘types’ of 
development the attempt to explain their developments separately would hinder 
understanding and impoverish explanation.  For example, notions of ‘extrinsic’ 
motivation and systems of rewards and punishments are psychologically inconsistent 
with the development of what Vygotsky named ‘higher mental functions’ and with 
their emotional and social occurrence.  Artificially creating excitement of passive 
emotion by physical activity such as handclapping, jumping, skipping and singing, as 
a preliminary to learning for the development of higher mental functions is entirely 
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unrelated to motivation and hence development.  Hence also the relation of teaching 
to learning conceived as instructional, didactic or expository and for the purposes of 
‘instilling’, ‘inculcating’, ‘disciplining’ and ‘training’ is not a relation between speakers 
in an educational dialogue.  Shored up by the prerequisite of silence and the 
authority to enforce silence, teaching as instruction is a form of monologue.  
Dialogue is engagement.  It fosters the expansion of spontaneous and scientific 
concepts and hence of explanation.  It has its own discipline intrinsic to the active 
emotions of enjoyment and happiness and to the love of learning.   
 
9.9 Social motivation 
I have attempted to explain not only why dialogue is necessary for the use of speech 
in the development of the scientific or explanatory concept but how dialogue, and not 
speech considered in isolation, is the means of the transformation of passive to 
active and hence motivation and social emotion.  I have demonstrated why active 
emotion is itself motivational and hence why motivation exists in social relations and 
not in interactions.  Interactions are nothing more than changes in behaviour caused 
by the passive emotional responses to rewards and punishments.  These changes 
cannot be ‘instilled’, ‘inculcated’ or ‘trained’ except through further rewards and 
punishments.  Since in the biological explanation there is no conception of an ‘inner’, 
mental life and of its emotion as anything but the observable evidence of training or 
responses to the stimulus of actual or potential rewards or punishment, motivation 
can be understood only as the response of passive emotion to some external 
stimulus.  This conception of motivation as extrinsic and as maintained by 
hierarchical layers or levels for the administration of rewards and punishments 
cannot explain the conditions for the autonomous motivation of this or that individual.  
These conditions are social and they are understood as the consequences for 
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mental, emotional and social development, of the continued development of scientific 
or ‘explanatory’ concepts and of the further and sustained engagement, through 
dialogue, discourse, conversation, and even monologue, with the public meaning of 
the varieties of every aspect of culture and civilisation.   
 
The dialogue is the origin of motivation for both speakers if the dialogue is the means 
of mental development.  That is to say the development of the scientific or 
explanatory concept, during the course of its development, causes the passive 
emotion of the spontaneous concept, to undergo the transformation to active 
emotion for both speakers.  This transformation includes the ‘transition’ or increase 
in psychophysical activity described by Spinoza (Eth. III. 11).  The development of 
the scientific concept takes a finite period of time.  The teacher and student are 
engaged in the dialogue until the student is able to use language relevant to the 
development of the concept and its explanatory power independently.  Because the 
development of the concept continues for as long as the transformation of passive to 
active emotion motivates the speech for its continued development, dialogue 
continues until the explanatory power of the scientific concept or theory is exhausted.  
A scientific concept or any explanatory theory must be able to explain the objects or 
events relevant to the concept or theory.  The objects or events explained by the 
theory are its data.  Conversely the data corroborates the theory or is evidence for 
the explanatory power of the theory.  The objects or events thus explained become 
part of theoretical perception of all objects or events of experience.  The explanatory 
power of the theory or concept and hence the speech for it, is exhausted when it can 
no longer explain the data or objects relevant to the theory or there is no data or 
evidence to corroborate the theory or concept.  Because the scientific concept or 
theory develops only inasmuch as the speech for its development in the dialogue is 
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motivated, the progress of the development of the concept and its explanatory 
power, that is, its power to transform public meaning through ‘sense’ into personal 
meaning, makes meaningful the objects of experience when these are 
simultaneously theoretically and emotionally saturated.  If the final form or prolepsis 
of the concept is understood as included within the emotion function, the theoretical 
saturation of perception is motivated by the emotional saturation of experience.  This 
relation of the scientific and spontaneous concepts of Vygotsky’s psycholinguistic 
theory of concept development with his plans for a theory of emotion exhibits the 
explanatory significance of Vygotsky’s theories for Damasio’s notion of ‘extended 
consciousness’ and possibly for neuroscience in general.  A complete account of 
consciousness is impossible without including an explanation of the theoretical and 
emotional saturation of perception.  That is why Vygotsky’s explanation completes 
Damasio’s account.  Moreover Damasio’s biological account of the emotions is 
brought to life only in the explanatory environment of Vygotsky’s psychology.  
Interactions between core consciousness “accounts of ongoing relationships 
between organism and objects” and “a consistent set of previously memorised 
objects pertaining to the organisms history” may explain the “capacity to be aware of 
a large compass of entities and events” in ‘extended consciousness’ but “that critical 
gift called language” (Damasio, 2000, pp 197-198) marks the difference between the 
biological ‘life’ of extended consciousness and the potential “to enjoy that life of the 
mind, which is defined by understanding” (Eth. IV. App. 5).  It is surely true that “a 
man is bound to be a part of Nature and to follow its universal order; but if he dwells 
among individuals who are in harmony with man’s nature by that very fact, his power 
of activity will be assisted and fostered” (Eth. IV. App. 7).   
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The relation of teacher to student in a dialogue is maintained while the speech for 
the development of the concept is motivated by the emotional transformations that 
make possible that very process of development.  Motivation is not explained by the 
process of development itself but by the transformation of emotional experience, and 
this process can continue for as long as the speech for the development of the 
concept is used for the prolepsis of the concept, its final form and the union of the 
public meaning with its personal meaning.  The student will therefore be motivated to 
speak only for as long as the development of the concept increases mental activity 
both for the development of the concept and its accommodation to the conceptual 
apparatus of the student’s own mental life, background knowledge, worldview, itself 
already emotionally saturated.  Hence prolepsis is a motivational phenomenon.  It is 
not intrinsically a private mental phenomenon but a phenomenon of motivation, 
active emotion and hence of social emotion and social relations.  The teacher 
maintains the speech motivation of the student through the continuous development 
of the concept and the mental life of the student.  At every stage in the dialogue 
where the student has been motivated to use speech to explain some part of 
experience the teacher has expanded the student’s speech for the development of 
the concept by demonstrating the range of explanation by the use of language for 
that concept or theory.  In explaining the concept the teacher’s own conceptual 
development, both of the concept, or theory and of the use of language in its 
explanation, may continue and expand, and this development of the concept may 
itself motivate further speech in a dialogue with the student.  But principally, authority 
consists in the teacher’s ability to mobilise the speech of the student.  It is the 
motivation of the student to speak which becomes the means of expanding powers 
of comprehension, of understanding, the interiorisation of speech for the concept, 
and the increased psychophysical activity and hence well-being and happiness of 
 178 
the student.  This increase in activity, of active emotion or motivation is social and 
the social emotions sustain this activity and its means.   
 
Theoretically, social emotions are concepts.  The patterns of social relations that 
determine these emotions are developmental and motivational and it is not possible 
for there to be social relations or concepts of them which are at variance with the 
mental and hence emotional development of an individual.  Mental and emotional 
development or education arises at the interface of emotion and speech, or more 
broadly, from the complex relation of biological to cultural phenomena.  The relation 
of biological to cultural phenomena is obtained in educational development, and the 
unity of mental and emotional development is the practical determinant of teaching 
standards.  Mental development is not explained in biological terms alone or as the 
result of interactions between individuals, nor in social or political terms alone or as 
the work of policy but solely in the explanatory language of educational processes.  
In offering an explanation of the means of concept development through speech 
motivation I have suggested that the emotions engaged must be regarded as 
evidence of human social relations.  Although biologists use the word ‘social’ to 
describe these ‘relations’ as ‘interactions’, the biological use of this word cannot be 
equivalent to the meaning the word has in ordinary language.  Social emotions are 
sustained for as long as is the dialogue for mental or concept development.  Social 
emotions are the form taken by active emotions or motivation when the dialogue for 
mental development motivates.  The social emotions or the concepts of them are 
simultaneous with the conditions for mental development.  Sharing speech in a 
dialogue and using classrooms as places where students meet to converse, discuss, 
debate, argue, lecture, question and listen and yet not sit in silence, just where 
explanation is essential for development, where learning is the cause of 
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development and not its result, will dictate and determine these social relations, 
emotions and concepts of them.    Social norms and concepts of them do not pre-
exist social relations and neither can ethics and social norms be conceived as forms 
of culture independently of the facts of nature.  Therefore there are no supernatural 
concepts.   
 
Result 
In this chapter I have explained how Vygotsky’s researches into the unit of analysis 
indicated how his last works converged on a theory of emotion and motivation.  In 
completing this I have introduced the material relevant to the first part of research 
Question 3.  I have demonstrated how the relation of Vygotsky’s psycholinguistic 
theory of concept development to Damasio’s Neo-Jamesian and neuroscientific 
theory explains speech motivation and in this introduced the material relevant to the 
answer to research Questions 3 (page 71) and 4 (page 68).  Finally I have explained 
how the emotion function motivates concept development and how in discovering the 
relation of explanatory or scientific theory to the objects of the environment this 
relation is at once a social phenomenon where concepts of it are entirely determined 
by the demands of education itself.  That is I have shown ‘extended consciousness’ 
arises only in the dialogue for scientific or explanatory concepts.  In this conclusion I 
have completed the answers to research Question 3 and resolved the principal 
problem posed in Question 4.   
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CHAPTER 10:  VALIDITY 
 
Introductory survey 
In this chapter I consider the validity of the argument for the thesis, review the overall 
structure of the argument, its coherence and credibility. 
 
10.1 Argument 
The thesis is that Vygotsky explored Spinoza’s Theory of Emotion to develop a 
theory of motivation relevant to his psycholinguistic theory of concept development.  
The argument for the thesis is made from the evidence of Vygotsky’s unfinished 
monograph on the Theory of the Emotions, his objections to the Jamesian theory of 
emotion and the solution to those objections suggested by the Neo-Jamesian 
neuroscience of Damasio.  The form of the argument may be regarded as the 
relation of terms in which Spinoza’s philosophy is the middle term and the 
psychology of Vygotsky and the neuroscience of Damasio are one or the other of the 
major and minor terms.  Vygotsky and Damasio each argue the relevance of 
Spinoza to their own field.  In the overall argument of this thesis I confirm the 
completeness and application of the arguments for Spinoza’s theory of emotion by 
Vygotsky and by Damasio.  The interpretation and application of Spinoza’s theory is 
confined to its relevance to psychology by Vygotsky and to neuroscience by 
Damasio and my argument respects these constraints.   
 
In Theory of Emotion Vygotsky explores the results and applications of contemporary 
neuropsychology relevant to the explanation of the relation of lower mental functions 
to higher mental functions and in particular the relation of primary emotions to 
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secondary or higher emotions but he is unable to find a theory able to explain both 
primary and secondary emotions in any coherent relation.  Vygotsky arrives at the 
conclusion that Spinoza’s philosophy, especially because of its monism, has the 
potential to solve the problem unsolved by contemporary science.  Vygotsky plans to 
test the explanatory potential of Spinoza’s theory by subjecting it to analysis from the 
perspective of contemporary science.  By this means Vygotsky expected to 
demonstrate how the empirical theory of William James would give a comprehensive 
account of the relation of higher to lower emotions, of secondary to primary 
emotions.  But it does not.  Had a Neo-Jamesian solution been available to Vygotsky 
he would have completed his argument, started in Theory of Emotion, for the relation 
of Spinoza’s theory of emotion to the concept of motivation of Problem of the 
Environment and Thought and Language and its relation to his psycholinguistic 
theory of concept development.  But there was no Neo-Jamesian theory advanced at 
that time.  Hence Vygotsky was unable to complete Theory of Emotion.  In short, if 
there had been a Neo-Jamesian theory, then Vygotsky would have completed 
Theory of Emotion.  There was no such theory, therefore he did not complete his 
theory.  I explored Theory of Emotion and listed Vygotsky’s objections to the 
Jamesian theory.   
 
Damasio has explained why his theory of neuroscience is not Cartesian and why his 
approach is Spinozist.  His argument is similar to Vygotsky’s.  I note various 
authorities regard Damasio’s neuroscience as the successor to Jamesianism and 
refer to it as Neo-Jamesian.  I accept these claims as true and consolidate my 
assumption with reference to neuroscience research and conclusions testing a 
relevant part of Spinoza’s theory of mind.  The research into ‘Spinoza’s Conjecture’ 
was conducted independently of the neuroscience of Damasio and can be regarded, 
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from the standpoint of the thesis, as corroborating Damasio’s position with respect to 
Spinoza.  It also offers an empirical and scientific corroboration of Spinoza’s 
epistemology relevant to the thesis. 
 
Therefore if a Neo-Jamesian theory is accessible, it can help to complete Vygotsky’s 
argument started in Theory of Emotion and this I attempt.  It would follow:  if 
Damasio’s Neo-Jamesian theory is adequate for the purposes of Vygotsky’s 
argument then Vygotsky’s project can be completed.  Following Vygotsky’s approach 
to the ‘test of Spinoza’s ideas’ I set out a similar ‘methodological test’ to test the 
claims of the Neo-Jamesian theory against Vygotsky’s objections to the original 
Jamesian theory.  In addition the Neo-Jamesian theory of Damasio is itself Spinozist 
and in this sense Damasio’s neuroscience offers Vygotsky more than he would have 
expected.  Despite this advantage the purpose of the methodological test is not to 
corroborate the empirical reliability of Damasio’s theory but its reliability as compared 
to Spinoza exactly as attempted in the case of the Jamesian theory in Vygotsky’s 
analysis of Theory of Emotion.  That is, the test concerned methodology only.  It is 
shown in the result that Damasio’s Neo-Jamesian theory resolves Vygotsky’s 
objections to the Jamesian theory except in one respect.  Damasio has omitted parts 
of Spinoza’s argument and this represents a residual objection.  I reintroduced the 
omitted parts of Spinoza’s argument and work towards a solution from the 
perspective of Damasio.  Meanwhile, approached from the perspective of Vygotsky 
the same residual objection can be resolved from the perspective of Vygotsky’s own 
psycholinguistic theory of concept development.  In consideration of this approach 
from the perspective of Vygotsky I have argued for the isomorphy of Spinoza’s 
concepts of ‘adequate’ and ‘inadequate ideas’ with Vygotsky’s ‘scientific’ and 
‘spontaneous concepts’.  Moreover I argued for the equivalence in function of 
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Spinoza’s concept of ‘common notions’ with the function of speech in Vygotsky.  I 
have also demonstrated the isomorphy of Spinoza’s concept of ‘perfection’ with 
Vygotsky’s concept of ‘final form’.  I have shown that these are functionally 
equivalent forms of concept prolepsis.  The resolution of the problem of omissions 
from Spinoza is precisely the point at which the psychology of Vygotsky and the 
neuroscience of Damasio are relevant to one another.  At this intersection of their 
theories and their shared interest in Spinoza is revealed what might be called the 
‘function of emotion’ of Vygotsky’s unit of analysis, complete with an explanation of 
the internal dynamics of ‘emotional experience’ and this conclusion would not be 
possible unless the interpretations of Spinoza by Vygotsky and Damasio were 
consistent with one another.  The result is consistent with the evidence for it.  I 
suggest that the argument for the thesis is valid.  The validity of the argument 
depends upon the accuracy of interpretation of Spinoza by Vygotsky and Damasio 
and that each interpretation is consistent with the other.  I suggest I have 
demonstrated that this is the case since if this were not the case the argument would 
not have obtained an adequate result in Chapter 9.  The argument for the thesis is 
explanatory and theoretical.   
 
It is conceivable that subjects prepared for fMRI scanning, divided into a dialogue 
pair and either a single subject speaking to himself or giving instruction, would show 
in the dialogue pair greater activity in those brain centres that relate cognitive activity 
with speech and pleasure than would the single individual or one individual giving 
instructions or reading to the other.   
 
 
 184 
10.2 Credibility 
Spinoza’s theory is not historically regarded as an empirical theory.  Vygotsky’s 
psychology and Damasio’ neuroscience are empirical theories.  Vygotsky’s argument 
for a ‘test’ of Spinoza’s theory against the science of the day was intended to test the 
‘empirical’ theory of emotion.  This is certainly possible if one discards the traditional 
idealist prejudice that Spinoza’s theory is a masterpiece of rationalist philosophy.  
Even if Spinoza’s philosophy is not empirical in the broadest sense or in the sense in 
which he explains the higher order ‘knowledge of the second kind’, nonetheless, 
those concepts of Spinoza which can be treated as functionally equivalent to certain 
concepts of Vygotsky’s own theory can be regarded as having empirical content.  My 
references to Spinoza were restricted to those parts of Spinoza’s philosophy which 
were relevant to Vygotsky’s interest in Spinoza.  On the other hand Damasio has 
restricted his own references to those parts of Spinoza’s philosophy where he shares 
an interest in an empirical account of the body.  Hence the discussions of both 
Vygotsky and Damasio concerned those parts of Spinoza’s theory which could be 
given an empirical treatment.  In addition both Vygotsky and Damasio agree that 
Spinoza is a materialist.  The credibility of the thesis concerns its discussion of 
methodology and not the truth or adequacy of Spinoza’s philosophy.   
 
10.3 Coherence 
The coherence of the argument depends very largely on the coherence of Spinoza’s 
theory and my following his own argument in making the case for this thesis.  The 
theories of Vygotsky and Damasio are very different and notwithstanding their 
empirical interests as I have shown, each makes assertions concerning the 
philosophy of Spinoza with their own concerns in mind.  Yet the result is coherent 
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across the argument for the thesis and the results, the function of emotion, speech 
motivation and the socialisation of emotion have credibility.  Because of the 
systematic organisation of the Ethics and its logical strength, it is difficult to misquote 
Spinoza or to reconcile interpretations which vary very widely.  References are made 
to Spinoza, principally to the Ethics, throughout the thesis and these references are 
followed out in that part of the thesis argument relevant to the problem addressed.  
The problems were raised after the review of the relevant literature and the research 
Questions raised by those problems are set out in work order to solve the problems 
of the argument in stages.  In addition to the references to Spinoza, I have 
demonstrated how references to the primary sources of Vygotsky and Damasio are 
themselves coherent and all of these are coherent with the philosophy of Spinoza.   
 
Result 
In this chapter I have reviewed the validity of the argument and obtained a synoptic 
view of its coherence.   
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 CHAPTER 11:  CONCLUSION 
 
Introductory survey 
In this concluding chapter I place the result in its context.  This is the psychological 
and historical context described by Yaroshevsky and includes Vygotsky’s 
understanding of the place of his psychology in a wider perspective.  I try to suggest 
that the result has some intuitive coherence with Vygotsky’s psychology.   
 
11.1 Considerations of Yaroshevsky 
A main conclusion is the agreement of the result with the estimation of Vygotsky’s 
plan for the Theory of Emotion by the Vygotsky scholar Mikhail Yaroshevsky.  In 
considering the direction Vygotsky planned in the Theory of Emotion, Yaroshevsky 
suggested that “Vygotsky saw, better than anyone else, that the alternative to 
mechanistic and biological determinism in the scientific cognition of man was 
neodeterminism rather than indeterminism” (Yaroshevsky, 1989, p 312) and that this 
meant, after “Affirming the principles of sociodeterminism, historicism and systemis 
character”, that “Vygotsky was the first to understand the dependence of the 
progress of ….psychology….on creating a general psychology as a methodology of 
the ‘middle level’, which would….become distinguishable as a special scientific 
subject” (Yaroshevsky, 1999, p 265).  The ‘middle level’ reconciles the biological, 
and hence biological determinism in psychological explanation, that is explanation 
‘from below’, with sociodeterminism, that is, explanation ‘from above’, and in this 
reconciliation obtains the causal relation of social with biological phenomena, 
expressed in a new causal determinism, Yaroshevsky calls ‘neodeterminism’.  
People, their emotional lives and social relations and the creations of culture are all 
part of nature but the relation between natural history and human history is not 
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simple and uniform or continuous.  Because verbal thought is “determined by a 
historical-cultural process” the use of sounds and gestures prior to verbal thought 
can be explained biologically.  This does not mean that the sounds and gestures 
made by apes have no meaning, only that ‘meaning’ must be understood 
biologically.  In the advance from the use of sounds, gestures or signals to verbal 
thought and word meaning “development itself changes from biological to 
sociohistorical” (Vygotsky, 1986, p 94) and it is this transformational change that has 
been the subject of this thesis.  In citing the independent researches of Köhler, 
Yerkes and Learned in the use of speech sounds by chimpanzees, Vygotsky seeks 
to explain why the speech sounds are “not connected with intellectual reactions” and 
moreover that the “affective states producing abundant vocal reactions in 
chimpanzees are unfavourable to the functioning of the intellect” (Vygotsky, 1986, p 
78).  That is, in the case of chimpanzees, but also of all other apes, there is no 
causal relation of language, or any part of culture, to their “affective states”.  To 
express this concept in the language used by Yaroshevsky, there is no causal 
relation shown between biodeterminism and sociodeterminism.  Efforts to argue that 
social phenomena can be explained in biological terms, as in say, social Darwinism, 
have no means of explaining mental phenomena, human relationships and creative 
culture except in terms of the pleasant or painful (rewards and punishments) 
interactions of organisms.  Once one understands how the development of thinking 
is changed when it is mediated by speech, “we must consider it subject to all the 
premises of historical materialism” (Vygotsky, 1986, p 95) which is to say that the 
social phenomenon of speech has causal efficacy in relation to the origins of 
thought.  But since thought “is engendered by motivation, i.e. by our desires and 
needs, our interests and emotions” (Vygotsky, 1986, p 252), I have attempted to 
explain the relation of motivation to speech.  I have attempted to show that speech 
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obtains a transformation of the biological origins of motivation and that this 
transformation is possible only in speech for explanatory or scientific concepts and 
moreover in speech shared in the social relation of a dialogue.  That is to say I have 
attempted a causal explanation for mental development by explaining the function of 
emotion in this process and I have tried to suggest that this conclusion is consistent 
with Yaroshevsky’s understanding of the direction Vygotsky was taking with Theory 
of Emotion as I explained in Chapter 2. 
 
11.2 The meaning of ‘social’ 
A further main conclusion concerns the meaning of the concept of social emotions.  
This concept can be understood vaguely and the terms for it used inexactly.  I have 
indicated that Damasio assimilates motivation to biological drives and regards, what 
he calls ‘social emotions’, as having a solely biological origin.  All animal life exhibits 
“social emotions” and “you will find examples of social emotions in chimpanzees” 
(Damasio, 2003, p 46).  Moreover, the reason “why some people become leaders 
and other followers…has little to do with knowledge” and everything to do with social 
emotions.  Unlike Yaroshevsky and Vygotsky, Damasio does not notice any 
discontinuity between natural history and human history, between biodeterminism 
and sociodeterminism.  The question is:  Where is this discontinuity to be found?  
Darwin expressed the view that “the difference in mind between man and the higher 
animals, great as it is, certainly is one of degree and not of kind” (Darwin, 1977, p 
494) but he expressed this view largely in the context of his discussion of ‘moral 
sense’ or ‘social instincts’.  In his study of ‘The Expression of the Emotions in Man 
and Animals’ Darwin advanced an argument “to account for most of the expressions 
and gestures involuntarily used by man and the lower animals, under the influence of 
various emotions or sensations” (Darwin, 2008, p 33) and Paul Ekman has argued 
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that “…most now accept the evidence for universality…” of emotions and their 
expression (Ekman, 2008, p xxiv) because these emotions are “the product of our 
evolution” (Ekman, 2008, p 366).  In agreement with Darwin and Damasio, Ekman 
says that “my work and that of others provide strong evidence for at least the facial 
expressions of anger, fear, disgust, sadness and enjoyment” (Ekman, 2008, p xiii).  
Ekman’s photographs for this illustrates the same emotions described by Robert 
Plutchik (Plutchik, 2001, p 349) as primary emotions.  Ekman “showed the pictures 
to people in Chile, Argentina, Brazil, the USA and Japan” and concludes “Contrary 
evidence, against Darwin’s claim of universality, would have been to find that the 
expressions…were judged as showing another emotion…This never happened” 
(Ekman, 2008, p 377).  Ekman, Plutchik and Damasio agree concerning the primary 
emotions and in this they agree that the primary emotions are the product of natural 
selection.  But Darwin also adds that “…social qualities…the paramount importance 
of which to the lower animals is disputed by no one, were no doubt acquired by the 
progenitors of man in a similar manner, namely through natural selection, aided by 
inherited habit” (Darwin, 1977, p 498) and in Expression supplies photographs to 
illustrate the expression of secondary emotions including contempt, jealousy, 
surprise, upset and terror.  This would appear to refute the Vygotskian thesis I have 
argued.  It would seem to follow that secondary, social, emotions are simply the 
product of natural selection.  However, Ekman’s detailed commentaries for the 
anniversary edition of Expressions, continue, in the same order as the list above, 
with his own or expert remarks as follows:  ‘Darwin is wrong’ (p 254), ‘I disagree with 
Darwin’ (p 256), ‘I agree with Darwin that there is no facial expression for jealousy’ (p 
260), ‘Darwin fails to differentiate’ (p 285), ‘The wrinkles were added’ (p 297), 
‘Darwin and Duchenne leave out the importance…’(p 301).  The photographs do not 
depict social emotions because Darwin, like Damasio following him, has no means of 
distinguishing between passive and active emotions.  Instead Darwin does suggest a 
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“much more powerful stimulus to the development of the social virtues, is afforded by 
the praise and blame of our fellowmen” (Darwin, 1977, p 499).  Moreover Darwin 
adds “civilisation thus checks in many ways the action of natural selection (p 503, 
501, 504) and finally Ekman concedes that where Darwin did give an explanation in 
terms of natural selection he also qualified this explanation, and hence weakens his 
argument, by appeals to the notion of the inheritance of acquired characteristics.  
Hence Darwin describes biological passive emotions and social interaction.  He does 
not describe active emotions or social relations, nor does he have the conceptual 
apparatus for the explanation of their occurrences.  The photographs can be 
regarded as evidence for the evolutionary universality of the passive or primary 
emotions listed by Ekman, Damasio, Panksepp and Plutchik but not as evidence for 
the higher, secondary and active emotions obtained only from an explanation of the 
causal interaction of social with biological phenomena.  This is why Spinoza says “I 
have neglected the outward modifications of the body observable in emotions, such 
for instance, as trembling, pallor, sobbing, laughter, etc., for these are attributable to 
the body only, without any reference to the mind” (Eth. III. 58. Sch.). Spinoza offers 
an explanation of the social emotions that arise in social relations mediated by 
‘common notions’.  These higher emotions are here shown to be fostered by social 
relations and in particular in the educative dialogue for the explanatory concept.  
Though largely determined by the facts of nature and the evolution of the central 
nervous system in apes it is because chimpanzees are too excitable to develop 
speech that these animals cannot develop concepts.  Aside from development as a 
result of the action of natural selection, they show no potential for mental, emotional 
or social development and are permanently confined to perception of the immediate 
physical environment and to involuntary ‘pleasure’ or ‘pain’ reactions and responses 
to its changes including the administration of ‘rewards’ and ‘punishments’ by human 
keepers.  An understanding of the differences between the natural development of 
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apes and the cultural development of humans explains why this is the case and 
explains also why the relation of culture to nature in the case of human mental, 
emotional and social development is mediated by the processes of education, and 
nothing else.   
 
11.3 Emotion function 
With these two sections I have attempted to place the result of the thesis in some 
context and to show that I have attempted to follow out the direction Vygotsky was 
taking in his researches according to Yaroshevsky.  In this section the diagrammatic 
illustration of the result may suggest that the result is itself immediately 
comprehended.  The arrows suggest the inverse relation of spontaneous to scientific 
concepts central to the understanding of Vygotsky’s psycholinguistic theory of 
concept development.  The ascending arrow for spontaneous concepts represents 
the generalising of sensory and perceptual experience of the environment through 
speech.  This sensory experience constitutes the successive layers of passive 
emotional experience of Damasio’s protoself, core self and autobiographical self.  
This experience has a ‘deep’ structure to it as it is mediated by successive 
evolutionary developments of the nervous system.  Part of this experience 
constitutes what Spinoza meant when he says “we know and feel we are eternal” 
(Eth. V. 23. Sch.) but other layers are constitutive of temperament and mood.  These 
emotions also constitute our ‘background knowledge’ or worldview.  Language for 
this knowledge melds with ‘inner speech’ in the nonverbal narrative.  As we share 
the dialogue in speech for the explanation of a scientific or academic or explanatory 
concept represented by the descending arrow, the expansion of our worldview by the 
dialogue, the questions it prompts us to put and our own momentary reflections 
transforms the passive emotion of pleasure into the motivation to speak and hence 
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develop the concept and its deductive interrelations with other ‘concepts’ of our 
mental life.  This process of speech enlisting emotion is represented by the circular 
motion of the arrows.   
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The circular motion suggests how the sense of speech for spontaneous concepts is 
transformed by the meaning of speech for the development of the scientific concept.  
As the spontaneous concept is developed in speech during its transformative 
incorporation into the development of the scientific concept, the circular motion 
expands.  At the point the scientific concept arrives at the origins of sensory 
experience, the scientific theory is instantiated, it explains the data.  But this 
explanation or instantiation is at once a mental and emotional transformation so that 
the theoretically informed perception of nature is simultaneously an emotionally 
motivated perception.  The illustration of the ascending and descending arrows can 
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be doubled to properly represent the dialogue.  To the right of the diagram social 
relations represents the simultaneous conditions of speech motivation. 
 
Result 
In this chapter I have explored the relevance of the result to Vygotsky’s wider 
perspective and its value as an explanation of speech motivation.   
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